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Abstract 
 
The capture of value from property development processes is a challenge for many 
planning systems.  In the UK there is a long history of using value capture 
mechanisms; most recently in the name of ‘supporting growth’ and to secure funding 
for infrastructure. This research examines the latest English policy on value capture, 
the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), a type of “impact fee”, to study policy-
making in this area. 
The planning system, and the CIL policy, are conceptualised here as a series of 
arenas where different knowledges engage with each other. Three main arenas are 
identified:   assessments of the value generated by the development process; the 
distribution of the value between the actors involved in the development process, 
including the capture of a share by the state to fund infrastructure provision; and, the 
decision on how funding is spent. 
Using an interpretive policy analysis approach influenced greatly by Hajer across two 
case studies, the research reveals that the underpinning economic viability 
assessment process is problematic, with specialist knowledge claims having a 
distinctive performative impact on the outcome of the policy making process.  The 
viability assessment then provides a frame within which other policy debates are 
enacted and this influences planning practice in new and particular ways. This 
analysis demonstrates the extent of the institutionalisation of an economic growth 
discourse within the English planning system. This finding contrasts with previous 
periods in which value capture had underpinning social rationales.  Finally, the 
implications of this Institutionalisation are that the transparency of the decision 
making process is obscured by the use of technical and specialist knowledge by key 
actors, especially in relation to the viability assessment.  This governance effect of 
the viability assessment frames the policy priorities and the tactical activities of local 
authorities in policy making in this area. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Population growth and economic growth require new development and infrastructure 
to support that new development.  Infrastructure provision is crucial to support future 
property development and economic growth, yet the availability of public funding to 
support this remains very limited.  The need to secure additional private sector (or 
national tax payer) funding, for strategic infrastructure, represents a shift from the 
traditional model of public sector funding and provision of infrastructure.  The capture 
of value within the planning system is a challenging objective, it is also one which has 
remained elusive since the introduction of the planning system in the UK in 1947. 
The Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) is the latest policy initiative to address the 
value capture challenge in England, it is an area based levy on new development 
payable on the commencement of development, reflecting concerns in three areas.  
Firstly, the dissatisfaction and criticisms of the existing value capture mechanism, the 
delays in negotiation, the uncertainty and unpredictable nature of the charge, the lack 
of transparency, and this all leads to extra risk and transaction costs for the private 
sector.  Secondly, the continued wider criticism of the planning system as stopping 
and slowing down development and increasing costs, similarly in the value capture 
area of planning policy.  Finally, the need to collect more funding and more efficiently, 
such as to collect more from small infill schemes where the current negotiation is 
inefficient and yet cumulatively small schemes generate demand for extra 
infrastructure. 
The issue of using value capture to fund the provision of infrastructure is also at the 
heart of the relationship between the state/planning system and the private 
sector/developers and about the role of planning.  It is reflective of not just the shift 
towards increased private sector funding, but also of the planning system in the UK 
increasingly being focused on supporting growth and delivery by the private sector.  
As a result there has been a shift from the capture of value explicitly to tax 
betterment, towards the capture of value for strategic infrastructure provision (CIL), 
additional to the capture of value to mitigate negative impacts and externalities 
(Planning Obligations). 
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The introduction of the CIL in 2010, presents an opportunity to study this area in a 
new way as this policy moves the debate from the development management area of 
planning into the policy making area, from a one to one site specific negotiation into a 
public consultation on an area wide economic viability assessment. 
The new policy also presents a new challenge in the governance of a new process, 
involving a range of actors and the need to engage with these actors in the viability 
assessment, the setting of the rate and the decision over what the funding will be 
spent on.  This requires planners to become involved in areas of knowledge and 
expertise which are new to them and challenging, in turn requiring new skills and 
relationships.  The process is no longer a direct negotiation as in Planning 
Obligations but a more complex process involving a range of actors, taking place in a 
series of arenas and within a wider policy discourse. 
1.2 Research aims, objectives, research questions 
The main aim of the research is to better understand the viability assessment 
process as involved in value capture policies and how they operate in practice.  The 
CIL being a relatively new policy offers an opportunity to study this process, as it 
places the viability assessment at the heart of the policy and explicitly requires an 
open collaboration between various parties involved in the development process, 
something new to value capture policies in England. 
In studying the viability assessment process within the CIL policy process the 
research identified the key features of value capture mechanisms and perhaps this 
could be used to inform a better designed policy in the future.  Furthermore, by 
considering the policy making process in a local context this allows national policy 
making assumptions about viability assessments as rational-technical activities to be 
studied as they play out on the ground and whether they are in fact more socially 
constructed in nature. 
The research uses the implementation of CIL policy to investigate how planners use 
knowledge sources in their decision making, and how they interact with other actors 
involved in the process.  The two research questions are therefore:- 
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1) How is knowledge generated and validated to support planning 
decisions in relation to the delivery of infrastructure as funded by value 
capture mechanisms? 
2) Can policy making be improved by planners having a greater knowledge 
of the decision making of developers and the operation of land and property 
markets? 
These two research questions require an analysis of how the policy is implemented 
in a specific local context, in order to understand the knowledge generation and 
validation processes, the key events and the key arenas in which this takes place, 
and how they have impacted on the policy process.  The use of a specific local 
context, allows the policy process to be considered within the local land and property 
market context.  To attempt to uncover some of the decision making of the various 
actors involved, in particular the local authority planners involved in the CIL policy 
and in turn the implications for skills and relationships with other actors. 
1.3 Research Context 
The choice of CIL as the policy to be studied is due to the importance placed on the 
economic viability assessment as part of its process and the collaboration of parties 
involved.  Alternative growth based polices such as New Homes Bonus could have 
been used but they don’t explicitly place viability assessment at the heart of their 
policy making processes.  There are other policies which employ viability 
assessments in their policy making processes such as Strategic Housing Market 
Assessments (SHMAs) and Strategic Land Availability Assessments (SHLAAs) as 
part of the Local Plan process, but these don’t specifically deal with the capture of 
value from the development process.  The CIL as a policy brings together value 
capture and viability assessment and unlike the one to one negotiation of s106 
agreements does this in a more open process of wider engagement and 
collaboration. 
The research has been undertaken using two case studies in the North East of 
England, whilst these are not typical cases of where the CIL policy has been 
introduced in the UK, they do however offer an opportunity to investigate its 
introduction in an area of the UK where the policy has not been particularly well 
embraced.  It must be acknowledged that the introduction of CIL is not mandatory, 
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with local authorities having the option not to introduce the levy.  Only two CIL have 
been progressed in the north east of England a much lower rate than anywhere else 
in the UK.  The low take up of the policy reflects the poor market and economic 
conditions in the region including in the local authority areas selected.  The 
challenging market conditions are likely to heighten the contested nature of the 
process, especially as these locations have a limited history of value capture under 
previous mechanisms such as Planning Obligations. 
The requirements from the CIL policy involve generation of knowledge, the testing of 
this knowledge and is more complex than a site specific negotiation of Planning 
Obligations.  The need to construct an area wide assessment of viability, to establish 
boundaries of value and the need to take into account land values across the area 
are examples of this.  In addition, as a wider range of actors is involved, there is also 
a more complex governance of the process required, the requirement to consult and 
engage with other actors is explicitly required hence relationships are vital. 
At a more general level the funding and provision of infrastructure in the north east 
has historically been very much dominated by public sector funding.  This reflects a 
series of Government policies, at national, regional and local level, over many years.  
From the Assisted area status in the 1960s, the various regional and local policies 
relating to economic development and regeneration of the areas of the north east 
have attempted to address the decline of traditional industries and to regenerate the 
economy of the area.  There has also been a significant involvement from a series of 
National and Regional Government Agencies which have invested in the north east 
working with local authorities and often investing in strategic infrastructure. 
The challenging property market in the north east is also reflected by, historically 
much development only being able to proceed with public sector assistance.  Only 
retail development, some commercial office development in central Newcastle and 
private housing development are commercially viable. 
Value capture in the north east is challenging against this background, the local 
authority culture is dependent upon public sector funding for strategic infrastructure 
and in addition the private sector also has a history of needing public sector subsidy 
in many areas and sectors of development in the north east.  The national policy shift 
to secure more funding from the private sector for strategic infrastructure reflecting 
5 
 
the neoliberal market policies, is more difficult in the north east than in some other 
parts of the country. 
Value capture is also at the heart of the role of planning and the relationship between 
state and private sector, the rise of market mechanisms supported by neoliberalism 
places viability at the centre of this relationship.  Viability starts to force policy choices 
and decisions over what to fund from the viability determined level of income.  Value 
capture whether presented as an explicit tax on betterment or as a mechanism to 
fund the mitigation of negative impacts of development or the funding of strategic 
infrastructure still implicitly taxes the development value.  The role of value capture in 
planning is different to value capture by other taxation mechanisms as it is explicitly 
related to planning policy and planning decisions.  In some ways this can be seen as 
at odds with the neoliberal rationale that the market mechanism should have as little 
state interference as possible and yet CIL has been introduced as a new additional 
source of funding from the private sector. 
Finally, the new policy mechanism has implications for the role and skills of planners, 
the need to understand viability as a process as well as an assessment, the 
contested nature of that process, the evidence involved and its interpretation, the use 
of consultants to support the process.  This requires planners to engage with new 
types of knowledge and to form and manage new relationships with a range of actors 
through the policy making process, in turn requiring planners to learn and develop 
new skills at a time of reduced institutional capacity and powers. 
1.4 Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 2, considers the history and policy context as background to the CIL as the 
latest policy mechanism for value capture in the UK.  The different types of value 
capture mechanism, the shift from explicit taxation of betterment, to value capture to 
mitigate the impact of development, to the latest policy mechanism to capture value 
to fund strategic infrastructure to support growth, are also considered.  The history of 
policy in this area in the UK is considered including the details of the latest 
mechanism the CIL, including a consideration of the policy guidance in particular 
around the viability assessment as a central part of the CIL policy. 
In chapter 3, the research and literature is reviewed in relation to value capture within 
the role of planning, as a subset of wider planning policy.  This chapter sets out the 
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alternative economic theories for determining the economic rent as part of the value 
capture process leading on to, the different approaches to the analysis of policy in 
this area as related to the actors in the development process.  This is followed by a 
consideration of the governance arrangements and the relationships between those 
actors in the process.  CIL as a value capture mechanism is then considered in how 
it impacts as a planning policy tool, the viability assessment process and the 
governance of that process.  Finally the types of knowledge used in decision-making 
by planners are considered. 
In chapter 4, the methodology used in the research is set out, an interpretivist 
approach has been selected, to uncover the meanings involved in CIL policy making, 
and to assist in the investigation of the governance of the process.  The ten step 
methodology of Argumentative Discourse Analysis (Hajer, 2006, p. 101) is set out as 
the framework for the data collection and data analysis.  The methods of the data 
collection and analysis as carried out are then discussed, with the discursive 
mechanisms involved in the discourse analysis also considered.  Finally, the ethics 
and reflexivity of the researcher are considered in how they could potentially impact 
on the research. 
Chapter 5, as a further development of the policy background to the case studies, an 
analysis of the national policy from the Barker Report in 2003 up until 2015 is set out 
to show how the CIL emerged as a policy and the major events that influenced that 
process.  The discursive struggle and how it influenced national policy making is set 
out, prior to considering the national policy impact on practices at a local level in the 
cases studies. 
Chapters 6 and 7 set out details of the two Case Studies Durham and 
Newcastle/Gateshead based on the empirical data collected from policy documents, 
minutes of meetings and semi-structured interviews with a range of actors involved in 
CIL policy making in the two case study areas.  The key events and sites of 
argumentation are identified for the case studies, then using the Hajer (2006) 
methodology, the discursive struggle is set out within the three main sites of 
argumentation with a consideration of their impact on policy practices in those local 
areas. 
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Chapter 8 discusses the findings from the two case studies, it seeks to compare and 
contrast the findings from the two case studies, and make a comparison with the 
national policy viewpoint, within the framework of the two research questions.  The 
main focus of the discussion is about the impact of the discursive struggle on policy 
practices and on the use of knowledge by planners in the decision making process. 
Finally chapter 9 considers the conclusions that can be taken from the research 
including key contributions, the effectiveness of CIL as a policy, reflections on the 
research process and finally areas of future research. 
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Chapter 2 History and Policy Context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The capture of value within the planning system in the UK has a problematic history, 
the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) is the latest policy to attempt to address the 
problem.  The concept of value capture in itself is problematic, with several 
alternative definitions of and viewpoints on “value”, but for the purposes of this 
research it is that based on value created by the property development process 
permitted and facilitated by the planning system.  In addition the method of 
assessment and capture of this value is also problematic, with several attempts 
having been tried in the UK since the planning system was introduced in 1947.  It is 
hoped that by reviewing the history of this policy in the UK, some lessons may be 
identified that could help inform future solutions and in turn lead to proposals for 
improved policy in this area. 
This chapter reviews what is meant by value capture leading into the important 
distinction between explicit and implicit taxation.  The history of value capture policy 
in the UK is then considered, reviewing national betterment taxes and the history of 
planning obligations.  These mechanisms are considered in how they have 
approached the calculation of the value, how this has been captured or shared 
between actors, how the policy mechanisms have dealt with the issue of spending, 
the perception of the mechanisms and their wider policy fit.  Alternative mechanisms 
are then briefly discussed including impact fees of which CIL is an example.  Finally, 
CIL policy guidance is then set out especially in relation to the viability assessment 
due to its importance to the process, before CIL as a policy is also considered 
against the earlier categories. 
2.2 Definitions and Types of Value Capture 
2.2.1 Definitions of Value Capture 
Value capture is used to describe the extraction of betterment and has been defined 
as  
“value capture refers to the process by which a portion of or all land value 
increments attributed to “community effort” are recouped by the public sector 
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either through their conversion into public revenues through taxes, fees, 
extractions and other fiscal means, or more directly in on-site improvements 
for the benefit of the community” (Smolka and Amborski, 2001, p. 1). 
This is a definition from American literature (Oxley, 2004b) and illustrates the 
importance of both land value increase and of public or community effort (or costs) to 
create that value, the costs on the community could be also in the form of negative 
impacts of the development on the land in realising its increased value. 
There is an important distinction to be made between capturing value being driven by 
the objective of taxing betterment with a view to redistribution of this value from 
landowners to the community and the capture of value to fund the provision of 
infrastructure or to mitigate the impact of the development.  In many respects these 
seek to capture the same value as generated by the development of land, but the 
justification, the process of calculation of the value and its distribution to the different 
parties involved will vary.  The value created is as a result of new development and 
this value can accrue to different parties involved in the process, the developer, the 
landowner, and the developed property owner as well as the state/community. 
The starting point for defining value capture is the notion of land being a factor of 
production, which under classical economics generates two rewards, transfer 
earnings and economic rent (Prest, 1981).  The “economic rent” is a payment above 
the “transfer earnings” that being the level which is the value to keep the land in 
productive use.  This is discussed more fully in the next chapter on economic theory, 
it is nevertheless a critical element to consider when considering taxing land values 
and capturing value from the development process.  The transfer earnings are 
current or existing use value and economic rent is an increase in land value above 
this. 
The view is that landowner’s benefit from increases in the value of their land, 
resulting from no effort by themselves, (termed economic rent) this is considered 
either unearned or even undeserved, depending on the circumstances.  This dates 
back to Henry George (George, 1879) in the nineteenth century and Ricardian 
Principles of economic rent (Evans, 2004b).  The assumption is that the supply of 
land is fixed, therefore if demand for land rises, the price rises, accordingly therefore 
the landowner has gained without doing anything to deserve this (Evans, 2004a).  
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This concept of landowners receiving unearned income, or even undeserved income 
for having done nothing to earn it, is at the heart of this debate on value capture.  
This value increase is termed “betterment” and is defined as “an increase in the value 
of land and property through the possibility of a more profitable use ….not through 
work by the landowner” (Allinson and Askew, 1996, p. 79). 
The betterment is generated as a consequence of actions by the state, via the 
planning system intervening in the land and property market, with intended and 
unintended outcomes.  This betterment can be triggered in three ways, a grant of 
planning permission, an expression of interest by a purchaser and by the 
construction of infrastructure or housing nearby (Allinson and Askew, 1996).  The 
provision of infrastructure and the granting of planning permission are state actions, 
the demand by a purchaser is likely to be a private sector action the generation of 
value therefore requires market demand. 
2.2.2 Types of Value Capture Policy 
The categorisation of value capture and betterment is also problematic; a detailed 
breakdown is set out by Alterman (2011) with three categories of value capture. 
Firstly macro value capture which results from land ownership policies which are not 
market regimes, therefore are not relevant to this research.  Secondly, direct value 
capture of an unearned increment, this land value increase can be from either 
general economic growth over time or from a public sector action, such as a grant of 
planning permission or public sector provision of infrastructure.  Finally, indirect value 
capture which is not driven by the notion of capturing unearned income, but rather to 
generate revenue for funding public services, but because it targets the same value 
stream can often be confused with the capture of betterment (Alterman, 2011).  The 
important point is the different conceptualisation of value, in the second category the 
capture of land value or betterment is driven by redistribution from land owners to the 
state or community, in the third category it is the capture of value is to cover costs, 
this is an important distinction. 
Bailey (2011) in his detailed categorisation, has also made the distinction between 
the capture of land value resulting from the grant of planning permission which he 
defines as a betterment tax and a charge recovered for the costs of infrastructure 
provided in connection with development which he terms as an infrastructure charge.  
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This again introduces the distinction of capture of value as against the recovery of 
costs, and relates back to how the funding is to be spent mentioned earlier. 
A further conceptualisation of value capture is also introduced, the capture of value to 
mitigate the negative impacts or externalities of the proposed new development.  
This is also captured from the same value stream and has similar objectives to the 
redistribution of land value from betterment taxes, whilst also has similarities in the 
funding of infrastructure from the value capture as a cost recovery exercise. 
These differing conceptualisations of value capture are important in the reactions of 
various actors involved in the development process, the justification for the value 
capture policy and how it is presented, it is critical to its acceptance and its influence 
on the behaviours of actors and in turn on the achievement of wider policy objectives. 
2.3 Implicit and Explicit Land Taxation 
Before considering the history of policy in the UK in this area, it is worthwhile 
developing the important distinction between the value or cost driven approaches, 
which can translate into value driven explicit taxation and cost driven implicit taxation, 
as in any event the value captured is generated by development.  Oxley (2004a, 
2008) has considered some of the main issues in relation to implicit and explicit 
taxation to fund affordable housing, but many of the points made equally relate to the 
capture of value generally. 
In evaluating the effectiveness of value capture mechanisms five sets of issues 
highlighted by Oxley (2004a) in relation to Planning Obligations can be considered 
more generally in relation to value capture mechanisms.  Firstly, the principle of 
hypothecation, this essentially relates to what the collected funding is to be spent on, 
within this are three further considerations.  Firstly, how well defined are the elements 
upon which the funding will be spent, secondly, how much certainty is there about the 
spend and its timing, these are sometimes termed as the “rational nexus” issue, 
(Purdue et al., 1992) finally there is the potential mismatch between where the 
money is collected and where the money is spent the hypothecation issue. 
Secondly, the redistributive process relates essentially to how the generated value 
from the development process is distributed between the parties, who benefits and 
who loses.  This can be a struggle between various actors, but varies with the type of 
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value capture mechanism involved, with some mechanisms having a significant 
element of negotiation and consultation and others less so.  There are also 
implications for actors not involved in the policy process. 
Thirdly, the ad hoc nature of the implicit taxation of Planning Obligations is due to the 
negotiation of the mechanism on a site by site basis, it is unavoidably inconsistent 
and unpredictable as each individual case is different and the negotiating process 
also different (Oxley 2004b).  The nature of the value capture mechanism, whether it 
is explicitly a tax or more implicit in nature, how it is perceived and accepted is 
important.  The issues of predictability, certainty, speed and timing of collection, 
transparency, simplicity, flexibility and efficiency are all important elements of the 
assessment of the nature of any value capture mechanism. 
Fourthly, the challenge of how to calculate the economic rent or value available to be 
captured, this is present in all types of value capture mechanisms, it is also key in 
terms of the impact on the behaviour of actors as the calculation of this value then 
leads into the struggle between the different actors highlighted above about how it is 
divided.  As Oxley (2004a) states the site by site basis of the Planning Obligations 
presents a much better chance of achieving an accurate level of economic rent 
assessment, compared to a national taxation of betterment.  But in evaluating value 
capture mechanisms more generally, a specific challenge is the calculation of the 
economic rent, as the less specific the information the less accurate will be the 
calculation. 
Finally, any value capture mechanism is likely to have wider policy objectives beyond 
merely attempting to capture value to fund something, its wider objectives or the 
relationship of the value capture mechanism with other policies is therefore a key part 
of the evaluation of the mechanism.  As part of this consideration, the anticipated 
behaviour of various actors to the policy, in particular landowners and developers, 
and whether those expectations are correct are also important to the evaluation. 
Having set out a broad framework within which to consider and evaluate value 
capture policy, it is now worthwhile considering the history of value capture in the UK 
context. 
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2.4 History of Value Capture in the UK 
There have been three broad types of value capture mechanism introduced in the UK 
since 1947, firstly, National Betterment Taxes from 1947 to 1985, secondly locally 
negotiated Planning Obligations from 1983 onwards and finally the Community 
Infrastructure Levy from 2010-onwards the first two of these are now considered. 
2.4.1 History of National Betterment Taxes in the UK 
Historically Britain has led the way in discussions about betterment and value 
capture, with even as far back as the Housing, Town planning, etc. Act 1909 the 
notion of a national betterment capture levy introduced (Healey et al., 1995).  
However the real start of the discussion of value capture within the Planning System 
was in the Uthwatt Committee Report 1942, which defined betterment as  
“any increase in the value of land (including buildings thereon) arising from 
central or local government action, whether positive e.g., by the execution of 
public works or improvement, or negative, e.g., by the imposition of restrictions 
on other land (Uthwatt Committee, 1942, para 260)” (Healey et al., 1995, p. 
23). 
The Uthwatt Committee was perhaps the most detailed discussion concerning 
betterment in the history of UK Planning and it introduced the two important concepts 
of “shifting value” and “floating value” (Alterman, 2011).  “Shifting value” assumes 
that demand for any given land use is finite within a geographical area.  Therefore 
land value will move up or down depending upon where restrictions or permissions 
are granted, and will be shifted or redistributed based on that allocation, this is 
termed the Shifting Value Theory (Healey et al., 1995).  In this way Planning by its 
very nature of allocating land uses is a factor in determining land values (Campbell et 
al., 2000), therefore the study of value capture is implicitly also a consideration of the 
wider role of planning. 
“Floating value” refers to the speculative nature of potential land values, where the 
allocations of permission to develop are distributed.  Value will float over allocated 
land, but only some of the total land allocated will actually benefit from this value 
(Alterman, 2011) by being actually developed.  This relates back to the earlier idea of 
realised and unrealised betterment and the fact that there needs to be market 
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demand to realise the value.  In addition, some land owners would lose their existing 
rights to develop through the new planning system, (termed worsement) and could 
claim compensation in this respect for loss of value, whilst those gaining rights and 
value should pay a betterment levy (Healey et al., 1995). 
The essential distinction between the two concepts, is that shifting value is influenced 
by the state allocation of land uses within the planning system, whereas the “floating 
value” concept concerns more the fluctuations in market demand for sites and which 
sites actually benefit from development and realise the value, this is influenced by the 
actions of private sector actors. 
There have been four occasions when a betterment tax has been introduced in the 
UK.  The first was as part of the planning system established by the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1947 when the “Development Charge” was introduced 
alongside the nationalisation of development rights that the Act also introduced, by 
the need to secure planning permission to develop land.  The charge was at a rate of 
100% on “the difference between the existing value of land and any increase in value 
created by the grant of planning permission” (Healey et al., 1995, p. 28). 
This reflected the view at the time that any increase in land value resulting from the 
grant of planning permission should accrue to the state, based on the 
recommendations of the Uthwatt Committee.  This scheme assumed that land sales 
would take place at existing use value, between private landowners and private 
developers, for two reasons, firstly the public sector played a major role in new 
housing development and could acquire the land compulsorily at existing use value 
anyway.  Secondly, the private sector developer would acquire at existing use value 
and then be able to pay the charge for the right to develop the land.  Liability to pay 
the charge was triggered by the application for planning application (Healey et al., 
1995). 
In fact many landowners held out for higher land values above existing use value or 
didn’t sell, the result was that much land was held back from development.  As there 
was no political consensus on this matter the prospect of a repeal of the charge was 
anticipated and it was repealed in 1951.  The 100% tax rate was also criticised by the 
Central Land Board as having been too high and that it lacked flexibility.  The 
objectives were clearly to capture the full economic rent, created by the granting of 
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the planning consent, it was not linked to any commitment as to where the income 
would be spent or on what.  The charge reflected the view at the time that the 
increase in land value should accrue to the state, it was also considered that the 
behaviour of developers and landowners would accept this proposition, although this 
was in fact not the case (Healey et al., 1995). 
The calculation of the charge was timed at the application for planning permission 
rather than the actual development of the site, it was envisaged that the landowner 
would reflect the charge in accepting the lower existing use value. The existing use 
value and development value were based on valuations of land and not actual 
transactions. 
The Land Commission Act 1967 was another attempt to introduce a Betterment Levy, 
initially at a rate of 40% to leave a reasonable incentive for the landowner and 
developer, but with the prospect of higher rates of 45% and 50% in later years, but in 
fact this never happened.  Like the Development Charge, it was directly related to 
extracting development value of land and with the objective of keeping down land 
prices, which had recently boomed in the mid-1960s.  The Land Commission was 
established to collect the levy in a similar way to the Central Land Board established 
in 1947 for the Development Charge (Cullingworth, 1976). 
There were however some differences to the earlier charge, as well as taking a lower 
tax rate, it was linked to a realisation of the land value either through a sale or 
granting of lease, although there was a provision to collect the levy if the owner 
developed the land himself with no monies involved (Cullingworth, 1976).  It was 
anticipated that the levy would be paid for by the seller of the land rather than the 
developer as purchaser of the land.  It was criticised as being too bureaucratic and 
was rather short lived and was abolished with a change of government after 1970 
(Bailey, 2011). 
In 1973 the Development Gains Tax was introduced at a rate of 30% in a period of 
rising property values by the then Conservative government but was replaced in 
1976 by the Development Land Tax Act (DLT) introduced by the then Labour 
government.  This was again a tax on land value increases, set initially at 80% it was 
intended to rise up to 100%, as part of the Community Land Scheme (Healey et al., 
1995).  It was part of a wider scheme to support large scale public sector led 
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schemes and to use public land ownership to support positive planning (Healey et al., 
1995).  There was concern at the time that in a period of rising land prices that land 
hoarding was taking place and landowners with planning consents could sit on the 
land without developing it as the value continued to rise (Healey et al., 1995). 
The calculation of the tax was based on the difference between market value which 
reflected the full potential of the land for development, less the current use value 
which produces the development value.  This is again reflective of the economic rent 
theory set out earlier and discussed more fully in the next chapter.  The DLT was 
payable on the Realised Disposal Value, which was calculated by deducting the 
current use value and any costs spent on improvements from the actual net proceed 
from the sale.  The tax became payable at the point of which the contract becomes 
legally binding and which could be conditional on the securing of planning 
permission.  If no land disposal took place, then a deemed disposal was deemed to 
have taken place at the start of a project of material development, with the market 
value of the land calculated as “the consideration at which the interest in the land 
might reasonably be expected to fetch on a sale in the open market” (Rees W H, 
1980, p. 149). 
This calculation of the tax was quite complex and involved and again needed the 
calculation of actual transactions and valuations of land.  The rate of the tax was 
initially set at 80% but again with a change of administration the rate was reduced to 
60% and then it was finally abolished in 1985 when it was collecting relatively small 
amounts of revenue compared to the costs involved in its administration (Healey et 
al., 1995).  It was also criticised for distorting the operation of the market and 
restricted the supply of development land coming on to the market (Crook, 2016a) 
In considering the National Betterment Taxes against the framework outlined above, 
it is clear that the policies were strongly driven by the notion that land value uplift or 
economic rent should be explicitly taxed, and that this should also have the 
advantage of keeping land prices low.  The conceptualisation was very much around 
capturing value as opposed to funding infrastructure, in fact the spending of the 
income was not really considered an issue at all.  The hypothecation issue however 
was a concern, that the money will not be spent in the local areas where it has been 
generated from, or even on infrastructure provision (Ratcliffe et al., 2009) the fact that 
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they were collected by large bureaucratic and centralised bodies only emphasised 
the concerns in this respect. 
These policies reflect the times in which they were introduced they were based on a 
clear objective of redistribution of value, from the landowner to the state.  The 
assumption was that landowners would accept current use value with little or no uplift 
and still sell land for development, when instead they just didn’t sell (Evans, 1996).  
Even by reducing the tax rate below 100% in later taxes the assumption was 
landowners would still sell land.  But landowners by not making land available, 
caused development to be slowed down or stopped, this issue was exasperated by 
the lack of political consensus, and meaning landowners in particular had an 
expectation that the tax would be repealed sometime in the near future (Crook, 
2016a). 
The nature of value capture mechanisms were such that they were relatively, certain 
and predictable, although valuations were sometimes an area of dispute.  The 
process was transparent, but not always clear or simple, in fact the complexity of 
some of the later taxes led to their demise.  They were not flexible and able to 
respond to different market conditions either spatially or temporally and with variable 
market impact.  They were also not very efficient as with DLT one of the main 
reasons it was withdrawn was the amount it was collecting compared to its cost of 
administration (Healey et al., 1995). 
The complexity of the calculation of the economic rent is also an issue, the principle 
is the collection of the difference in land value (the economic rent) as demonstrated 
by an actual transaction or a valuation, but sometimes not yet actually realised 
(Allinson and Askew 1996).  Which introduces the issue of the timing of the 
collection, if at the application for or the granting of planning permission, this is well in 
advance of any value being released from the development process. 
The use of actual transactions or valuations as the basis of assessment is also a 
factor to be considered, which can lead to extra costs in preparing valuations, may be 
delays in reaching an agreement with the collecting body and in the general 
uncertainties involved in the taxes (Ratcliffe et al., 2009).  The calculation of the 
economic rent is complex and the ability to separate out general economic effects 
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from those generated by the state by provision of infrastructure, or by the grant of 
planning consent, is difficult, relying on a range of assumptions on costs and values. 
Finally, the relationship between the betterment taxes and wider policy objectives, 
again reflects the still significant role of public sector direct development in housing 
and town centre development, the importance of public land ownership to support 
delivery that prevailed although declined over most of the period.  The capture of 
value to be redistributed was generally accepted but assumptions about landowner’s 
behaviour was generally incorrect, as landowners held back land from the market.  
The timing of the taxes also often reflected a booming property market, with concerns 
about the excess profits being made by developers and landowners, but by the time 
the legislation was introduced the boom was over and the taxes often contributed to 
the slowing down of the property development. 
In the 1980s this approach was abandoned, although the Planning Gain Supplement 
(PGS) proposals which emerged after the Barker Review in 2004 can be considered 
to be a failed fifth attempt at such a tax, as will be considered in Chapter 5. 
2.4.2 History of Planning Obligations in UK 
In the 1980s an alternative approach to securing value capture emerged with the 
1983 Circular 22/83 “Planning gain (DOE).  In fact the powers to enter into 
agreements with developers had been in place since as far back as 1909 and 1932, 
it is estimated that only approximately 500 agreements had been entered into over 
that period until 1967 (Ratcliffe et al., 2009). 
Under section 52 of the 1971 Town and Country Planning Act there was provision to 
capture planning gain, this was a very loose system and in 1983, circular 22/83 
“Planning Gain” issued by the Department of Environment introduced some tests to 
be applied to any planning agreements.  There were three tests which have 
remained substantially unchanged, these are that the obligations must be necessary 
to make the development acceptable in planning terms, be directly related to the 
development and fairly and reasonably related in scale and kind to the development 
(DOE, 2003 p47 Cullingworth et al., 2015, p. 162). 
The term planning gain was also considered a potentially misleading term and in 
1991 some amendments were made in circular 7/91 “Planning Obligations” which 
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changed the name of the agreements.  The Town and Country Planning Act 1990 
section 106 had also replaced the earlier statutory basis for the agreements and tied 
these agreements more specifically into the grant of planning permission 
(Cullingworth et al., 2015).  The Circular in 1991 also widened the remit of planning 
obligations to include the funding and provision of affordable housing.  The widening 
of the scope was also based on the findings of Tesco v Secretary of State (1995) 
which also stated that a local authority could demand obligations beyond those 
implied in the circular (Cullingworth et al., 2015). 
There was increasing disquiet about planning agreements and during the property 
boom in the early 1990s, concern that planning permissions were in effect being 
bought and sold as part of these agreements.  The Nolan Committee looked into this 
as part of its investigation into public life and whilst not finding evidence of buying 
and selling of planning consents did have its findings reflected in the next 
amendment of the guidance in this area in circular 1/97 “Planning Obligations”.  It 
recognised that local authorities were under financial pressure, and that this was a 
factor in this issue.  In the Green Paper 2001 “Planning: Delivering a fundamental 
change” the negotiation of planning agreements was acknowledged as a difficult and 
complex process, often leading to delays and uncertainty for developers, although 
evidence of this varied across the country (Cullingworth et al., 2015). 
The emerging issues of simplicity, clarity and speed were identified (Cullingworth et 
al., 2015) and have continued to be areas of discussion in this policy area and as will 
be discussed later a key driver of the emergence of CIL as a policy.  At this time 
considerations of alternatives to negotiated planning obligations were set out and 
consulted upon, in the 2001 Green Paper. A tariff proposal was proposed, but this 
was considered to be too “sketchy” and also raised issues of what the money 
collected would be spent on with no specific site issues identified.  There was 
concern over the potential complexity involved in the setting of the tariff and an 
element of inequity in the fact that high value areas would benefit more than low 
value areas (Cullingworth et al., 2015) all issues that similarly emerge in the 
implementation of CIL. 
Another consultation in 2003 “A new approach to Planning Obligations” (ODPM, 
2003) and then the Governments response to this consultation in January 2004 
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“Contributing to Sustainable Communities: A new approach to Planning Obligations” 
again considered some form of “standard planning charge” to move away from the 
negotiation of planning obligations still considered problematic alongside the granting 
of planning permission (Crook, 2016b).  In parallel the Barker review into housing 
supply was also reporting back, this proposed a new tax on betterment in the form of 
the Planning Gain Supplement, which as the name suggests was to be additional to 
a retained but scaled down Planning Obligations.  Whilst PGS can be considered to 
be a fifth attempt at introducing a national betterment tax, it is also important in that it 
proposes to separate the betterment tax from the mitigation of externalities, as will be 
considered later.  This separation of the two elements, of impact mitigation and 
betterment was proposed in Healey et al. (1995) to avoid confusion. 
In July 2005 Circular 5/05 (ODPM, 2005a) was issued and whilst retaining many of 
the original tests clearly reflected the reduced role of planning obligations responding 
to the recommendations of the Barker Review.  The issue of economic viability 
testing of planning obligations also begins to emerge, as set out in the “Planning 
Obligations: Practice Guide” issued by DCLG in July 2006,  
“Technical skills: for certain circumstances and areas of the planning 
obligations process there is a need for more technical and specialised skills.  
For example, when addressing developer viability issues in policy formulation 
and where relevant on applications there is a need for a thorough 
understanding of the role of viability in the economics of a development” 
(DCLG, 2006, p. 29) 
This guidance also raises the issue of skills of planners in relation to viability which 
again will be discussed later.  A related matter is whether if the Planning Obligations 
policy as set out in the Local Plan would then be a “material consideration” in 
deciding a planning application (Campbell et al., 2000).  This had been an issue in 
negotiating planning obligations since 1997, and was part of a gradual shift in the UK 
Planning system, towards a greater financialisation and marketisation of the process 
(Campbell et al., 2000). 
The Barker review proposed a new PGS but even with a scaled back role for 
planning obligations, they were also to be more market oriented, and to take account 
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of the costs of mitigating the impact of the proposed development in the decision 
making process (Campbell and Henneberry 2005). 
“In some instances … it may not be feasible for the proposed development to 
meet all the requirements set out in … planning policies and still be 
economically viable. … where the development is needed to meet the aims of 
the development plan, it is for the local authority and other public sector 
agencies to decide what is to be the balance of contributions made by 
developers and by the public sector infrastructure providers in its area 
supported, for example, by local or central taxation”.(ODPM, 2004, p25-6  
Cited in Campbell and Henneberry, 2005, p. 243). 
Accordingly, although there was the proposal to split the two types of value capture, 
with mitigation of externalities to planning obligations and the capture of betterment 
to the PGS, both value capture proposals were framed by a shift towards greater 
consideration of economic viability in the decision making and of market 
considerations. 
There have also been various reports into this area, in 1999, the Urban Taskforce 
identified Planning Obligations as a key mechanism for achieving an improvement in 
the quality and management of the urban environment (Campbell et al., 2000), yet 
also made criticisms as follows, Section 106 agreements took too long to agree, 
agreements were not produced in a standard form across the country and they 
revealed little commercial grasp by planners (DETR, 1999). 
The Planning Obligations system has been in place for some time as mentioned 
earlier, but has been the subject of significant criticism, leading to the recent policy 
changes.  Whilst initially linked to the costs of mitigation measures to deal with 
externalities of a development, it has frequently been widened into an informal tax or 
tariff (ODPM, 2005a).  They have however been successful in generating substantial 
funding for infrastructure especially in the boom years of the mid 2000s, (Crook et al., 
2008; Burgess et al., 2011).  But more recently since the decline in the property 
market since 2008, many agreements have been and are currently being, 
renegotiated and many developments have been stopped or delayed due to these 
requirements, (Monk and Burgess, 2012).  This has also been partly facilitated by the 
provisions of “Section 106 affordable housing requirements - Review and appeal” 
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(DCLG, 2013c) released in April 2013.  Sometimes worsened by the fact that some 
developers haven’t honoured agreements and some local authorities have not been 
good at monitoring compliance (Bailey, 2011; Burgess and Monk, 2016). 
In addition, Planning Obligations have not been uniformly implemented across the 
country producing unacceptably wide variations in agreed payments, which is difficult 
to justify (Bailey, 2011).  There has been an especially limited recovery of funding in 
areas of the country with poorer property markets (Crook et al., 2008).  They have 
mainly been applied to larger scale developments (Crook et al., 2008), with only 
6.9% of developers pay anything (Bailey, 2011).  The result is that many smaller 
schemes have not made any contribution to infrastructure, only 60% of residential 
schemes of more than 10 houses had such agreements in 2003/4 (Crook et al., 
2008). 
There has also been criticism for the negotiations causing delays to development 
coming forward, as they are negotiated on a site by site basis; they also cause 
uncertainty to developers as to the time and cost until finally agreed (Barker, 2004).  
They are also not transparent with little or no accountability and have often not been 
applied fairly either in a local context or across the country as a whole. 
There continue to be further amendments proposed to Planning Obligations but they 
are retained, including their role in providing funding for affordable housing provision, 
which remains controversial (Oxley, 2004b).  The interaction between what are now 
two value capture mechanisms is an important part of the area researched as whilst 
the two assessment processes of the two mechanisms impact on each other, even 
more critical is the impact of the two policies on the struggle over the distribution of 
the share of the value released from the development process. 
The assessment of the planning obligation level is primarily a cost based exercise of 
calculating what the money will be spent on, as mitigation for the impact of the 
proposed development or in the provision of affordable housing.  As mentioned 
earlier this has become more complex with the introduction of defined planning 
obligation requirements in Local Plans, meaning that as a “material consideration” 
these costs in financial terms need to be calculated in relation to their impact on the 
viability of development to pay these costs.  The assessment and negotiation of the 
planning obligations are therefore now framed within a site/project based assessment 
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of costs, values and potential to make a contribution to planning obligation (policy) 
requirements.  The assessment process and the distribution of the value are 
inextricably linked and this is part of the problem as the assessment of planning 
contributions is clearly related to the bargaining and negotiating strength of the 
parties involved (Crook, 2016b). 
There has been research into the micro politics of the negotiation of Planning 
Obligations, (Healey et al., 1995; Claydon and Smith, 1997; Campbell and 
Henneberry, 2005) the changing nature of planners role from a techno-rational role to 
one of negotiation is also clearly reflected in this change with the impacts that has for 
governance and planners, skills, knowledge and culture (Campbell and Henneberry, 
2005) and discussed more fully in chapter 3.  The dissemination and take up of best 
practice by local authorities has varied across the country especially in relation to 
development viability (Crosby et al., 2013; McAllister et al., 2013).  The effectiveness 
of local authorities in delivering Planning Obligations is also a reflection of the local 
institutional context (Dunning et al., 2016), something which is anticipated to be also 
relevant to the study of CIL. 
There has also been much research into planning obligations and the funding and 
delivery of affordable housing (Crook and Whitehead, 2002; Jones and Watkins, 
2009), this is something not considered in detail in relation to this research, as much 
of the research deals with the conflicts between value capture from housing 
development and its implications for house prices and the use of this value capture to 
fund affordable housing (Oxley, 2008).  It is acknowledged however that with two 
mechanisms (Planning Obligations and CIL) both seeking to capture value from one 
pot, there are issues, which has been researched in its early stages by (Monk and 
Burgess, 2012). 
As referred to earlier Oxley (2004b) has considered Planning Obligations as an 
implicit tax to fund affordable housing, against the five point framework set out 
earlier.  To briefly consider this within the wider history and policy context, the 
hypothecation issue is less of a problem on planning obligations as it is clear what 
the funding collected will be spent on and when the elements will be delivered, in 
addition as the items are directly related to the site and the impact of the 
development the issue of mismatch is also irrelevant. 
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The dividing up of the economic rent, is not explicitly referred to, the capture of value 
is implicit and related to specific costed items, the sharing of the economic rent is 
avoided, yet as discussed in (Healey et al., 1995; Campbell and Henneberry, 2005) 
the negotiation of Planning Obligations funded from the development value released 
by the development process on a specific site, is very dependent on the negotiation 
skills of the actors involved.  There is however little clarity about the amount of value 
created and how this is actually divided up and who loses and who benefits from the 
mechanism. 
The ad hoc nature of Planning Obligations as an implicit tax, is due to the negotiation 
of the mechanism on a site by site basis, it is unavoidably inconsistent and 
unpredictable as each individual case is different and the negotiating process also 
different.  A criticism of Planning Obligations is the unpredictability, the delays and 
costs involved and the lack of transparency.  However, the mechanism does have 
flexibility to reflect market and site conditions, as such it is considered by some as 
fair.  The timing of the value capture mechanism is also towards the end of the 
development process, this has advantages in terms of cash flow for developers and 
also for the certainty of site specific information and therefore the accuracy of the 
assumptions made for the calculation of the contributions. 
The calculation of the economic rent could be accurately assessed as part of this 
process, due to the accurate information available, but the negotiated nature of the 
mechanism may often distort or obscure the appraisal process rather than make it 
transparent.  The affordability of the contribution sought will be the basis for any 
discussion or negotiation, with the value generated from the development process for 
that specific site and its ability to fund the sought contribution the basis of the 
negotiation. 
Finally, the value capture mechanism within the wider policy context is that Planning 
Obligations have a dual function, of mitigating the impact of the new development as 
well fund the provision of affordable housing.  Within a constrained level of viability 
choices between the two objectives will need to be made as part of the negotiation 
process.  With the inclusion of an additional value capture mechanism such as CIL 
this has changed this negotiation dynamic, further as both mechanisms will have to 
be funded out of the same value generated from the development of the site. 
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The criticisms of Planning Obligations as a value capture mechanisms and the need 
to generate additional funding from the capture of value increasingly led to the 
Government considering new value capture mechanisms from the late 1990s.  These 
alternative mechanisms are now discussed. 
2.5 Alternative Mechanisms 
2.5.1 Tariffs and Optional Planning Charge 
As discussed earlier the concern about the negotiation of planning obligations was 
important after the Nolan Committee report in 1997 (Committee on Standards in 
Public Life (Chair Lord Nolan), 1997) the lack of transparency, the delays and costs 
involved in negotiating planning obligations and the lack of predictability and certainty 
to developers all became issues and which prompted consideration of alternative 
mechanisms.  Tariff based systems were initially considered, with the “roof tax” idea 
based on the Milton Keynes model, this was an average charge per dwelling to pay 
for infrastructure set up under the planning powers of the Milton Keynes partnership 
(Crook, 2016b). 
Proposals were published for s106 contributions alongside the Development Plan 
frameworks (DTLGR, 2001) which would set out what was expected, this would 
provide more predictability and certainty to developers and also save time and the 
cost on negotiation.  However, there was much criticism of the proposals, with four 
main point’s highlighted (Crook, 2016b), firstly, the affordability and averaging issue, 
a standard charge would impact differently on individual sites, secondly, the cost or 
value basis, it was felt that these proposals were seeking to introduce a betterment 
levy with a tariff linked to values rather than costs.  The lack of a hypothecation test 
as required in s106 agreements (the match of charge to costs from the actual 
proposals), meant that this dislocation of payment level from the costs imposed by 
the development, also felt more like a charge on development value.  Thirdly, the 
separation of the final payment from the direct impact and provision of the affordable 
housing element of the tariff again suggested that it was more a tax.  Finally there 
was even doubt about the legal enforceability of the contracts (Crook, 2016b).  
Essentially, it was felt that the benefits of a standard charge, such as predictability, 
certainty and transparency would not be realised, as in many cases negotiation 
would still be required and that the tariff system merely replaced one type of 
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complexity with another form.  The idea was abandoned following the House 
Commons committee in 2002 and it was proposed to streamline the existing Planning 
Obligations system. 
The issue of Planning Obligations and the need for more speed, certainty and 
transparency remained and was considered again in 2003, this time the Optional 
Planning Charge (OPC) was proposed (ODPM, 2003).  This was similar to the earlier 
tariff proposals, and was to be an alternative to the negotiation of Planning 
Obligations under the existing system.  The certainty of a standard charge provided 
an alternative to the negotiation of planning obligations to a developer, so offering a 
choice (Crook, 2016b).  However, again the proposals came in for much criticism, 
again the simplicity and flexibility issue emerged, the affordability/averaging issue, 
also the “rational nexus” issue about the collection of the charge and the guarantee 
of the use of this funding on the infrastructure identified (Crook, 2016b). 
In any event, the Barker Review recommendations overtook these proposals with its 
proposed PGS.  The overall issue as highlighted in the Barker report, was the 
separation of the mitigation of impact, the funding of affordable housing provision and 
the taxation of betterment.  Which mechanisms should deal with which of these three 
elements was an important point, in 2005 (ODPM, 2005a) the government supported 
the use of standard pooled charges for S106 agreements which would be published 
in the LPAs Supplementary planning guidance.  Whilst similar to the earlier OPC 
proposals they were expressly not to be used to as a “betterment levy” (para b7) and 
were envisaged to be a relatively temporary measure whilst more long term 
measures were introduced, at the time the PGS which had emerged from the Barker 
review and is now briefly considered. 
2.5.2 Planning Gain Supplement (PGS) 
The Planning Gain Supplement was a proposal for a betterment tax from the Barker 
review, it can be considered to be a fifth attempt at introducing a national betterment 
tax following the earlier attempts.  The PGS as a betterment tax to be levied in 
addition to a scaled back Planning Obligations system, was criticised on a similar 
basis to previous tax proposals, the detailed implementation proved a challenge, the 
assessment of the “economic rent” or the increase in land value, the complexity of 
administration the need for valuations.  Again the impact on the viability of 
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development in low value and poor market areas, even if the rate of the charge was 
low at 20 to 25% (although no level was explicitly set out), the lack of clarity about 
how much of the funding collected would be returned to the area where it was 
collected and the certainty it would be spent on infrastructure, were all familiar 
concerns.  The PGS after much discussion and consideration was abandoned in 
October 2007 and replaced by the CIL.  This is considered in more detail in Chapter 
5 as the policy in value capture evolved over a 10 year period from 2004 to 2014.  
The final type of alternative mechanism for capturing value are Impact Fees, which 
have been widely used in the USA but are a new mechanism to the UK, some 
research has been undertaken in both the USA and the UK into the mechanism and 
this is considered in the next section. 
2.5.3 Impact fees 
The impact of the Barker Review on the value capture policy mechanisms in the UK 
was significant, with the separation of the two types of value capture into two 
mechanisms.  The introduction of the PGS and its evolution into the CIL is 
considered in more depth in chapter 5, alongside the retention of Planning 
Obligations on a scaled back basis.  These changes were a reaction to the problems 
of the Planning Obligations mechanism, there was also a view that a new more 
efficient and effective mechanism in economic terms could be developed, something 
discussed in the context of economic theories in chapter 3.  Whereas the Barker 
Review proposed a fifth attempt at a national betterment tax via the PGS, when this 
was ultimately unsuccessful, from this did emerge the CIL as a form of “impact fee” 
as a new and better value capture mechanism. 
Impact fees are defined by Nelson as “charges known as “impact fees”, are one-time 
assessments by local governments on new development, or the owners of new 
development, to help pay for the existing, new, or expanded infrastructure needed to 
serve that development” (Nelson and Moody, 2003, p. 1).  This mechanism is 
therefore presented as about funding infrastructure not collecting value uplift, yet it is 
not saying it’s about mitigation of impact as such.  Nelson goes on to say, “in 
practice, impact fees bridge the gap between the cost of new municipal infrastructure 
and available funds” (Nelson and Moody, 2003, p. 1). 
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The different types of Impact Fee have been considered by Healey et al (1995), with 
two broad categories identified, a Flat-fee nationally applied, and whilst this is open, 
predictable and practical to implement, it is nevertheless not very flexible and 
perceived as unfair.  In contrast a local authority implemented charge negotiated on a 
case by case basis, could better reflect the diversity of conditions between local 
areas, would be seen as fairer and be more flexible to reflect real impacts of 
development at a local level (Healey et al., 1995).  The same issues of who 
calculates the charge and its flexibility are again key factors, Healey et al set out the 
challenge as balancing flexibility and predictability. 
Healey et al (1995) propose a new system which is similar to Planning Obligations, 
but with much greater clarity and accountability, with a systematic approach to 
negotiation, to improve the level of predictability compared to the current s106 
system and also to link the charge to local impacts.  It is considered that the issue of 
flexibility is vital as has been the case with Impact Fee systems in the USA and 
France (Healey et al., 1995). 
Reviewing some research by Nelson and Moody (2003) of impact fees in the USA, a 
key argument for impact fees as a mechanism is that they are economically efficient 
in the provision of infrastructure, but as Nelson points out they are often under-priced 
as they assess as an average price rather than at the marginal price (Nelson 2003).  
Impact fees increase the certainty and supply of development land by the provision of 
infrastructure (Nelson and Moody, 2003), but this must be partially offset by the fact 
that impact fee income will rarely cover the full infrastructure costs. 
The other key point to consider is who pays for the impact fees, and what impact do 
they have on land prices and on end use development prices or house prices.  This 
has been an area for considerable research in the USA (Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 
2003; Nelson and Moody, 2003; Evans-Cowley et al., 2005), and there was potential 
effects on lowering land values and on raising house prices and in some cases even 
both together (Nelson and Moody, 2003).  Much depended on the supply of 
alternative housing sites and the demand for housing and so local land and property 
markets were critical to the impact.  What is important to note is that the costs of the 
infrastructure provision tended to be passed back to the landowner in lower land 
values, whereas the higher prices of houses reflected the higher value of the 
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infrastructure provision (Nelson and Moody, 2003).  This also highlights the 
importance of the separation of the impacts of cost and value, this is something 
which is fundamental to value capture mechanisms and how they are implemented 
generally and will be considered further later. 
In more recent research this was refined somewhat with a view now taken that 
impact fees don’t just increase development costs and potentially stifle development, 
but do have benefits for communities in the provision of infrastructure and affordable 
housing (Burge et al., 2007).  Much of the earlier research often having used a 
partial-equilibrium approach in their analyses, had assumed that impact fees were 
added to the development process whilst everything else remained unchanged, 
whereas in practice this wasn’t the case (Burge et al., 2007).  It is important to 
consider what the other alternative methods available to fund infrastructure are and 
to consider alternatives more widely.  In this respect, growth impact fees can be 
beneficial as a “growth management tool that reduces risk and uncertainty in the 
development process” (Burge et al., 2007, p. 706).  They can in growth areas provide 
a higher quality of life with less negative effects of growth (Burge et al., 2007), but 
this does suggest that as policy they are more appropriate in areas of growth. 
Some research into the impact of impact fees in the UK was undertaken in the 1990s 
before the prospect of their introduction in the UK, they considered the impact of 
these fees on the viability of development in a series of case studies (Goodchild et 
al., 1996; Henneberry and Goodchild, 1996).  Again the differentiation between costs 
and values emerged, the costs were physically driven, whereas the values were 
market and economically driven (Goodchild et al., 1996; Henneberry and Goodchild, 
1996).  In the absence of other measures impact fees would impose the greatest 
financial burden on proposals at the margins of profitability and probably not reflect 
the strengths and weaknesses in the market (Goodchild et al., 1996). 
The justification for the policy in the UK was considered to be in providing private 
finance for infrastructure, and in shifting the financial burden from the whole 
community (via national taxation) to the users of the new infrastructure, but there was 
a concern about the impact on increasing house prices (Goodchild et al., 1996).  
There would be impacts on the operation of the planning system, something which 
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has in fact been apparent anyway with the increasing use of planning obligations as 
discussed earlier. 
The idea behind impact fees were to allocate the shortfall in the infrastructure costs 
proportionally across the new development schemes that would benefit from that 
infrastructure provision.  The impact fee is the last step in the planning process in 
that it is the strategic infrastructure needed to deliver the Local Plan, in that way it 
Plan-led (Nelson 1999 cited in Ratcliffe et al., 2009).  They are considered to be 
more transparent, predictable, more equitable and more efficient in collecting income 
(Grant 1993 cited in Ratcliffe et al., 2009) This all goes to support the shift in policy 
towards CIL rather than other alternatives being considered, such as Tariffs and 
planning charges. 
This is further highlighted by Lord (2009) in relation to CIL, who suggests that whilst 
CIL can be considered a further step in the evolution of Spatial Planning, it presents 
planning with cultural and capacity issues in its implementation, especially in the area 
of setting the charge rate, and with little guidance to support planners in the process 
(Lord, 2009).  The implementation of CIL would present challenges to planners in 
terms of the asymmetry of information between parties and the differing negotiation 
skills of the actors involved in the process (Lord, 2009) similar to the challenges in 
negotiating s106 agreements. 
Finally, the Government did briefly consider the introduction of Impact Fees in 2001 
but abandoned it because of the difficulties of setting the level of fees (Crook, 
2016b).  The above consideration of Impact Fees as a type of value capture 
mechanism highlights both advantages and disadvantages of the mechanism and of 
the challenges in its implementation.  Nevertheless this third type of value capture 
mechanism is the Community Infrastructure Levy introduced from 2010 as a type of 
Impact Fee.  An analysis of the national policy changes over the period from the 
Barker review in 2003 to 2010 is set out in chapter 5, as the PGS evolved into CIL, 
the chapter then considers how CIL itself has changed from 2010 to 2014. The 
details of the policy mechanism are set out in the next section as the latest example 
of policy in this area in the UK, including the guidance on viability testing which is at 
the heart of the policy. 
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2.6 Community Infrastructure Levy Policy 
The CIL as a policy is briefly described, this is followed by consideration of some of 
the issues it raises in relation to the calculation of the land value or economic rent 
available to be captured and in how that is distributed between a range of actors in 
that process. 
The first reference to CIL is in section 206 of the Planning Act 2008, which provides 
the power for LPAs to charge a CIL, it is an optional charge and local authorities are 
not compelled to do so.  It came into force on 6th April 2010 under the Community 
Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 (DCLG, 2010b); the policy was justified as 
follows:  
1) Planning obligations were often slow, unpredictable and based on ad hoc 
negotiations and not transparent. 
2) The burden of funding was unfair on major developments that usually had to 
agree s106 agreements, whilst smaller developments didn’t usually pay yet 
the cumulative impact of these smaller developments required infrastructure. 
3) Government intervention is necessary to create this fairer, simpler and more 
transparent system of standard charges. 
4) Capable of unlocking extra funding to provide infrastructure for local 
communities. 
5) To better resource local authorities to fund infrastructure provision which in 
turn can open up sites for future growth. 
6) Greater efficiency in collecting income from small sites which cumulatively 
require additional infrastructure but haven’t contributed in the past. 
Essentially the policy was driven by the expectation of greater funding income from 
smaller developments, providing greater certainty and transparency to developers 
and a simpler system.  It is worthwhile reflecting on these objectives and justifications 
of CIL and how it is working out in practice.   
Over the four year period from April 2010 to February 2014 the CIL legislation was 
amended on several occasions, by Community Infrastructure Levy (Amendment) 
Regulations 2011(DCLG, 2010b; DCLG, 2011), The Localism Act 2011, the 
Community Infrastructure Levy (Amendment) Regulations 2012 (DCLG, 2012), the 
CIL rate setting guidance (December 2012) (DCLG, 2012a), the National Planning 
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Policy Framework 2012 (DCLG, 2012b), the Community Infrastructure Levy 
Amendment Regulations 2013, CIL rate setting guidance 2013 (DCLG, 2013a), and 
most recently the CIL Regulations and CIL Guidance 2014 (DCLG, 2014a).  This has 
provided a significant background level of uncertainty to the policy and complexity to 
its implementation with changes roughly every six months, the nature of the CIL has 
also changed over the period as now considered, in light of the original objectives set 
out above. 
The CIL was defined by DCLG as  
“The Community Infrastructure Levy is a new levy that local authorities in 
England and Wales can choose to charge on new developments in their area.  
The money can be used to support development by funding infrastructure that 
the council, local community and neighbourhoods want – for example, new or 
safer road schemes, park improvements or a new health centre” (DCLG, 
2011). 
The charge “applies to most new buildings and charges are based on the size and 
type of the new development” and is charged at a rate per sqm (DCLG, 2011). 
The provisions have been retained in the Localism Act 2011, but this requires that a 
significant proportion of the revenue be directed to projects in neighbourhoods and 
that revenue can be spent on on-going costs of infrastructure as well as initial costs.  
Also under the Localism Act 2011 restrictions were placed on the use of Planning 
Obligations, to ensure that the contributions secured only relate to the specific 
planning proposals and that pooling of these receipts is restricted to a maximum of 
five planning applications, from 1st April 2014.  This has now been extended to 1st 
April 2015 (DCLG, 2013a).  Affordable housing which is still funded via s106 
agreements are not subject to this restriction (Localism Act, 2011). 
The Coalition governments reasons for retention with amendments of the CIL were 
that it provided a fairer system to fund new infrastructure as more developments 
would be contributing, be a more certain and predictable system for house builders 
and be more transparent as the draft charging schedule will be open to consultation.  
S106 agreements were often agreed behind closed doors and involved lengthy legal 
negotiations, CIL would cut the costs and time involved.  The new government also 
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wished to transfer some of the revenue raised to direct control of local communities 
Since the original launch of the CIL legislation and guidance in 2010 (DCLG, 2010c), 
a series of updates have also been brought forward, whilst much of this relates to 
legal and administrative detail as applied to implementation, there are however, 
some important changes to highlight.  In areas where Neighbourhood Development 
Plans are in place, charging authorities must pass on 25% of CIL receipts related to 
the proportion of the development that is in that part of the area (DCLG, 2013). 
The final consultation on further amendments was issued in April 2013, (DCLG, 
2013a) “informed by practice experience to date from the development industry and 
local government” (DCLG, 2013b).  The Government’s response to the consultation 
was issued in October 2013 and these are incorporated into the latest amendments 
issued in February 2014 (DCLG, 2014a, DCLG, 2014b).  The main changes are as 
follows: 
1) The charging authority is now required to demonstrate that it has struck an 
appropriate balance between the desirability of funding infrastructure from the 
levy and the potential effects of the levy on economic viability of development 
across its area, putting a greater responsibility on the LPA than in the earlier 
2010 test, in terms of providing evidence.  This has implications for planning 
practice as will be discussed later in consideration of viability issues. 
2) The provisions for setting differential rates have been amended, to allow 
differential rates by reference to both intended use and scale of development. 
3) The deadline date for changes to pooled s106 contributions, referred to above 
was to put back to April 2015 from April 2014. 
4) Charging authorities are now allowed to accept payment in kind through the 
provision of infrastructure and allowing greater flexibility around phased 
payments relating to complex development proposals (DCLG, 2014a). 
These issues all have implications for planning practice, in relation to the 
implementation of CIL as a policy and both the role of planning and of local authority 
planners which is a key part of this research. 
The number and regularity of amendments to the CIL policy and associated guidance 
issued over the four year period is an issue in itself, and has contributed to the 
continued uncertainty and confusion about the relationship between S106 
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agreements and CIL.  In addition the continued issue of affordable housing being 
funded by s106 agreements and not CIL remains a key factor in the implementation 
of the policy (Town and Country Planning Association, 2013). 
The funding of affordable housing while being provided for in the original Planning 
Act 2008, was not included in the 2010 regulations.  DCLG consulted on this at the 
end of 2011 as affordable housing provision has been a significant beneficiary of 
s106 agreements in the past (DCLG, 2011b).  The total value of planning obligations 
secured in 2007/8 was worth £4.9bn, of which approximately half was for new 
affordable housing (Crook et al., 2008).  On 7th May 2012 a DCLG select committee 
raised concerns about affordable housing funding and the changes to s106, 
recommending to Government to “clarify the relationship between the CIL and 
section 106 agreements, and how together they can be used to maximise affordable 
housing delivery”.  This also reveals the confusion and concerns about the 
relationship between CIL and the reduced s106 system (Monk and Burgess, 2012). 
Having set out a description of the CIL policy as it has developed it is important to 
consider how the Government guidance to its implementation has evolved and in turn 
how this has impacted on policy making and implementation. 
2.7 Community Infrastructure Levy Guidance 
Alongside and sometimes included in the various amendments to the CIL policy that 
have been issued over the period 2010 to 2014 there has also been specific 
guidance on how to implement the CIL policy, in particular the setting of the charging 
rate, with several versions of the guidance as discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
The CIL process consists of five stages, but the main feature of the CIL policy 
implementation is the process of setting, consulting upon and approving the 
proposed charging rates for the LPA area and this is the key focus of this research. 
The CIL process consists of five stages as follows: 
1) Public Consultation on the preliminary draft charging schedule 
2) Public Consultation on the draft charging schedule (for a minimum of 4 weeks) 
3) Charging Schedule examination 
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4) Examiners report published (which is no longer binding on the LPA) 
5) Approval of charging schedule by a resolution of the Council and introduction 
of the CIL (DCLG, 2010b). 
In 2010 guidance was issued to assist Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) in the 
preparation of the draft charging schedules, the most important aspect of which is the 
setting of the appropriate rate of levy.  The charging authority in setting the CIL rate  
“must aim to strike what appears to the charging authority to be an appropriate 
balance between the desirability of funding infrastructure from CIL and the 
potential effects (taken as a whole) of the imposition of CIL on the economic 
viability of development across its area” (DCLG, 2010b, p. 4). 
The charging authority is also required to “use appropriate available evidence to 
inform the draft charging schedule”, this is not to focus on the implications for 
individual development sites but rather for the area as a whole, recognising perhaps 
that some potential development sites may be put at risk.  There is no specific model 
or methodology required to be used in assessing the economic viability but evidence 
will need to be provided to the independent examiner as part of the approval process 
(DCLG, 2010b). 
The guidance also provides for a differential rate to be applied for different uses and 
in different locations across the LPAs area but the more complex the charging 
schedule the more difficult it could be in complying with “state aid” conditions of EU 
legislation.  The differential rates need to be fully justified and supported with 
available evidence, although it is also recognised that available data will not be 
comprehensive (DCLG, 2010b).  In addition to the “economic viability assessment”, 
there is also a requirement that the LPA has an up to date Development Plan, there 
is provision for joint examination of a draft charging schedule alongside the proposed 
core strategy if one has not already been approved (DCLG, 2010b).  CIL has been 
described as a plan-led policy (Jones and Paul, 2009).  In addition there is a 
requirement to draw up an infrastructure plan which underpins the Development Plan 
and sets out the infrastructure that is to be funded by CIL and which cannot overlap 
with infrastructure to be funded from s106 agreements (DCLG, 2010b). 
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The key points relate to the preparation of the three main documents, the 
infrastructure delivery plan, the economic viability report (or viability assessment) and 
the (preliminary) draft charging schedule.  The assumptions made in these 
documents, the assessment of the balance, the risks that attach to the decisions 
made based on these documents and how these are communicated to stakeholders 
are all important elements within the CIL process and will be investigated as part of 
this study. 
The link to the Development Plan was also strengthened by the National Planning 
Policy Framework (NPPF) released in 2012 para 175 which stated:  
“Where practical, Community Infrastructure Levy charges should be worked up 
and tested alongside the Local Plan. The Community Infrastructure Levy 
should support and incentivise new development, particularly by placing 
control over a meaningful proportion of the funds raised with the 
neighbourhoods where development takes place” (DCLG, 2012b para 175) 
 
Also the issue of the viability of the Development Plan is to be tested under para 173 
as set out below: 
“Pursuing sustainable development requires careful attention to viability and 
costs in plan-making and decision-taking. Plans should be deliverable.  
Therefore, the sites and the scale of development identified in the plan should 
not be subject to such a scale of obligations and policy burdens that their 
ability to be developed viably is threatened. To ensure viability, the costs of 
any requirements likely to be applied to development, such as requirements 
for affordable housing, standards, infrastructure contributions or other 
requirements should, when taking account of the normal cost of development 
and mitigation, provide competitive returns to a willing land owner and willing 
developer to enable the development to be deliverable” (DCLG, 2012b para 
173). 
 
Together these two paragraphs emphasise the importance of viability in planning in 
current policy and guidance and how the CIL is becoming part of that new approach.  
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This is further reflected in the stricter test in the 2014 guidance (DCLG, 2014a) which 
states 
“They will need to draw on the infrastructure planning evidence that underpins 
the development strategy for their area. Charging authorities should use that 
evidence to strike an appropriate balance between the desirability of funding 
infrastructure from the levy and the potential impact upon the economic 
viability of development across their area” (DCLG, 2014a, p. 12). 
The removal of the words “what appears to the charging authority to be” also 
removes the discretion of the LPA in determining the balance appropriate to its area 
and policy objectives.  The guidance goes on to state 
“What is meant by an appropriate balance? 
The levy is expected to have a positive economic effect on development 
across a local plan area. When deciding the levy rates, an appropriate balance 
must be struck between additional investment to support development and the 
potential effect on the viability of developments. 
This balance is at the centre of the charge-setting process. In meeting the 
regulatory requirements (see Regulation 14(1)), charging authorities should be 
able to show and explain how their proposed levy rate (or rates) will contribute 
towards the implementation of their relevant plan and support development 
across their area. . 
As set out in the National Planning Policy Framework in England (paragraphs 
173 – 177), the sites and the scale of development identified in the plan 
should not be subject to such a scale of obligations and policy burdens that 
their ability to be developed viably is threatened.” (DCLG, 2014a, p. 12) 
The emphasis in the 2014 guidance is more towards deliverability and supporting 
development and not threatening viability of development by the scale of “policy 
burdens” in line with the 2012 National Planning Policy Framework and further 
supplemented by the 2014 National Planning Policy Guidance (DCLG, 2012b) which 
are on-line.  The changes from 2010 to 2014 reflect a growing importance being 
placed upon delivery of development in a period of difficult market and economic 
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conditions, linked with this emphasis on delivery is the importance placed on viability 
assessments to support the delivery of the Development Plan, but also in setting the 
rates for CIL.  The Viability Assessment is at the heart of the CIL process in its 
influence on the establishing the balance and the settings of the CIL rates.  The 
guidance available to LPAs in carrying out the Viability Assessment is now 
considered. 
2.8 What is the Viability Assessment? 
There is a limited range of guidance available specifically to assist with the viability 
assessment, as there is no specific methodology or approach advocated by 
Government to undertake this work.  They also set out differing approaches that may 
be taken, as will be discussed below.  This is a challenge to local authority planners, 
seeking to improve their knowledge in this area, yet at the same time need to make 
the appropriate decision.  Before the different types of guidance are discussed and 
compared, it is worthwhile briefly setting out the general nature of the viability 
assessment that needs to be carried out both for the CIL rate setting but which also 
relates to the Viability Testing of Development Plans. 
The Viability Assessment undertakes an area wide appraisal of the economic viability 
of development across a whole local authority area and across various land uses it 
includes two elements the area-wide assessment and the assessment of threshold 
land value. 
2.8.1 Area-wide Appraisal 
The area wide appraisal employs the residual valuation approach, commonly used 
on a site specific basis to appraise specific development projects by developers to 
decide what land value they can afford to pay for the land purchase.  The residual 
land value is calculated by deciding the Gross Development Value of a completed 
development, this end use value usually being based on comparable evidence of 
values established for a particular type of property in a specific location.  From this 
valuation of the completed development is taken the costs of carrying out the 
proposed development, which includes the building costs, the finance costs, 
professional fees and marketing costs and an amount for developers profit for 
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carrying out the project and the risk involved.  The residual figure, is the amount left 
for the developer to be able to buy the land from the landowner. 
In some respects land values are derived from the value of completed development, 
based on the assumption that the demand for land is derived from demand for 
property.  However, the delay in supply coming forward due to the timescale of the 
development process means this is also not that efficient.  In addition, the price of 
land is not always that transparent depending on the nature of the transaction agreed 
between the parties and the competition between developers for the land. 
The residual valuation of a specific site for a specific proposed development is 
relatively straightforward, however when applied on an area wide basis this is more 
problematic.  Firstly, a decision has to be made as to the geographical variation in 
values across the area for completed developments.  Then assuming the same 
development costs for all the developments, a derived pattern of land values can be 
produced.  Secondly, this has to be varied again by differing uses, so that a 
geographical spread of residual land values can be produced for various different 
uses across the area.  This is usually done by selecting a range of typical 
hypothetical sites with hypothetical schemes to attempt to model the area in valuation 
terms.  Which leads on to the third and final problem, that the costs of development 
of sites vary with their location, they are not all the same for a variety of reasons, not 
just ground conditions or physical issues but perhaps other issues, this may mean 
that by taking an average some sites will make more profit than the hypothetical 
appraisals show and others will appraise at less and will not proceed to be 
developed. 
2.8.2 Assessment of Threshold Land Value  
The second part of the viability assessment involves the assessment of the threshold 
land value (TLV), which is defined as “the value at which a typically willing landowner 
is likely to release land for development” (Local Housing Delivery Group, 2012).  This 
assessment of the TLV is particularly challenging and several approaches to this 
have been advocated in the different guidance as discussed more fully below, if 
market evidence is available this is helpful, but it is vital to be aware of the full details, 
of the transactions in the evidence. 
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Frequently evidence of land transactions is not available and then evidence of non-
development land values have to be used, with some form of uplift assumed as an 
incentive to the land owner to sell at above the current or existing use value.  Much of 
the assessment of TLV also reflects the land ownership patterns of an area, the 
differing expectations of different land owners and the relationships between actors in 
locations all of which impact on land values in the area 
2.8.3 Calculation of Headroom 
The overall viability assessment then involves making a comparison between the 
area wide residual land values and the threshold land value, see figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Viability assessment diagram from Harman Report (Local Housing 
Delivery Group, 2012 p25) 
Essentially the task is to calculate the economic rent on the land and how it could be 
divided up between the parties.  The uplift in land value over the current or existing 
land use value which is created by the right to develop granted by planning 
permission is the starting point.  This has to be divided between the landowner, 
developer and the community or public sector.  The two calculations one of the 
derived residual land value from end use property values shows the land value taking 
into account the developers return as profit as this is included in the residual 
valuation. The threshold land value is an assessment of what uplift above current or 
existing use land value a landowner needs to be persuaded to sell their land.  If there 
is a gap between the two land values, this is the headroom available for the 
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community or public sector to take as it is the economic rent in total.  How this 
economic rent is shared is the result of the CIL decision making process and the 
subject of this research. 
A key challenge here is that not only are there a lot of variables involved all of which 
can be contested, there is also the question of using market evidence which is by its 
nature historical, to inform assessments about the judgements and behaviours of 
actors who are looking forward into the future.  It has also been suggested the use of 
the appraisal to make an assessment as to the level of the policy burden (i.e. levels 
of affordable housing, s106 and CIL) that can be supported by development projects 
and land values in which judgements are being made about these levels introduces 
the issue of circular arguments which is not adequately addressed by the current 
guidance (Crosby et al., 2013). 
2.9 Viability Assessment Guidance 
The Government CIL guidance has not set out any specific guidance on the 
methodology to use for the viability assessment, except to say there are valuation 
models and methodologies available and whilst there is no requirement to use these 
it may be helpful in defending the proposed rates to use one of them (DCLG, 2013a).  
There have been several influential guides, the Homes and Communities Agency 
area- wide viability model (HCA, 2011), the RICS “Financial Viability in Planning” 
(RICS, 2012) and the “Viability Testing for Local Plans – Advice for planning 
practitioners” by Local Housing Delivery Group (Local Housing Delivery Group, 
2012). 
The HCA area-wide appraisal model is still used as a viability appraisal model to 
assess viability of sites and uses a residual valuation approach.  Some consultants 
have developed their own bespoke appraisal models to calculate residual land values 
or if an assumed land value is put into the model then it can be used to calculate a 
range of profit levels.  Either approach can calculate the available headroom above a 
standard developers profit level of say 20% of Gross Development Value for a 
residential development. 
The problem is that even using standard software packages, each bespoke model 
each different package will operate in a slightly different way and produce slightly 
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different results even with the same input assumptions.  The actual appraisal models 
used by developers or house builders whilst confidential also will differ both in the 
assumptions used, the objectives required from the models and also in the actual 
basis of the operation of the model.  What this effectively means is that no definitive 
agreement on exact figures can be reached easily unless one model is used by all 
the parties to the discussion, and this may not in fact reflect their own internal 
business model for confidential reasons. 
One of the most influential guidance on CIL was issued by the Local Housing 
Delivery Group in June 2012, “Viability Testing Local Plans – Advice for planning 
practitioners” (Local Housing Delivery Group, 2012), this is often known as the 
Harman Report after the chairman of the group Sir John Harman.  This guidance is 
strongly supported by the house building industry and places a lot of emphasis on 
delivery, reflecting the Local Plan focus.  Much of the concern is about ensuring an 
adequate supply of viable sites to deliver the housing supply set out in the Local Plan 
proposals and it equates viability with deliverability.  It also sets out that area wide 
assessment of viability is challenging as it only provides a high level of assurance 
and cannot guarantee that all individual sites are viable in an area, but that a 
sufficient number are viable to ensure the supply of housing as set out in the Plan.  It 
stresses the need to collaborate with local partners with local market knowledge and 
knowledge of development economics and in day to day delivery.  The guidance also 
places emphasis on the “cumulative policy burden” and the need to choose between 
different policies priorities as will be returned to later. 
The “Financial Viability in Planning” issued by the RICS in August 2012 (RICS, 2012) 
is also based on the residual method of valuation.  The RICS guidance can be used 
for individual site specific residual valuations, with “benchmark site value” defined as  
“Site value should equate to the market value subject to the following 
assumption: that the value has regard to development plan polices and all 
other material planning considerations and disregards that which is contrary to 
the development plan” (RICS, 2012, p. 4). 
This is considered to be similar to the “competitive return to the landowner” as set out 
in the NPPF and similar to the TLV concept referred to above.  In undertaking an 
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area wide assessment a further adjustment may need to be made to take account of 
emerging policy not least the proposed CIL proposals. 
2.10 Conflicts between guidance 
One of the main areas of conflict between the two main sources of guidance, the 
Harman report and the RICS guidance is in relation to the concept of a “threshold 
land value”, which is the value at which land will come forward to the market, i.e. 
providing the land owner with enough incentive to sell the land. 
In the Harman Report the preferred approach to assessing the TLV is by using a 
premium over current use values and that the premium should be determined locally 
by using an evidence based approach.  As Wyatt and McAllister (2013) point out 
there are several problems with this, firstly there is no empirical basis for the uplift 
calculation, it will vary over time, place and sector and has no relationship with the 
final end value of the development.  Secondly, landowners expectations will be 
anchored to previous high deals in an area and this will stop supply coming forward if 
land values fall, thirdly, using a static model to incentivise landowners will mean that 
in good times landowners will be over rewarded in up turns and not in downturns, 
with conversely policy costs too low in good times and too high in bad times.  They 
go on to say there are in fact two elements of this uplift or premium, firstly, the growth 
premium which reflects the present value of the future growth in land value after it is 
developed and secondly, a compensation for giving up the option to develop some 
time in the future and these cannot be properly reflected in a percentage figure 
(Wyatt and McAllister, 2013). 
This was discussed in Barker (2004) in setting out the PGS details of how to 
calculate the difference between the Planning Value and the current use value.  The 
question was asked, how a valuer would find evidence of current use value without 
the hope of future development, the circularity of the argument was not resolved.  
The RICS approach is to look at market value and so is based on comparable 
evidence provided the evidence used has the correct assumptions about planning 
policy (RICS 2012). 
Which highlights the main area of conflict between the two main sources of guidance, 
the use of comparable evidence.  The Harman Report (2012) stresses the need to 
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look at local evidence, the RICS allows a wider use of market evidence, the Harman 
report talks about trying to assess the level of incentive landowners will expect based 
on local knowledge and the makeup of landowners in the area.  This assessment is 
based on testing a range of calculations on several bases, using comparisons or 
market value, current use value with an additional premium, a percentage uplift from 
current use value and a proportion of the estimated value of the completed 
development (Local Housing Delivery Group, 2012).  The value should also take 
account of the rural/urban nature of the site, and the viability of sites coming forward 
and of landowner’s likelihood to sell (ibid 2012).  This is interesting, as it places the 
expectations of landowners above market based evidence. 
Another point of difference is that of assumptions about planning policy requirements, 
with Harman (2012) this is about including policy or planning requirements only if 
they are able to be delivered in the viability of a site, hence the need to consider the 
cumulative policy burden and to in some cases force a choice between differing 
policy objectives.  The RICS (2012) guidance talks about using comparable evidence 
much more significantly and that the comparable evidence needs to be adjusted to 
ensure that it has the appropriate planning assumptions that are in accordance with 
the Local Plan and even emerging planning policy proposals.  The difference is that 
the Harman guidance places viability of development as a cap on policy 
requirements that can be funded, whereas the RICS guidance tries to reflect the 
planning policy proposals in the market value. 
Both approaches are about trying to calculate a market related incentive for 
landowners to sell their land and whilst in many practical senses they will produce 
similar figures, what is interesting is the differing approaches of the two main sources 
of guidance and how they have influenced the implementation of the CIL policy, 
which is now briefly considered. 
2.11 Implementation of CIL Policy 
The Planning Advisory Service (PAS) website has a frontrunners programme of 21 
local authorities implementing CIL, seven out of the eight original frontrunners have 
now published draft charging schedules, although these are again mainly southern 
England Councils.  Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council were in the second 
phase of Frontrunner Authorities, but decided following advice from consultants not 
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to proceed with implementing CIL.  This reflects the much greater progress in 
implementation in the south of England compared to other areas, there is now some 
progress across the country yet the North East region of England has been the least 
active with only Durham and Newcastle/Gateshead progress CIL in any official way. 
The PAS has identified several lessons that can be learnt from the Frontrunners, the 
need for political support as well as evidence, CIL shouldn’t be considered in 
isolation it is part of a wider policy context, it was important to engage with 
stakeholders especially landowners and developers, it was about delivery, there was 
still many misunderstandings about the policy.  That it was a Corporate project of the 
local authority and not just a planning project, and that other parts of the Council 
needed to be involved such as education, social services etc.   
In January 2014 Savills supported by the HBF, produced “CIL – Getting it Right” 
(Savills and Federation, 2014) which looked at issues around the implementation of 
CIL, they reflected much of the guidance of the Harman Report and again argued 
that the viability equated to delivery and that level of the TLV was also critical in this 
respect as shown in figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2 Diagram from CIL Getting it right (Savills and Federation, 2014) 
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The report suggested that within an overall level of viability sometimes policy choices 
may have to be made by local authorities, similar to the point about cumulative policy 
burden.  An important element of this could be between strategic infrastructure 
provision funded from CIL and affordable housing provision funded from s106 
planning obligations.  Savills went on to say there was a three way trade-off between 
CIL, s106 and affordable housing, the report also stressed the need for a viability 
buffer to ensure a future supply of land coming forward to reflect the risks and costs 
involved in promoting land through the planning system.  The setting of the 
Benchmark or threshold land value whilst difficult was crucially important.  The report 
also set out that local context was also crucial and the priorities between policy 
choices. 
Other issues that have become apparent from the implementation of the CIL policy is 
the concern about the mismatch in timing between infrastructure provision and the 
development activity, the lack of certainty in this respect was also an issue, this 
reflects the rational nexus issue referred to above.  The duty to cooperate between 
local authorities was also considered important in terms of deliverability of Local 
Plans and in the provision of infrastructure with again the boundaries being an issue 
and the hypothecation issue of mismatch between collection and spend. 
The NPPG from March 2014 set out four principles of Viability in Planning, evidence 
based judgement by sharing evidence and using a transparent process, understand 
past performance, based on a realistic operation of the market and past delivery of 
policy obligations, collaboration with stakeholders and a consistent approach based 
on a comprehensive understanding of viability issues.  This in summary sets out the 
challenge to local authority planners for the implementation of CIL, with viability at the 
heart of its implementation. 
These comments reveal that the policy is linked to growth and requires a degree of 
judgement to be applied, rather than a specific formula applied, as much uncertainty 
is involved.  This also further supports the view that the use of multiple knowledge 
sources to support decision making is at the heart of the implementation of this 
policy, especially in making decisions about the assessment of viability and of setting 
CIL rates. 
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2.12 Conclusion 
There are a range of broad issues that emerge from this consideration of the history 
and policy context of value capture as a policy in the UK Planning System.  Returning 
to the five point framework developed from (Oxley 2004b) used earlier to consider 
the other mechanisms of betterment taxes and planning obligations, this is now used 
to consider the latest policy CIL. 
Firstly, the hypothecation issue, is potentially a challenge with CIL as a policy, as the 
collection of CIL funding and the need for the spending are not necessarily 
particularly well matched spatially.  The match between collecting the funding and the 
certainty of spend when needed is another concern, the rational nexus issue, or the 
potential mismatch temporally.  Even the issue of double counting is part of this 
concern, in fact the question of where the funding is to be spent and when are a key 
area of discussion in the policy and key to governance of the Policy. 
Secondly, the sharing of the value, the setting of the rate so that various actors will 
be able to support the CIL, this is also a key arena for discussion between the actors, 
terms such as striking the balance and cumulative policy burden reflect this area of 
dispute.  But it is also about which actors benefit and which lose from the policy 
which isn’t as simple as the sharing of any economic rent or development value 
released, but has wider policy implications. 
Thirdly, the perception of the CIL as the latest mechanism, after the criticisms of 
other policy mechanisms, does CIL have predictability, certainty, speed, 
transparency, simplicity, flexibility, efficiency and fairness.  This is an area to be 
considered in the research as well, it was promoted as having benefits in these areas 
but it is unclear whether that is really the case.  In any event the retention of Planning 
Obligations has not assisted the overall position in this respect.  The changing basis 
of justification, from capture of value explicitly as a national betterment tax to a more 
implicit capture of value to fund infrastructure for specific items to support growth is 
also an important change in perception. 
Fourthly, the calculation of the development value or economic rent, a challenging 
problem even on a site by site basis, when this is averaged out spatially it becomes 
more problematic.  The difficulty of establishing boundaries, the averaging having 
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variable impact on development viability across individual sites, the whole issue of 
future policy assumptions and the differing guidance on this.  The assumptions within 
the area based appraisals and the evidence used to support those assumptions, the 
methodology and appraisal software used, these are all areas of potential dispute 
within the governance of the CIL policy, in calculating of the development value 
available to be captured. 
Finally, the CIL as a policy within the wider policy context, the position in relations to 
the other value capture mechanism such as Planning Obligations is key, but also in 
relation to other policy proposals.  CIL interacts with other policies in its 
implementation especially those about funding and delivery of infrastructure.  The 
CIL is presented as a policy to support growth and to remove barriers to growth, to 
impact on behaviours of actors and their decision making in this respect.  The 
research into CIL has had to consider its governance, this includes the skills and role 
of local authority planners, the use of consultants, the consultation and engagement 
process and the relationships between the actors involved in the CIL policy making 
process. 
Having considered the history and policy context in the area of value capture as 
background of how we have got where we are today, it is now appropriate to 
consider some of the wider theoretical background to value capture and its role within 
planning and how this also frames the current policy position. 
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Chapter 3 Value Capture within the Role of Planning 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Having considered the history of value capture mechanisms in the UK several points 
arise, the first issue is how to determine the value that can be collected, which 
requires a consideration of the economics upon which this is based.  Following on 
from establishing the value that is available for capture, there is the process by which 
this value is divided between the actors involved, including how much is captured by 
the public sector.  This introduces the consideration of decision making of actors 
such as developers and landowners in the development process and the governance 
arrangements of how they interact within the development process. 
Planning policy tools such as value capture mechanisms influence the governance 
arrangements and the behaviour of actors, the nature of and research into the 
influence of these value capture mechanisms, and of viability appraisals as a part of 
that process is considered.  These policy mechanisms are implemented by local 
authority planners as actors in the governance process, therefore theories and 
research into the decision making process of planners is considered including their 
use of knowledge to make those decisions, relating back to the research questions 
set out earlier. 
3.2 Economic Theories for determining the Economic Rent 
3.2.1 Neo-classical economics 
As discussed in chapter 2, the definition of value is that released by development of 
land as a factor of production and termed as “economic rent” (Oxley, 2004b).  This is 
based on the David Ricardo model (Ricardo, 1951) (figure 3.1), which shows land as 
fixed in supply (Q), as demand increases due to economic growth and population 
growth, the demand for land increases from D to D1 and so in turn does the value of 
land P to P1.  The landowner has benefited in higher land values for having done 
nothing and therefore was undeserving of this. 
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Figure 3.1 Ricardian Model of land supply (Evans 2008) 
Based on the above Ricardian Model is the view that a tax on the economic rent or 
increased land value should not distort the economy and therefore a tax on land 
seemed to be uniquely justified (Evans, 2008).  This was also promoted by Henry 
George (George, 1879) and the single tax movement, which suggested that even if a 
tax rate of 100% were applied to the land value increases or economic rent, it 
wouldn’t impact on either the supply or demand of land coming forward for 
development (Evans, 2008).  This is based on a classical economics model which 
assumes that price is determined by the interaction of supply and demand and 
reaches an equilibrium position based on the basis of all the actors in the market 
acting and making decisions rationally (Evans, 2008). 
3.2.2 Welfare Economics 
As a subset of the above perspective, as it is still based on rational decision making 
assumptions and is interested in the efficient use of resources, is “The Economics of 
Welfare” (Pigou, 1920).  The establishment of the planning system to regulate land 
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use and property development is justified on this basis.  As the planning system 
controls the use and development of land, when permission to develop is granted, it 
causes an increase in the value of that site.  The effect is similar to that shown in 
figure 1 earlier, as the increase in value is still based on higher demand, but this can 
only be realised by the granting of planning permission, this value increase or 
economic rent is termed “betterment”.  Betterment is released by the state giving 
permission to develop and therefore again is not due to any efforts by the landowner.  
Therefore as set out earlier the taxation of betterment is also considered both 
justified and economically efficient (Oxley, 2004b). 
Adam and Tiesdell (2013) set out three main areas of market failure planning policy 
seeks to address, firstly, negative impacts from a development termed “externalities”, 
where a development has detrimental effects on other people and they need to be 
mitigated by action or compensated for.  As discussed in the last chapter this is a key 
role for Planning Obligations in the UK planning system.  Secondly the provision of 
“public goods”, these are goods which have no market value and are provided by the 
public sector and then can be benefited from by a developer free of charge.  An 
example of this would be publicly funded and provided infrastructure opening up a 
development site.  Finally, lost opportunities where efficient use of resources is 
frustrated, by the multiple ownership of land, stopping a new development perhaps.  
The use of Compulsory Purchase powers to acquire land would be a state 
intervention for this purpose (Adams and Tiesdell, 2013). 
The first two market failures set out above can also justify a betterment tax on the 
increase in value of land, which has either been generated by the public funding of 
infrastructure as a public good, or to pay for the negative impact of the development, 
which is linked to the cost of the mitigation measures.  As will be considered later 
these have to be funded out of the economic rent or land value increase from the 
development. 
The determination of the economic rent, based on these two classical economic 
models, is assumed to be unproblematic.  That the land value in current use and the 
increase after planning permission is granted can both be calculated based on full 
market knowledge.  The calculation of these land values is however not that straight 
forward in practice due to lack of full market information.  In addition valuations are 
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not objective exercises, but subjective judgements of value, and therefore are 
problematic in determining accurately the level of economic rent, they are also a 
snapshot in time (McAllister et al., 2013). 
Land itself is different, it is not a homogenous product, although costs are involved in 
changing uses, they can nevertheless be changed, therefore supply is not fixed for 
specific uses (Whitehead, 2016).  Furthermore the planning system itself introduces 
some problems, such as administrative failures, political pressures, it influences the 
supply of land for certain uses in specific locations, it can also influence demand and 
transaction costs (Whitehead, 2016). 
The assumption that all actors will act rationally and make rational and fully informed 
decisions, is therefore problematic, in reality not all actors have access to full 
information and don’t always act rationally.  Actors are also very varied and 
heterogeneous, having very differing aims, objectives, business models and attitudes 
to risk (Adams and Tiesdell 2013) which all influence their decision making. 
To overcome the shortcomings of the rationally based economic models an 
“Institutional” approach is helpful in trying to take account of the differing aims, 
objectives, business models and attitudes to risk which influence decision making.  
The Institutional Approach also allows account to be taken of the effect of the local 
context on the decision making process of various actors. 
3.2.3 Old Institutional Economics (OIE) 
The use of “Institutional Approaches” initially sought to take account of the influence 
of the context in influencing decision making, by examining the details of the 
institutional factors such as the rules, norms and social factors on the behaviour and 
decision making of actors.  The approach originally from (Veblen, 1899 as cited in 
Needham et al., 2011) has been criticised as not being able to generate any theories 
from the detailed empirical data generated (Coase, 1988) and has led to alternative 
Institutional Approaches such as New Institutional Economics discussed below.  
Nevertheless as Needham et al. (2011) state in their consideration of Institutional 
Theories in relation to land markets, one important conclusion from OIE, is that 
“institutions can greatly influence land markets” (Needham et al., 2011, p. 167).  That 
in itself justifies a shift away from the analysis of decision making in land and 
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property markets based only on the rational assumptions of the neo-classical models.  
Institutions become internalised into practices, an example Needham et al. (2011) 
quote is the institutional discretionary nature of the UK planning system, which tends 
to encourage the practice of pre-application discussions by developers with planners, 
to reduce uncertainty in the development process. 
3.2.4 New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
In response to some of the criticisms of Institutional approaches, a relatively new 
addition to economics emerged, New Institutional Economics (NIE) which places the 
assumption of rational decision making within an institutional setting.  It is important 
to clarify at this point that “institution” is not equivalent to an organisation, but rather 
defined as “rules, norms and regulations by which society function……they also 
change and develop over time as circumstances and experience dictate.” (Keogh 
and D'Arcy, 1999, p. 2407). 
NIE developed from “The nature of the firm” (Coase, 1937) and later work in (Coase, 
1988).  The premise is that there is a cost to using the price mechanism, such as the 
cost of discovering the price and the costs in negotiating and concluding the contract 
(Buitelaar, 2007).  These were later defined as Transaction Costs by (Williamson, 
1975) and the theory is that institutions act to reduce and minimise transaction costs.  
In the area of social costs or negative externalities the Coase Theorem suggests that 
the parties who gain and lose should negotiate and reach an agreement.  This avoids 
the costs of internalisation of the externalities problem, as a result of the government 
stepping in and introducing more costs into the overall process (Buitelaar, 2007). 
It is argued that planning or the state, should seek to reduce uncertainty and risk to 
the private sector and so reduce transaction costs.  The relationship between NIE 
and planning is however problematic (Moulaert, 2005) as will be considered later in 
this chapter. 
Keogh and D’Arcy (1999) have applied NIE in relation to land and property markets 
as shown below.  They have set out three levels to their model, with the Property 
Market itself as an “institution” at the middle level, which is influenced by and in turn 
influences decision making of individual actors at the lower level.  What Keogh and 
D’Arcy argue is that the market is not a neutral allocator of resources as the rational 
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models above would suggest, but that this allocation of resources is not independent 
of its form.  The Market itself is an institution “it is a network of rules, conventions and 
relationships” (Keogh and D'Arcy, 1999, p. 2408) 
They conclude that whilst institutions are designed to reduce uncertainty and 
transaction costs, this may only benefit powerful lobby groups, who can effectively 
lobby policy makers and influence policy  but that this is not necessarily the most 
efficient outcome for the market as a whole, see figure 3.2 (Keogh and D'Arcy, 1999). 
 
Figure 3.2 Institutional Hierarchy of Property Markets (Keogh and D’Arcy 1999) 
In a follow up to their original paper in D'Arcy and Keogh (2002) go on to state that 
any analysis needs to consider the role of institutional change in its effect on Market 
form and in turn on the allocation of resources.  What becomes apparent from this 
analysis is that notions of power relationships and social aspects cannot be 
separated from economic decision making and hence this needed to be incorporated 
into any analysis of policies that impact on the property market function. 
The main differences between OIE and NIE are that OIE emphasises institutional 
design which includes informal relationships and can be said to be Plan-led, whereas 
NIE emphasises market determinism similar to neo-classical models and can be said 
to be market led and prioritises economic factors (Kauko, 2012). 
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The determination of economic rent derived from this economic model would suggest 
that the impacts of institutions at a higher level and the actions of actors at a lower 
level both help determine market values.  In addition, within the market itself as an 
institution with its rules, regulations and norms; together both will impact on an 
equilibrium value as determined by the neo-classical economic model.  Whilst it 
reflects the subjectivity of valuer’s judgements as they are influenced by other factors 
within a market context, it still assumes that actors behave rationally within those 
rules, regulations and norms. 
3.2.5 Behavioural Economics 
Behavioural Economics is another relatively new perspective on economics and has 
emerged from psychology.  Since the world is uncertain, people tend to use rules of 
thumb, habits of practice and even emotions to make decisions, with resulting bias in 
decision making, this is termed as “bounded rationality” it also reflects the reality of 
less than full information availability assumed in the earlier models (Adams and 
Tiesdell, 2013). 
Three examples of deviations from standard decision making are, firstly, people’s 
actual preferences may not be just self-interest, secondly, people often act on beliefs 
that turn out to be incorrect and finally, people’s decision making is not reflected in 
neo-classical economic theory (DellaVigna, 2009). 
The presentation of information also influences behaviour, which leads on to the view 
that markets are in fact socially constructed and not given by some equilibrium price 
mechanism.  Whilst still a relatively new concept and contested by some, the general 
view of rational decision making is that it has become somewhat discredited without 
some consideration of other institutional or behavioural context.  Accordingly, it is 
inappropriate to place the market and planning into a dichotomous relationship 
(Adams and Tiesdell, 2010), but rather to consider how they interact especially when 
considering policies such as CIL which specifically effect the operation of land and 
property markets. 
The determination of the economic rent based on this economic model requires the 
behaviours of the various actors to be considered as they impact on the market.  The 
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impact of “bounded rationality” and bias on judgements that are made by actors and 
by valuers in making their judgements. 
In property development the analysis of risk has been categorised under two factors, 
firstly, risk attitude which is largely driven by perception and greatly influenced by the 
context and secondly by human judgement which is based on the notion of heuristics 
(Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2007).  Within risk attitude, four basic attitudes to risk 
have been identified, on a continuum from, risk averse, risk tolerant, risk neutral to 
risk seeking with these modified due to the situated environment (Hillson and Murray-
Webster, 2007).  In relation to human judgement, the notion of heuristics, is that 
there is intuitive judgement in development decision making, using rough and ready 
answers, short cuts and rules of thumb, often including significant bias (Johnson-
Laird, 2006). 
Four common types of heuristic have been identified in property development, firstly, 
availability, which subconscious search for data to compare to the current situation, 
this tends to favour recent transactions and events disproportionately.  Secondly, 
representativeness, this heuristics tries to pigeon whole situations into a range of 
stereotypical situations, whilst this may be a useful starting point it may prevent a 
more detailed analysis of the true detailed picture.  Thirdly, anchoring, this term is 
where a choice of starting value, based on experience, or from a suggestion, then 
becomes an anchor, around which adjustments are made, but with a reluctance to 
move too far from the initial figure.  Finally, the confirmation trap, which is an 
approach that involves assuming an answer, and then seeking the evidence to 
support that figure, this means the full evidence may not be fully considered (Robson, 
2009). 
Having considered the nature of the general economic models, it is clear that these 
need to be considered in more detail, specifically within a land and property 
development context, reflecting the complexity and unique features of land and 
property markets and of the development process. 
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3.3 Models of Development Process 
3.3.1 History of Real Estate Analysis 
The research and analysis in property and real estate has largely been based on 
classical economic theory, especially that as applied to the theory of the firm.  This 
has been firmly based on rational assumptions about behaviour and is still the basis 
of most research and analysis today.  In turn this means that most analysis is 
quantitative analysis and model building, but always with the assumption of well 
informed, profit maximising rational decision making. 
However, the property market rather than being an efficient and well informed market 
of the classical model, is in reality more complex, with the assumptions of that model 
undermined.  Information is not efficiently available to all in the market, due to the 
unique locational dimension of property it makes it a heterogeneous product, 
emphasised further by the complexity of multiple legal property interests and sectors.  
Accordingly as Leishman (2003) sets out the real estate or property market differs 
from the classical perfect competition theory in several ways.  Property markets 
consist of a number of distinct but interlinked sectors; properties themselves are 
heterogeneous due to location; the market is split into use, investment and 
development sectors; it is not independent of other markets; there is a low and 
irregular volume of transactions; poor information flows and not necessarily rational 
consumers and producers (Leishman, 2003). 
Accordingly, some attempts have been made to relax the traditional assumptions of 
the classical model and three paradigms can be identified in this respect, the 
institutional economics paradigm, the structure and agency paradigm and the 
behavioural paradigm, as set out below (Leishman, 2003).  These approaches whilst 
still not widely employed are growing in importance, as they can often be used in 
combination with the traditional quantitative analysis from Neo-classical Economics to 
help explain unexpected results from that analysis. 
3.3.2 Equilibrium or Neo-classical Economics Approaches 
There have been many attempts to model the relationship between the state and 
market in relation to land and property, reflecting the unique nature of land and 
property as compared to other commodities and therefore reflected in different 
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markets.  The initial point is that land and property is actually a bundle of legal rights 
held over a piece of land that can be traded in a market.  These rights are socially 
constructed within a society as they frame the relationships between people and to 
be enforceable require a legal system (Adams and Tiesdell, 2013).  These legal 
rights are bought and sold, or traded in a market, which is regulated by a legal 
system and are embedded in a process of governance and law (of which planning is 
part) (Adams and Tiesdell, 2013). 
The modelling of how these property markets operate has been the subject of much 
research over many years with several reviews having been undertaken.  One of the 
most comprehensive reviews of land development models was undertaken by Gore 
and Nicholson (1991), which presented various conceptual models of the land and 
development process, which they suggested fell into four broad categories.  Firstly, 
Sequence Descriptions of the process, secondly, Behavioural Models, thirdly, 
Production based analyses and lastly, Structures of provision approaches. 
Interestingly in spite of their comprehensive review, they conclude that the modelling 
of the development process was to some extent futile, as the development industry 
was too varied and heterogeneous.  Whilst all models offered some insight, they 
were best treated as a point of access into an analysis, pointing out the limitations of 
the model in that analysis (Gore and Nicholson, 1991). 
Healey (1991) set outs four main types of model, all of which involved different ways 
of thinking about the development process.  These were equilibrium models which 
reflect the neo-classical economic approach of balancing supply and demand.  
Secondly, event-sequence models, which seek to set out the various stages in detail 
of a development project and in what sequence these take place.  Thirdly, agency 
models, which follow on from the last model, by focusing on actors in the 
development process, their roles and their strategies.  Finally, structure models, 
which derive from urban political economy and seek to try and identify the driving 
forces behind the development processes, such as the Marxist theory of capital 
movements in the economy, (Healey, 1991). 
The equilibrium model, sometimes termed the mainstream or neoclassical economics 
approach, in particular has been criticised as being inadequate to describe the 
complex process of property development.  In 1991 Healey made the following 
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criticisms, economic models typically fail to consider, different forms of demand, such 
as occupier and investment demand, development agents being motivated by factors 
other than profit, the difficulty of assessing the financial viability of schemes, including 
distortions produced by appraisal methods and the complexity of the development 
process itself (Healey, 1991). 
The event sequence models, can be useful as a basis with which to link events to the 
drivers of development, such as economic, political, social and demographic, 
technological factors, cultural and environmental factors (Adams and Tiesdell, 2013).  
This model presents a detailed description of a development process, linking in 
various activities such as the securing of ownership of the land, the securing of 
various statutory consents, analysis of market demand and financial appraisal, into a 
process in which through three stages the developer’s room for manoeuvre is 
gradually reduced.  Whilst explaining events and processes well, it is weak in the 
importance of organisations and individuals in the development process, where the 
relations between people can be of critical importance.  Another important distinction 
is between actors and their roles, as actors may have more than one role.  Actors act 
as individuals within organisations as well as on behalf of organisations (Adams and 
Tiesdell, 2013). 
Agency or Actor-based models attempt to address this weakness, but many such 
relationships are inherently both time and place specific and also are dynamic and 
change over time.  This makes it difficult to capture the complexity of the 
relationships which can be considerable; they are also weak in terms of taking 
account of the economic context in which the processes take place. 
3.3.3 Institutional Approaches 
As a reaction to the dissatisfaction with some of the above approaches an 
Institutional model was set out by Healey (1992a). This model sought to combine 
elements of the above types of model, the challenge being to link agency and 
structure.  The model used three dimensions of material resources, rules and ideas, 
which could overlap or be integrated, to be analysed in a four stage process.  Firstly, 
a mapping exercise to describe the development process in operation, focussing on 
the events in the production process and identifying the agencies involved.  
Secondly, an analysis of the agencies to identify roles, power relations and the most 
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critical events in the process.  Thirdly, an assessment of the strategies and interests 
of actors, this being related to the resources, rules and ideas governing the 
development process for the specific scheme being studied.  Lastly, by relating the 
resources, rules and ideas from the specific scheme, to the wider society within 
which the development project sits. (Healey, 1992a). 
This model which was innovative in its introduction of social relations into the 
framework with which to analyse the role and activities of actors has nevertheless 
been the subject of some criticisms itself.  The emphasis on the Institutions involved 
in the process and on the production of the development, has led to criticisms that 
the model has problems dealing with changes in what is a dynamic environment and 
that the very separation of agency and structure is a major challenge in practice (Ball, 
1998).  Others have even suggested that the models initial application on a scheme 
in a regeneration area with significant market failure, means that the application of 
the model in an area of a buoyant market is problematic and has undermined the 
strength of the model for analysis and that essentially that the Institutional Approach 
emphasises the social over the economic (Guy and Henneberry, 2000). 
Ball (1998) suggests that the dichotomy between the market and institutions is a 
false one and it is more a continuum between opposites.  Ball also states that 
mainstream economics does in fact have tools to study institutions such as 
transaction cost minimising, game theory and information theory (Ball, 1998).  He 
went on to criticise the Institutional theories as inadequate for the analysis of the 
market as they played down the economic context in favour of emphasis on the 
behaviour of actors (Ball, 1998).  In his Structures of Building provision (SOP) model 
he tries to resolve the agency/structure issue and tries to reconnect organisations 
and markets in a dynamic context, but acknowledges himself the difficulties with its 
implementation and its contextual specific basis. 
Guy and Henneberry (2000) criticise Ball however, claiming that if the main dynamics 
of the production of property are driven by the market and this is read by property 
analysts using quantitative economic models, these may work well at higher strategic 
levels, but the deeper you go into an area the less reliable these models become.  
Hence the need to look at the economic as well as the social, as markets are not just 
technically determined but a process of negotiation and learning (Guy and 
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Henneberry, 2000).  Guy and Henneberry seek to integrate economic and social 
aspects in their wider relational approach, which is based upon behavioural 
economics (Guy and Henneberry, 2000).  The activities of actors is context driven, 
but their actions also influence the contextual structures, this explains why some 
decisions that appear irrational within the mainstream economic models, when the 
wider social context is considered become more rational. 
3.3.4 Network Approaches 
As mentioned earlier there has been limited research into land and property markets 
or the development process other than from a neo-classical economic perspective.  
Whilst this has begun to change with institutional approaches being used to reflect 
the context of an area and the local social influences on the decision making, there 
has also been a shift away from institutions to networks as the prevailing mode of 
governance.  Accordingly there has been new research and models produced 
reflecting this, Adams et al. (2012a) have carried out research into house builder 
networks, which as they state, whilst there is widespread evidence that the 
residential land market does not operate as the neo-classical model would suggest 
little empirical research has been carried out to find out how it does operate. 
Adams et al. (2012a) highlight the reliance house builders have on networks, to 
source land often in preference to market mechanisms, they also went on to 
investigate the strength of various relationships house builders have in their 
networks.  The conclusion reached was that planners were the most distant actors in 
the network and that this was largely due to an inability to articulate any shared 
interests on both sides (Adams et al., 2012a). 
In networks trust and reputation are crucial in binding together networks, even more 
so in land and property markets which due to their complexities and imperfections 
rely on trust and relationships to provide alternatives to contracts and insurances to 
reduce risk (Adams et al 2012) and reduce transaction costs (Gossling, 2004 cited in 
Adams et al., 2012b). 
However, Tait (2012) in his research into a particular development dispute between 
house builders and planners, identified that trust can also be of institutions and 
systems.  But what can be problematic when trust breaks down is the perceptions of 
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what the actor’s represent, not just based on direct experience (Tait, 2012).  As with 
trust, reputation is also socially embedded into the network of relations, it provides 
some indication of future behaviour as actors seek to maintain a good reputation 
(Hardin, 2006 cited in Adams et al., 2012b). 
 
Figure 3.3 Project ecologies (Henneberry and Parris 2013) 
Another example of research into network approaches in relation to land and 
property markets was by, Henneberry and Parris (2013) who suggest using “Project 
Ecologies” as an approach to analyse networks.  They argue there has been too 
much emphasis on structures rather than behaviour of developers, also that they 
have been treated as a homogeneous group when in reality this is not the case 
(Henneberry and Parris, 2013).  It is argued that project ecologies offer an analytical 
framework to empirically examine relationships, at different layers by recognising that 
property development projects are contextually embedded in systems open in time 
and space as shown in figure 3.3 (Henneberry and Parris, 2013). 
Having considered the economic theories and models and how they have attempted 
to represent the development process and the land and property market from a range 
of perspectives, that the complexity of the subject requires something wider than the 
neo-classical assumptions and hence the need to consider Institutional and Network 
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approaches.  What is apparent is that to implement institutional and/or network 
approaches of analysis, which by their very nature seek to take account of the 
context influencing the behaviour and decision making of actors within a setting, the 
governance arrangements within that setting also need to be considered. 
3.4 Shift in Governance Arrangements 
3.4.1 Hierarchies and shift from Government to Governance 
As the economic theories require an institutional framework to assist the analysis of 
the operation of property markets, the governance structure in an area emerges as 
important.  Governance has also been an evolving process as with economic theory, 
from the formal government structures to the “hollowing out” of the state (Rhodes, 
1994) of today.  Planning itself as part of local governance of an area has also 
changed from the rational planning of the 1940s to 1960s, with its emphasis on a 
welfare role and land use planning to the spatial planning of today which is more 
about coordinating delivery, enabling the market and a collective attempt to improve 
places (Healey, 2010). 
Hierarchies are governance usually by Government, with the assumption that the 
rules and decisions made at a high level will be followed by those at a lower level, 
hence the hierarchy description.  It is a form of command and control type of delivery, 
an example of which is the state driving development, such as in the New Town 
programme in the UK in the 1940s to 1960s (Adams and Tiesdell, 2013).  This style 
of governance has declined in the UK since the 1980s and has been reflected in the 
changing nature of planning as well.  There remains however some central control by 
Government through the issuing of policy guidance which is expected to be delivered 
at the local level.  CIL is perhaps an example of that, although even here there has 
been some local discretion given to local authorities as to whether to implement CIL 
or not and the ability to tailor it to reflect local conditions. 
3.4.2 Governance and the emphasis of Networks 
The concept of network governance (Rhodes, 1997) and the move from Government 
to governance has necessitated new ways of working and new approaches to 
analysing decision making by developers.  As a result of the neo-liberal changes and 
the emergence of the market as the dominant mode of governance, there have also 
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emerged networks as an alternative mode of governance, representing communities 
of interest, and partly due to the reduced ability of a much reduced state to deliver.  
Network governance also reflected a move away from the dichotomous relationship 
between hierarchy (state) and markets, although that boundary between state and 
market is often fuzzy and blurred (Buitelaar, 2007).  Networks are sometimes referred 
to as relational structures and whilst they can emerge around an issue or common 
cause, they also have sometimes been encouraged by governments via the planning 
system such as in Collaborative Planning approaches (Healey, 2006a).  Collective 
attempts to co-ordinate social life to a common end became known as “Network 
Governance” (Rhodes, 1997).  These deliberative approaches rely on voluntary 
commitment, trust and reputation to be successful and above all social relationships 
(Adams and Tiesdell, 2013). 
These approaches seek to reach a consensus and to give all stakeholders a voice in 
the process of decision making and have been particularly prevalent in planning 
since the 1990s.  Yet they have in some quarters been criticised as reflecting the 
dominance of market governance and in some way accepting this.  Furthermore, the 
issue of power relations is a significant factor in any form of network governance and 
in planning can be particularly relevant due to the political nature of the decisions 
(Hillier, 2000).  “It is the preliminary, backstage power play……which is the real 
politics of planning” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 83).  Network governance also requires new 
ways of working and this involves an understanding of identities of actors within a 
strategic context, both individually and collectively (Hillier, 2000).  
Whilst these three broad modes of governance, hierarchies, markets and networks 
are often presented in chronological order as they emerged, it would be inappropriate 
to consider one as a replacement for another; rather they can all exist together.  
Accordingly, it would be wrong to consider the state in the form of hierarchy as no 
longer powerful or that the market as an institution or mode of governance as unable 
to be influenced by networks such as communities of interest (Buitelaar, 2007). 
What these alternative modes of governance do is to highlight for the research, that 
the operation of markets and the behaviour of developers which the CIL policy will 
influence, take place within a social as well as an economic context. 
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3.4.3 Markets have emerged as the prevailing mechanism 
The governance by markets reflects the neo-liberal trend in governance that has 
taken place especially since the 1980s and the so termed “hollowing out of the state” 
(Rhodes, 1994).  There has been a conscious effort of some governments to reduce 
the size of government and to roll back the state.  Examples in the UK would be the 
establishment of Enterprise Zones and Urban Development Corporations in the 
1980s, covering areas with reduced planning and state regulation (Adams and 
Tiesdell, 2013). There has also been a scaling back of the planning system since the 
1980s with increasing emphasis on delivery as discussed in the last chapter, and 
sometimes portraying the planning system as stopping development (Rydin 2014).  
The role of the state (and of the planning system) became more one of an enabler to 
the private sector to deliver, especially as virtually all development is now carried out 
by the private sector, the CIL policy is part of that shift.  The state as it has been 
reduced has also been fragmented, and this institutional fragmentation has led to the 
entrepreneurial city (Harvey, 1989). 
As part of this neoliberal approach two theories have been prominent and based on 
NIE introduced above, namely transaction cost theory which contends that all 
organisations will seek to minimise the costs of transactions and this will promote  
market efficiency, the involvement of the state increases costs and therefore reduces 
efficiency (Webster and Lai, 2003).  There is also the property rights theory which is 
closely related, which states that all disputes between private parties will be resolved 
by negotiation between those parties and that only a legal and financial framework 
protecting the private rights is required (Alexander, 2001). 
It has been argued by theories such as transaction cost theory and property rights 
theory that externalities would be negotiated between private parties (Alexander, 
2001).  However, due to market boundaries and administrative boundaries often not 
being the same, problems emerge.  Infrastructure has not always been provided 
satisfactorily, coordination between separate private developments has not always 
been satisfactory, accordingly the issue of externalities emerge as a problem (Adams 
and Tiesdell, 2013).  What also emerges in this mode of governance is the concepts 
of place competition and social exclusion as the rights of some people are excluded, 
introducing the notion of power. 
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Others argue that price signalling should be given greater importance in the planning 
system as the systems exclusion of price signals has led to problems of a 
constrained supply of development land and high prices (Cheshire and Sheppard, 
2005).  They go on to propose a system of price signalling that if combined with 
Impact fees could depoliticise the supply of housing and make the system more 
transparent (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2005).  In a similar respect Lord (2009) has 
argued that Information Economics could be an appropriate way to make the 
calculation of the CIL more transparent, treating the CIL as a transaction cost and 
reducing the asymmetry of information between parties in the process of calculation 
of the CIL charge (Lord, 2009).  A further development of this approach is the use of 
Game Theory, it is argued this could be a useful basis with which to analyse the 
negotiation process of setting a CIL or indeed other planning decisions (Lord, 2009). 
These theories all reflect a neoliberal view that the market should operate with as 
little intervention by the state is possible, and that this is the most appropriate 
governance arrangement.  The nature and tools of state intervention in the land 
property markets however still remain relevant and influential and these are now 
considered. 
3.5 Planning Tools to influence the market 
3.5.1 Types of Planning Tools 
Having established that spatial planning is about local governance and that the 
operational performance of markets are influenced by that governance, it is important 
to consider what tools and mechanisms are available for spatial planning to influence 
markets.  It is important firstly to distinguish between land and property markets and 
the property development process. 
The property development process is about the production of the built environment 
through a process, which some of the above models have sought to illustrate.  The 
whole land and property market can be sub divided according to the users, into sub 
markets for developers, investors and users (Keogh, 1994).  Whilst the planning 
system has an indirect influence on the markets for users and investors, it has a 
direct influence on the market for developers (Adams and Tiesdell, 2010).  This is 
important to remember as the planning tools seek to influence the development 
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market and the behaviour of developers in that submarket and hence the implicit 
requirement to understand the behaviour of developers. 
There has been a significant amount of research undertaken on the range of 
planning instruments that are available; three conceptual categories can be set out 
as follows: 
1) Market Shaping Instruments – which relate to Local Development Plans and 
similar policy documents, which present a local political position and context.  
This is important context to developer’s decisions on transactions and 
development activity; they can provide certainty and reduce risk to developers. 
2) Market Regulation Instruments – which relate broadly to the development 
management function, this is primarily restrictive and sets the parameters 
within which market actors make decisions.  The inclusion of planning gain, 
such as s106 and CIL, within this function has only enhanced the role of 
planners as market actors, which is particularly important to this research. 
3) Market Stimulation Instruments – these include development subsidies and 
compulsory acquisition of property to assemble development sites, which 
assist in market actions and in transactions (Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2008). 
These instruments are broadly plan-making, development control and development 
grants, which clearly influence development decisions which is now considered. 
3.5.2 Economic Impacts of Planning Tools 
There are three levels of how planning impacts on markets, as follows: 
1) Macroeconomic impact – this is the impact on the wider economy and on such 
matters as house prices and the number of houses built.  This is very much 
linked to the economic development and promotion of growth role of planning. 
2) Urban Land Economic impact – this is the potential impact of planning 
instruments on the local property development activity, who builds what where.  
The notions of floating and shifting value as mentioned earlier are relevant 
here and the redistributive effect of planning policy and allocation of 
development to certain geographic areas. 
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3) Microeconomic impact – this is the potential impact of planning policy at the 
level of the firm, the impact on development appraisals and on the decision 
making of the developer (Adams and Tiesdell, 2010). 
These three themes whilst distinct are also interrelated, the introduction of a new 
policy such as CIL impacts at all three levels, indeed the objectives of the policy are 
to support growth at a national level, but the policy will also impact on the other two 
levels. 
3.5.3 Institutional Contexts and Value Capture Mechanisms 
As referred to earlier value capture mechanisms as a type of planning tool are 
influenced by their institutional context, therefore before considering the role of key 
actors in the operation of value capture mechanisms it is worthwhile briefly 
considering the operation of a range of value capture mechanisms within differing 
institutional contexts.  Considering the international experience is useful in this 
respect as the operation of planning systems themselves, and in turn of value 
capture mechanisms, are rooted in the political and administrative culture of a 
country and its legal framework as it affects property rights (Norton and Bieri, 2014). 
A number of authors (Ingram and Hong, 2012; Crook et al., 2016; Monk and Crook, 
2016) have identified several key elements as being particularly relevant to value 
capture mechanisms, these are property ownership rights, property development 
rights, the funding of local infrastructure provision linked to the delivery of 
development and the conceptualisation of value capture linked to the wider 
philosophy of the planning system in that country.  The operation of a value capture 
mechanism is dependent upon the private ownership of land and property and 
countries which don’t have a market in private property ownership transfer are 
effectively capturing value by the state ownership of land.  In China which has state 
ownership of land, the state still grants leasehold interests to the private sector to 
facilitate development, but without an open market trading of legal interests in land 
the system experiences challenges in establishing market values with which to 
assess value capture (Anderson, 2012).  In the UK context the nationalisation of land 
ownership was considered in the 1940s but not implemented, what was introduced 
was the nationalisation of property development rights via the introduction of the 
69 
 
planning system requiring planning permissions to develop land as considered in 
chapter 2. 
The second key element therefore is the ownership of the right to develop land, if this 
is owned by the state, then the granting of planning permission to develop provides 
an opportunity to secure value capture.  This however also depends on the amount 
of certainty and discretion involved in the operation of the planning system and in the 
nature of the value capture mechanism, as a fixed or negotiated charge and on its 
timing within the development process.  Monk and Crook (2016) in their 
consideration of planning gain in the UK as compared to Germany, Netherlands, 
USA and Australia point out that the degree of discretion in the UK planning system 
even if plan-led, provides the opportunity to negotiate planning gain, due to the 
uncertainty of securing planning permission and the need to take into account other 
“material considerations” in determining a planning applications being key to this.  
Under the greater certainty provided by the zoning based planning systems of 
Germany and the Netherlands the requirements in terms of value capture are more 
defined and fixed, which may be reflected in lower land values as the costs are 
passed back to the landowner, but don’t provide the opportunity to negotiate extra 
value as via the planning obligations in the UK.  Gielen and Tasan-Kok (2010) argue 
that the greater uncertainty and discretion, the more value capture that can be 
generated. 
Conversely, in the USA and Australia the ownership of the development rights 
remain with the landowner never having been nationalised as in the UK.  Whilst 
zoning plans provide some control over land use and development, value capture 
mechanisms such as impact fees, considered earlier in chapter 2, are more driven by 
the need to fund local infrastructure to support new development.  In the USA the 
rational nexus principle is a legal requirement to equate charges with spend, yet 
there is also a move towards a more negotiated approach (Monk and Crook, 2016).  
The Australian system has a little more discretion but again has to apply 
proportionality and the rational nexus principle. 
The need to fund infrastructure and to the delivery of development are a key driver 
for value capture mechanism across many countries, and are illustrated by two 
different approaches.  The value capture mechanisms which levy a charge on new 
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development are the main subject of this research but a major alternative is the 
process of land readjustment.  This is where the state seeks to acquire land 
ownership to facilitate development, then by providing and funding infrastructure on 
the state owned land it increases its value, in turn selling the land on to the private 
sector to develop and capturing the costs by the higher price achieved on the sale.  
This is a process that has been very prevalent in France, Germany, and Netherlands 
but also in India via its Town Planning Schemes (TPS) (Sanyal and Deuskar, 2012).  
The land readjustment approach reflects the need to deliver development as well as 
capture value and is influenced by the legal framework of property ownership.  In 
France, the property inheritance system has often led to much fragmentation of 
property ownership in urban areas and this needing to be overcome to bring forward 
development (Booth, 2012).   
The land adjustment approach has the advantage of ensuring the supply of land, but 
requires significant public investment to be committed up front, even if over time the 
land value increases capture the cost and return this to the public sector.  
Accordingly this approach is often supported by important public sector social and 
economic objectives to justify the upfront resources as has often been the case in 
Germany and the Netherlands (Monk and Crook, 2016).  The land readjustment 
approach has been much less used in the more market oriented UK context or in the 
USA and Australia although all have CPO powers with the state to assembly sites.  
Recently in France, Germany and the Netherlands there has been a move away from 
the land readjustment approach, to using CPO powers as part of public private 
partnerships more in line with the UK and USA approaches.  In some contexts even 
CPO powers are not needed, a private sector led land readjustment process has 
been delivered in Hong Kong and Tokyo in Japan linked to the capture of value from 
new rapid transit systems and development around new stations (Murakami, 2012). 
This leads on to the final key element the conceptualisation of value capture within 
the wider context of the philosophy of the countries planning system.  In the case of 
the USA, Australia and the UK the planning system is currently oriented to supporting 
growth and the market and less so towards the securing of state determined 
economic and social objectives more characteristics of the planning systems in 
Germany, Netherlands and France.  But this is also changing as the latter three 
countries also seem to be moving more towards market based mechanisms such as 
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the TLE local infrastructure tax in France to fund infrastructure (Booth, 2012).  
Historically France has never been influenced by the notion of the undeserving 
landowner benefiting from the uplift in land value as in the UK in the past, but today 
both see value capture as driven by a need to fund infrastructure to support growth 
with parallels between the CIL and the TLE and the IDP (UK) and the PAE 
development program in France (Booth, 2012). 
Today, few countries pursue value capture as an explicit tax on land or development 
value, rather it is presented as the recovery of costs of infrastructure provision or the 
costs to mitigate the impact of the new development.  In less developed economies 
there is also much interest in value capture mechanisms, especially as many of these 
countries have rapidly growing populations and economies requiring infrastructure to 
support that growth.  In his recent review of value capture in Latin America, Smolka 
(2013) explains that the notion of the unearned income accruing to undeserving 
landowners is still relevant in developing economies in contrast to the more 
developed economies of Western Europe, USA and Australia.  The importance of 
social justice issues are also relevant, in relation to the provision and funding of 
public services and in relation to the occupation and ownership of land.  This is 
beyond the scope of this research but it is important to remember, that as various 
countries such as Brazil and Columbia implement value capture mechanisms and 
other countries such as Argentina consider legislation in this respect (Smolka, 2013) 
in the face of powerful influences, that the whole policy is socially constructed. 
What is apparent is that the implementation of various types of value capture 
mechanisms are very much influenced by the intuitional context as set out above and 
that this changes over time and by location.  This shows how these policies are 
socially constructed and that there are not right answers that emerge from a technical 
analysis.  The socially constructed nature of the policy also requires research 
approaches able to uncover those policy processes, something which will be 
discussed in chapter 4.  It also demonstrates that the role of key actors and how 
value capture mechanisms share value are important and this is now considered 
further. 
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3.5.4 Landowner’s behaviour  
Whilst important actors in the property development process, relatively little research 
has been undertaken into the behaviours of Landowners, with economics traditionally 
assuming that supply is a function of demand.  In addition the difficulty of securing 
information on patterns of ownership, has meant that the main actors studied in the 
development process have been planners and developers rather than landowners 
(Goodchild and Munton, 1985).  The main reasons for landowners ownership is 
either for use or investment purposes, rarely for control.  Three separate behaviours 
were identified, the timing of the owner’s decision to sell land for development is 
related to the owners financial strategy, the nature of the owners contribution to the 
development process is reflected in the owners operational strategy and the owners 
management decisions as they effect development (Goodchild and Munton, 1985).  
In addition a distinction was made between the non-professional landowner who 
believes the policy context is against him due to his imperfect knowledge, the more 
experienced landowner tend to think of the policy context as more flexible. 
(Goodchild and Munton, 1985). 
Lack of knowledge and understanding can also influence the landowner’s willingness 
to sell, firstly, the pattern of land values, the effect of planning on that pattern and the 
uncertainty over planning permissions.  Secondly, the rise in land values over time 
due to economic growth and urban expansion, but expectations are not always 
realistic in the short term and finally landowners have a price below they will not sell. 
(Goodchild and Munton, 1985).  
A major impact of the planning system on the behaviour of landowners is the time 
taken to prepare Statutory Plans with the uncertainty this creates.  The number of 
unanticipated developments that proceed not identified in the Development Plan, or 
often the Plans contain unrealistic or vague policies and these also increases the 
scope for negotiations (Goodchild and Munton, 1985). 
In specifically considering the impact of tax on landowners the conclusion was that it 
was significant in the short term and often led to a wait and see outcome.  This is 
supported by the response to landowners to national betterment taxation discussed 
in the last chapter.  In relation to Planning Obligations and CIL the research predates 
these policies.  The assumption from economic theory is that the contribution or 
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charge should reduce land values, but it depends on the timing of the land purchase 
agreement.  In relation to Planning Obligations they are often negotiated much later 
than the land purchase price, so this assumption is not always correct.  As with CIL 
as well the assumption about a reduction in land values only occurs if the cost of the 
contribution or charge is known in advance of the land price negotiation and that 
there is certainty of its continuation into the future, generally an uncertain 
assumption. 
Whilst useful background it is important to consider this research in terms of the 
policy context at the time and whilst some of the conclusions probably still hold true 
some matters may not.  In any event an appreciation of the motivations and decision 
making of landowners is important within the CIL policy making process for the 
assessment of the threshold land value, i.e. the price a landlord will be willing to sell 
land. 
3.5.5 Who gains and who loses from value capture mechanisms 
The issue of who gains and who loses from the impact of various planning tools in 
this case value capture mechanisms, was considered in the last chapter under the 
section on Impact fees.  The dividing up of the value generated by development of a 
site between the various actors to the process, in particular the landowner, the 
developer and the local authority is the main focus of the negotiation between the 
actors and of the value capture mechanism in attempting to capture a share for the 
public sector to fund infrastructure provision.  However, in considering the wider 
policy picture, there needs to be consideration of other less obvious stakeholders, 
such as purchasers of property and the impact of value capture mechanisms on the 
completed development property prices. 
This depends on the market conditions for the end use development, if supply and 
demand are such that end use development values can rise then more economic 
rent can be generated, this can in turn provide other actors such as developers or 
landowners with higher income, as higher profit levels or higher land values, 
alternatively the value capture mechanism can capture more funding for 
infrastructure provision, paid for by the occupiers of new development, but benefiting 
them as well as the wider community.  If the infrastructure could not have been 
funded by the increased amount collected from the value capture mechanism then 
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the public sector would have needed to fund the infrastructure to enable the 
development to go ahead and this would have come out of wider taxation from the 
wider community to the benefit of the occupiers of the new development. 
The interaction between the land market and property market is also relevant, as if 
there is a shortage of supply of land then the price will go up, this will impact on the 
amount of development value that can be shared between the developers profit and 
the value capture mechanism.  The supply of land is determined not just by 
landowners and their expectations, but also by the allocation of land uses by the 
planning system (Whitehead, 2016). 
If the developer as another actor doesn’t get enough profit to compensate for the risk, 
the development will not go ahead; this in turn will impact on the supply and price of 
property and impact on demand and values of property.  Wider policy proposals to 
generate supply of property may override the need to capture value for infrastructure 
provision. 
Accordingly, the impact of value capture mechanisms cannot be seen in isolation 
from other policy objectives and tools and who may benefit and lose.  It also 
suggests the importance of planners having knowledge of market mechanisms and 
how value capture mechanisms and indeed other planning tools impact upon their 
operation. 
3.5.6 Market Skills of Planners 
Planning Policy will influence the market as indicated above, but in order to employ 
policy in a more effective way, spatial planning needs to embrace the notion that 
planners are market actors and seek to develop and build their skills and capacity in 
this area, to improve their effectiveness.  This includes a view that planners need to 
have an improved awareness of economic analysis and the impact of policy tools on 
local markets and funding infrastructure, both specifically relevant to this research 
(Amborski, 2011).  In their article Adams and Tiesdell (2010) suggest there are three 
crucial areas in this respect:  
1) Market Rich Information – needs to be secured and this needs to be 
supported by a better understanding of the motives and behaviours of private 
sectors actors 
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2) Market Related Skills – whilst planners often believe they are in a negotiating 
role with developers, especially in the area of planning gain, where it can 
become a dividing up of the spoils.  Instead planning intervention could be 
seen as strategic market management involving a collaborative negotiation, in 
which planning action helps transform market potential (Adams and Tiesdell, 
2010). 
3) Market Rooted Networks – as implementation and development relies on 
private sector actors to deliver, the challenge is for planners to build networks 
and breakdown the hostility between public and private sectors and build trust 
and relationships in which there can be collective learning (Adams and 
Tiesdell, 2010). 
This will not only require planners to acquire and develop new skills, but possibly will 
also require a cultural shift as referred to earlier, something which has been explored 
in this research into the behaviours of planners and other actors in the case studies. 
The effectiveness of spatial planning and its interaction with the market has moved 
from a market and planning dichotomy to a dialectic, which is encapsulated in the 
concept of governance, but this requires government to reach out to other 
stakeholders and involve them in the process.  This is a change from market 
intervention, to participation, which is more inclusive (Oxley, 2004b).  But this, as 
discussed earlier relies on relationships, and to assist in building these relationships, 
Adams et al (2008) in summarising a series of research papers suggests four areas 
where state actors could learn about the market: 
1) There is no such thing as a single market in land and property. – Policies need 
to be targeted to reflect the particular characteristics of the submarket they are 
intended to influence. 
2) The importance of market dynamism. – The property market is not static even 
though some analysis may make this assumption for convenience; emphasis 
cannot be on reaching equilibrium but rather how to achieve a desirable 
change of state. 
3) There is a desire among market actors for greater policy stability and 
predictability. – Policy has unforeseen impacts as well as predicted impacts, 
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closer working on policy formulation would be desirable and closer state 
market relations are crucial to this. 
4) Evident side effects of planning and associated public policies. – It is important 
for policy makers to understand market structures and disaggregation, yet 
there are also opportunities from side effects (Adams et al., 2008). 
In addition they suggest there are three main areas where market actors could learn 
about the state: 
1) The need to understand both the theoretical and practical insights into political 
and institutional realities which some market actors tend to ignore. – The 
fragmentation of the state and the need to understand the realities under 
which state actors have to work. 
2) Outcomes of policy objectives. – The market actors need to understand the 
policy objectives that the state is seeking to achieve and that these may not be 
clear or easily measurable.  The notion of power influences on this process 
also needs to be understood. 
3) There is a broad array of tools or instruments available to the state in seeking 
to change market outcomes. – These have been highlighted above, but also 
the restrictions and limitations of what is possible and available as well 
(Adams et al., 2008). 
These areas reflect some the earlier research and have assisted in framing the areas 
of investigation in the research.  Having discussed the tools and instruments 
planners have at their disposal it is now appropriate to consider the nature of the 
decision making process itself, starting with consideration of the process itself and 
then moving on to consider wider issues such as the types of knowledge involved 
and the use of judgement and discretion by planners.  
3.6 Viability in planning to assess and share the Economic Rent 
As set out above as the market mechanism has emerged as the prevailing 
governance mechanism, the policy tools have also shifted responding to this change 
this has placed viability and deliverability at the centre of planning policy and 
planning tools such as CIL.  There are several implications that emerge from this, the 
77 
 
nature of the assessment of the viability, the allocation amongst the actors involved 
and the governance of that process, these are now considered. 
3.6.1 The preparation of Viability Assessments 
There was significant discussion in the last chapter about the detail of the viability 
assessment process and the guidance that is available to support that process.  As 
both the CIL policy and the Viability Testing of Local Plans are relatively recent 
policies requiring area wide viability assessments relatively little research has been 
undertaken in relation to this process.  It is important to make the distinction between 
area wide viability assessments and viability assessments for Planning Obligations 
on a specific site which have been researched (Claydon and Smith, 1997; Campbell 
and Henneberry, 2005; Burgess and Monk, 2016; Dunning et al., 2016) and which 
reflect the increasing shift towards a negotiation role for planners within an increasing 
need to consider viability and deliverability of development proposals.  However, 
whilst the negotiation of Planning Obligations can often be relatively obscure and 
influenced by the knowledge and skills of the actors involved, the opening up of the 
area wide viability assessment required in the CIL policy may have significant impact 
on both the decision making process and the governance arrangements. 
There are some key points however that can be learned from the implementation of 
Planning Obligations and which are likely to be influential on the implementation of 
CIL.  Important areas of practice and skills were in relation to planners having 
knowledge of viability issues and understanding of development economics, which 
have been identified several times over the years and have become even more 
critical since the financial crisis in 2008 (Dunning et al., 2016).  It is also apparent that 
the evidence of delivery of Planning Obligations across the country has been very 
varied.  Whilst these variations did partially reflect the strength of economic and 
market conditions, this didn’t fully explain the variations, and raised the importance of 
dissemination of best practice, improving skills and even changing cultures as critical 
(Dunning et al., 2016).  To assist this process Dunning et al. (2016) have set out a 
model to illustrate this see figure 3.4.  This shows the position of an organisation in 
terms of its performance, with ideally seeking to move local authorities into box (b) 
from the other boxes. 
78 
 
The increasingly important role of development viability appraisals (DVA) in 
supporting planning policy proposals has been investigated by McAllister et al (2015) 
both in how they support CIL rates and as evidence to support the deliverability of 
Local Plan proposals.  They consider the DVA as a “calculative practice”, and 
suggest that the DVA itself presents a position of objectivity and precision, which in 
reality is not possible and which obscures the fact that the models inputs and outputs 
are socially constructed (McAllister et al., 2015). 
 Policy 
 
 
 
 
Practice  
 Weak Strong 
Strong (a) Tactically 
Strong; 
Strategically 
Weak 
(b) Tactically 
Strong; 
Strategically 
Strong 
Weak (c) Tactically 
Weak; 
Strategically 
Weak 
(d) Tactically 
Weak; 
Strategically 
Strong 
Figure 3.4 Transitions in policy and practice (Dunning et al., 2016) 
McAllister et al. (2015) also suggest that this use of DVA and their numeric nature 
perhaps offer a common ground for trust and negotiation based on (Porter, 1995), 
but that more likely drawing from (Christophers, 2014) that the DVA is performative in 
nature.  Christophers (2014) in his consideration of the Three Dragons appraisal 
model suggests that the nature of the model is such that it shifts from being an 
analytical tool to becoming one of determining and influence the performance of the 
decision making process, with human actors simply feeding in data into the model.  
These standard models it is argued also help embed certain standard assumptions 
such as the profit level of 20% of GDV for developers. 
Denis et al. (2006) make the point that numbers and quantification can in itself exert 
power and McAllister et al (2015) point out that the “Black boxing” of the detailed 
calculations in the DVA can also exclude actors from the process who don’t have the 
skills to interpret the figures.  They go on to say that the DVA is a vehicle to make the 
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complex process more governable (McAllister et al., 2015), which will now be 
considered further. 
3.6.2 Development Appraisals Spatial and Temporal Issues 
It is important to acknowledge that the developer’s decision to develop has two parts, 
the market assessment, is there demand for the end product and secondly the 
financial appraisal, can the scheme be delivered and make a profit to compensate for 
the risk involved, a development appraisal includes data from both parts 
(Henneberry, 2016). 
As discussed above the Viability Assessment element of the CIL, comprises a series 
of hypothetical development viability appraisals (DVA) on a range of sites, each 
based on the residual method of valuation which doesn’t deal with time particularly 
well, for three reasons.  Firstly, residual valuations use current values and costs to 
calculate the current residual land value, no attempt is made to forecast into the 
future.  Secondly, the assumptions on costs don’t always adequately reflect their true 
cost over time.  Finally, value is usually back loaded to the end of the development 
process (Wyatt 2007).  Cash flow models can address this, but the simplistic residual 
valuations used in CIL hypothetical DVAs as part of the Viability Assessment process 
tend not to. 
In a critique of appraisals in practice it is argued that the assessment of project 
performance should be separated from the financial decision (Henneberry, 2016).  
The developers return as a lump sum profit is not very realistic, the assumption of the 
financing and funding all being debt is also unrealistic in practice, yet these are the 
basis for the residual valuations in the DVAs. 
The complexity of the appraisal valuations are such that the impact of some variables 
is much greater than others on the overall outcome.  The impact of land value if fixed 
at the beginning in the model will be very high, in fact the whole issue of front and 
back loading of various elements in the appraisal is influential, which is also effected 
by the discount rate assumption (Henneberry, 2016).  In addition to the above 
temporal issues connected to the mechanics of the valuation and appraisal there is 
also the effect of the property market changes and delays on the construction 
process. 
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Moving on to spatial effects, costs and values vary geographically and this is one of 
the major challenges faced by CIL is how to map these differences.   The CIL viability 
assessment by using a simplified appraisal system, to deal with the averaging across 
a range of hypothetical sites, cannot reflect the heterogeneity of development 
conditions across different specific sites.  Accordingly CIL rates will therefore tend to 
be set conservatively, to ensure viability of sites with higher development costs, this 
in turn will mean that CIL will impact less on high value schemes. 
Finally, related to the above, the big issue is the separation of cost and value, the use 
of a cost based charge, to raise revenue, as constrained by a viability test 
(Henneberry, 2016).  This separation of cost and value in the assessment process is 
at the heart of the problem with the CIL viability assessment process, reflecting once 
again some of the problems from earlier value capture mechanisms. 
3.6.3 The Governance of the Viability Assessment Process 
The governance of the DVA process was also considered by McAllister et al (2015) 
and three main points emerged, firstly, the relative lack of oversight of or regulation of 
the DVA process, with little codified guidance, which as discussed in the last chapter 
is often contradictory.  The rules of the process are not codified and much of this is 
controlled by specialist consultants.  Which leads on to the second point that there is 
the governance of the client and consultant relationship to be considered. 
Finally, the importance of consultation and collaboration within the appraisal process 
to ensure robustness.  This comprised two elements, the contribution of local 
knowledge, which can be considered to be the comparable evidence to support the 
appraisal and secondly  
“the inclusion of a range of stakeholders, often with conflicting interests, 
highlighted the intrinsic uncertainties associated with the assumptions of the 
modelling process.  This served a legitimisation function, neutralising 
opposition and increasing stakeholder buy-in to the process.  However, the 
consultation process was essentially limited to experts and lay participation 
was absent”. (McAllister et al., 2015, p. 15) 
The emerging issues from this research are, the limited guidance provided by 
national government on how to undertake the viability assessment process has 
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meant due to a lack of capacity, skills or confidence, to local authority planners 
relying on the appointment of consultants.  In addition, the relative absence of any 
governance by national government to define best practice has meant this has been 
provided by other institutions and by specialist consultants.  This accordingly raises 
the importance of the local authority planners as client’s relationships with specialist 
consultants.  Finally, the consultation and collaboration with local stakeholders again 
is a key influence on the viability assessment process.  Not just because of the 
increasing emphasis placed on this is national guidance from 2012, up to the NPPG 
in 2014, but also because of the need to secure evidence and to secure agreement 
within an uncertain process from key stakeholders and partners.  However, this is a 
rather limited group of actors with many stakeholders excluded due to not having the 
specialist knowledge to engage.  These are all key elements that were considered 
within the research. 
3.7 Types of Knowledge in Planning 
There has been research into the types of knowledge planners use within their 
decision making, over several years, in 1991 Healey and Thomas identified three 
knowledge areas, the capacity to deal with information, the ability to understand 
organisations, networks and power relations and the ability to assess, expose and 
deliberate consequences (Healey and Thomas, 1991).  In 1992 Healey set out five 
areas of skills which planners used in decision making, firstly, Procedures: knowing 
and working the institutional apparatus of the planning system, secondly, Design: 
assessing design from different points of view, thirdly, Politics and Institutions: what 
the reaction of local politicians will be to certain proposals and decisions, fourthly, 
People: showing empathy and relating to a variety of different people and finally, 
Norms: boundaries and expectations of behaviour (Healey, 1992b). 
These skills are then synthesised into three knowledge types, rational-technical, 
aesthetic-expressive and moral-practical (Healey, 1992b).  In more recent work in the 
area, Healey identified four knowledge types, Strategy-making (the capacity to know 
a place), Imaginative capacity to see opportunities, Synthetic thinking and the 
Capacity for judgement (Healey, 2009). 
A further alternative model was set out by Rydin in 2007, which identified four types 
of knowledge claim, empirical, predictive, normative and process.  In planning 
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however it is not just the types of knowledge, but how they are integrated (Rydin, 
2007).  The Rydin model in figure 3.5 shows the seven types of knowledge claims in 
four categories and how they relate together, this could be an appropriate model to 
use as a basis to analyse planners decision making in respect of the CIL policy.  
Especially as CIL like many other planning policies involves the handling of multiple 
knowledge sources within a decision making process. 
The framework as well as providing an approach to categorise knowledge types, also 
considers the testing of different knowledge claims, and even conceptualises 
planning as the creation of a series of arenas to recognise and test different 
knowledge claims (Rydin, 2007).  In these arenas by “opening-up” to give space to 
voices and claims and “closing-down” to recognise and test claims, the planning 
system performs its function, the framework is needed to help identify the different 
knowledge types and the appropriate institutional arrangements needed. 
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Figure 3.5 Knowledge(s) and the planning process (Rydin, 2007) 
The framework also sets out to assist with some of the Institutional Issues, such as 
how knowledge is generated, how is the testing to be handled and what is the role of 
planners and researchers in that process (Rydin, 2007).  The idea of planners as co-
producers of knowledge, in the commissioning and appointment of consultants, is 
relevant to the CIL policy making process and is also addressed in the framework.  
The categorisation of types of knowledge used within planning, whilst useful is 
perhaps less important than how the knowledge is used and how that knowledge is 
contested as part of this process. 
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In the literature there is however much agreement on the importance of the 
application of knowledge for action as being central to planning as a process, and of 
the integration of multiple knowledge’s (Vigar, 2012).  Planning activity operating at 
the interface of knowledge and action is also discussed by Campbell (2012), who 
believes that the definition of knowledge can be left broadly defined, but by using the 
term knowledge as opposed to data, implies an assumption of causality that 
knowledge can provide insight into outcomes (Campbell, 2012).  Also that between 
knowledge and action is “synthesis” which is the combining of knowledge types 
together to make decisions (Campbell, 2012). 
Planning as a practice of Knowing is an alternative conceptualisation of the use of 
knowledge in planning, which shifts the focus from knowledge as something planners 
have, to knowing as something planners do (Davoudi, 2015).  The relationship 
between knowledge and action is central to planning and is now considered. 
3.8 Decision making in Planning 
The use of knowledge in decision making in planning is determined by the 
institutional context as this determines the blend of knowledge’s that need to be 
brought together.  Professional knowledge is conditional and is based on the 
judgement of the particularities of a specific situation (Squires, 2005).  Knowing this 
context is vital to making appropriate judgements and this in itself is a type of 
knowledge, “action as a form of knowledge” (Vigar, 2012, p. 6).  Knowledge is 
embedded in planning work in two respects, it is generated by situated social practice 
and by engagement with material reality (Vigar, 2012).  Professional Knowledge can 
include experience, or tacit knowledge, learned by doing and codified knowledge as 
set out by research and policy and learned through formal education (Vigar, 2012).  
The knowledge is generated in the context of action to achieve an outcome and is 
motivated as expertise (Vigar, 2012). 
Campbell (2012) suggests that decision making in planning confronts four generic 
questions, what is going on here (Descriptive knowledge), why is it like that 
(Analytical or Explanatory knowledge), what to do (Prescriptive knowledge) and what 
ought to be done (Normative knowledge).  Davoudi (2015) in a similar way sets out 
knowing what (cognitive theoretical knowledge), knowing how (skills and technical 
knowledge), Knowing to what end (moral choice) and Doing (action/practice).  These 
85 
 
are brought together as practical judgement, which includes desire (what ought to be 
done) and the right judgement (what is done), which is more about experience of 
doing than evidence or codified guidance (Davoudi, 2015). 
Similarly, Campbell divides questions into “is” questions and “ought” questions, with 
planning decision making about the linking of is and ought (Campbell, 2012).  This is 
further developed into the concept of “is” being “analysis” which is explanatory and 
backward looking and the “ought” being “synthesis” which is a form of reasoning and 
is forward looking.  Synthesis learns from the past but is normatively directed and as 
such is dependent on judgements and ethics as it is the reasoning behind the choice 
of the course of action and consequentially involves more risks than analysis 
(Campbell, 2012).  This all has important implications for decision making in planning 
and in CIL, which is more than assessing evidence, it involves moral judgements and 
therefore values, it is also about experience or tacit knowledge as well as codified 
knowledge in guidance. 
3.9 Judgement and Discretion in Planning 
Campbell (2006) suggests that planning is the art of situated ethical judgement, and 
makes five points about what needs to be done in decision-making in planning.  
Davoudi (2015) states that planning as a practice of knowing is a dynamic process, 
“it is a socially constructed understanding that emerges from practical collaboration” 
(Davoudi, 2015, p. 323).  As a result it is also therefore multi-dimensional, with four 
dimensions, it is situated and provisional, collective and distributed, purposive and 
pragmatic and mediated and contested (Davoudi, 2015). 
The use of judgement introduces not just the use of knowledge but also values, by 
making judgements planners take moral positions, involving personal individual 
values (Vigar, 2012).  The judgement often uses previous experience of similar 
situations applied to the evaluation of a variety of knowledge sources within the 
current context.  However as all situations are effectively unique to some extent, it 
also requires practical judgement for each situation (Forester, 1991 cited in Vigar, 
2012). 
The combining of a range of knowledge sources also introduces the concept of 
power plays and the influence of parties on the planners judgement (Flyvbjerg, 
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1998).  The use of different knowledge’s by different actors in their different roles and 
how this relates to the testing and validating knowledge is also important (Alexander, 
2008).  Judgement can be altruistic in nature, seeking to give all stakeholders a voice 
(Hillier, 2000) but can also be more technically driven.  In relation to the judgements 
around the setting of the CIL charge rate, the primarily technical nature of the 
evidence and calculation may mean, a consultation with mainly professionals and 
technical experts, excluding others without the specialist technical knowledge, but it 
does not exclude the concept of power plays and of the need to consider moral 
positions and values. 
The introduction of values and the taking of a moral position, of course reflects the 
move away from planners taking a technic-rational neutral position, as it has become 
increasingly impossible (Healey, 2006a).  Two issues emerge from this, the tension 
between the values of individual planners as professionals and the collective values 
of the organisations within which they work and secondly, that the historic neutrality 
of planning decision making has actually supported power plays (Campbell 2006). 
The freedom of planners to make decisions sometimes termed the “judgement 
space” (Vigar, 2012) or “discretionary space”, is considered to be diminishing (Gunn 
and Vigar, 2012).  Inch (2010) identifies an acceptance of a disparity between values 
that planners aspire to and identify with and those they seem to be prepared to 
accept in everyday practice. 
This reduced space for judgement and discretion it is argued has emerged as a 
result of Local Government reform and the reduction of the state as referred to 
earlier.  Greater involvement by politicians in decision making and the view that the 
professional autonomy of planners has been undermined by changes to the system 
(Gunn and Vigar, 2012) are also important background to this study of CIL.  It has led 
to a reappraisal of the role of planning and its relationship with the development 
industry (Campbell and Marshall, 1998; Inch, 2010).  The move to a more market 
orientated planning system of which CIL can be seen as one element, has also seen 
resistance in planning practice (Campbell and Henneberry, 2005). 
The nature of the use of knowledge in planning decision making being socially 
constructed and dynamic, the use of judgement and discretion by local authority 
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planners under pinned by values but impacted by policy guidance are a key part of 
the background to the research and the impact on the role of planners. 
3.10 Conclusion 
The Literature Review has sought to consider the literature at several levels in how it 
has related to the research aims, firstly a consideration of the economic theories 
setting out how the economic rent (or development value) at the centre of value 
capture mechanisms can be assessed and divided up.  The move from the 
assumptions of rational behaviour by actors in their decision making at the micro 
economic level, to having to consider the institutional context on the decision making 
process and the alternative approaches available to assist this.  The various models 
of decision making within the development process are then considered, with again 
the development of the analysis from classical rational approaches to institutional 
and network approaches. 
This shift in governance arrangements, is then considered within a wider context of 
policy making as the shift from hierarchies to networks is examined, leading on to the 
consideration of the market which has prevailed as the dominant governance 
mechanism.  This leads on to a consideration of the Planning tools that are available 
to influence decision making at various levels within the market, the impact on 
various actors, who benefits and who loses from value capture mechanisms and how 
this impacts on the skills of planners as actors in the process. 
The calculation of the share of the economic rent is then considered as the different 
actors shares are assessed as part of the process.  An examination of the limited 
research into viability assessments and the appraisal process is considered, it being 
a key part of the policy making in value capture mechanisms. 
The review of the literature finally considers the planner’s use of knowledge within 
the decision making process, the relationship between action and knowledge, the 
moral judgments and values that are involved in planning decisions and the limited 
amount of discretion planners have, with the impact this has on the role of planners.  
The dynamic and socially constructed process of planning decision making are 
considered further in the next chapter on the research methodology. 
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Chapter 4. Methodology (Argumentative Discourse Analysis of the micro 
politics of value capture) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the theoretical framework and methodology 
for the research.  The ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning the 
research are set out, followed by consideration of the choice of methodology for the 
research.  The research design is then discussed with the methods of data collection 
and analysis also set out.  A final section on the researcher’s positionality and 
reflexivity in relation to the research together with any ethical issues that need to be 
considered are discussed. 
4.2 Ontological and Epistemological Position 
The nature of the research as set out in the research questions earlier, concerns 
policy making, which is driven by changing social meanings, as highlighted by the 
history of policy making in this subject area.  The research also seeks to consider the 
behaviours and decision making of actors within the policy making process. 
Accordingly, the research has taken a constructivist view of the nature of reality: that 
reality is essentially socially constructed and there will be a range of interpretations 
from different actors, a series of multiple realities.  This is manifested through 
people’s actions, words and beliefs as social reality is produced and reproduced as 
practices with multiple meanings (Fischer, 2003). 
In turn the epistemological position is one, where the nature of social knowledge 
being without structure or order is produced by people interpreting the world and 
trying to make sense of it (Wagenaar, 2011).  This epistemological position seeks to 
understand but not explain behaviours (Fischer, 2003).  In order to study the “making 
sense” of this complexity requires ordering devices to assist in the interpretation of 
meaning that different actors place on it, such as in discourses.  “Social 
Constructions are produced and negotiated through the medium of discourse” 
(Fischer, 2003, p. 68). 
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4.3 Policy Analysis 
As mentioned earlier planning as public policy has an impact on land and property 
markets at three different levels, macro-economic, land economy and micro-
economic.  This research sought to investigate the latter two areas, the land 
economy or property market and the micro-economic or level of the firm or developer.  
Within a local context these two levels interrelate, the micro-economic level of the 
firm involving actors making decisions based upon financial models and appraisals, 
and the land economy level being the area at which the policy is implemented and 
involving a network of actors in its implementation.  In studying these two different 
levels of interaction, two areas of research need to be considered, firstly that of policy 
analysis as it relates to local areas and networks and secondly the decision-making 
of actors at the micro-economic or level of the firm. 
4.3.1 A History of Policy Analysis 
The study of policy implementation can be traced back to the 1950s (Lasswell, 1951) 
and the study of mechanisms of policy making.  In the 1950s however the 
assumption was that a linear process of survey, analysis, plan, and implementation 
was how policy was delivered, perhaps with a further step of feedback to learn 
lessons for the future.  This traditional approach also assumed that by establishing 
formal structures and procedures policy would be implemented as envisaged.  This 
also reflected the welfare state and the dominant role of the public sector in the 
immediate post Second World War period. 
In the 1960s and 70s the dominant role of the public sector, was beginning to be 
challenged, the assumption that formal structures and procedures ensured policy 
implementation was undermined by individual people pursuing their own agendas.  
These actors often in positions of authority, termed “elites”, used informal processes 
behind the formal structures and procedures.  This introduced the concept of 
“power”, and how individual actors and groups of actors used power to influence 
decision-making, which in turn introduced the importance of relationships between 
actors and how they negotiated with each other.  In the 1960s and 1970s the 
analysis of actors was prevalent in policy analysis with emphasis placed on the 
politics and power in decision making and how the state interacted with the private 
sector, the Action-centred approach of (Barrett and Fudge, 1981) and Advocacy 
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Coalition Frameworks (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) are examples of policy 
analysis at that time. 
In the 1980s the state and private sector relationship shifted, with a reduction in the 
power of the state and government, sometimes referred to as a shift from 
Government to governance (Rhodes, 1994).  In policy analysis it also reflected the 
fact that whilst the formal structures and procedures of the past had been embodied 
in the state and public sector, this was increasingly embodied in social relationships 
which “structured” the behaviour of actors, rather than formal structures and 
procedures of government policy. 
By the 1990s the field of policy analysis recognised that governance was within 
networks of relationships and the “Argumentative Turn” (Fischer and Forester, 1996) 
was introduced, as an approach with which to analyse policy.  This introduced a 
range of concepts with which to analyse policy networks, such as frames (Schön and 
Rein, 1995) and policy narratives, storylines or discourses (Hajer, 1995; Yanow, 
1996).  In this postmodern approach to research these concepts attempted to provide 
ordering devices with which to mediate between structure and agency (Hajer and 
Laws, 2006).   
Towards the end of the 1990s the “Institutionalist Turn” (Healey, 1999) was 
presented as an alternative approach, which emphasised social relationships 
strongly situated in specific localities.  This introduced the capacity of governance 
into the analysis framework of the networks, but again used ordering devices to study 
these relationships, such as policy communities, policy arenas and policy discourses 
with which to study policy making in specific localities (Vigar et al., 2000; Healey, 
2006b). 
In the 21st century, the emergence of “Interpretive Policy Analysis” (Yanow, 2007), 
“Deliberative Policy Analysis” (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003) and Phronetic Policy 
Analysis (Flyvbjerg, 2004) as examples of a new interpretive approach, have taken 
some of these matters further.  All broadly agree that the rational and linear approach 
to policy implementation is no longer appropriate for studying contemporary policy 
implementation due to the challenges, uncertainty, conflict and complexity involved.  
Accordingly, an interpretive policy analysis approach was considered to be 
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appropriate, as it was based on discourse analysis with its ability to deal with multiple 
social meanings, this is considered further in the next section. 
4.4 Theoretical Perspectives 
The research questions set out earlier, sought to investigate the decision making 
processes of various actors within the network, the local authority planners, making 
the decision regarding the CIL charging level, the decision making of developers and 
landowners and potentially the decision making of other stakeholders.  This involves 
making judgements as well as generating and testing different types of knowledge 
claim, accordingly it varies according to perceptions of risk and uncertainty, the 
availability of and interpretation of knowledge claims.  Whilst notionally undertaking 
similar analysis of the knowledge claims; the differing interpretations, identities and 
objectives of different actors will influence their judgements in the process. 
Accordingly, the research methodology was required to capture these differences 
and to understand the objectives, interpretations and meanings of the various actors 
and how they influenced the policy making process.  The use of discourse analysis 
was therefore considered as an appropriate mechanism with which to undertake the 
research.  Discourse is more than discussions or talking, it is the meaning of 
statements and is very dependent on the social context within which it is uttered and 
by whom, furthermore at the micro-political level of everyday interactions, they 
represent systems of power and the social practices that produce and reproduce 
them (Fischer, 2003). 
Discourses are defined by Hajer “discourse is a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts 
and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed to give meaning 
to physical and social relations” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). 
Discourse analysis attempts to show how these actions and objects come to be 
socially constructed and what they mean for social organisation and interaction, in 
this case within a specific policy area.  Discourse analysis emerged from the work of 
Foucault, who used discursive practices as his basic unit of analysis (Fischer, 2003).  
Discourses also structure the policy debate, they determine the range of subjects that 
can be considered, they specify the views that are legitimised as acceptable 
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knowledge claims and even which actors that are the agents of that knowledge 
(Fischer, 2003). 
There are several approaches to discourse analysis with two main categories, 
linguistically based approaches such as Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 
1992) and more context based analysis such as the Interpretive Policy Analysis 
(Yanow, 2000).  As Wagenaar (2011) sets out these can be termed discursive and 
dialogical approaches to using discourse analysis, the former draws from an 
individual’s self-contained understanding of the world whereas the latter sees 
meaning emerging from the position of the individual and his perspective.  This leads 
on to the inevitable requirement to consider the interaction between the relationship 
of the individual and other actors and with the wider context through which meaning 
emerges (Wagenaar, 2011).  Practices are a reflection of a shared framework of 
understanding actions of the world, they represent a meaningful exchange between 
our actions and their impact on the world (Wagenaar, 2011). 
The interpretivist approach, assumes that social reality emerges from the interaction 
between actors but is not willed, it is not a product of thinking but is tied to actions 
and patterns of activities and from interaction with the wider world and between 
actors (Wagenaar, 2011). 
This latter category of interpretive discourse analysis, was considered to be 
appropriate to the research, as the research seeks to deal with multiple meanings 
and the micro-politics within a specific area.  The contested nature of the micro-
politics in this field of policy making however, also suggested a Foucauldian inspired 
approach, which when applied to policy analysis assumes that discourses are 
distributed across institutions and struggle and compete against each other for 
recognition and dominance (Fischer 2003). 
Hewitt (2011) identifies four strengths of Foucauldian discourse analysis of public 
policy, firstly, it illuminates the mechanisms of institutions and governance; secondly, 
it helps uncover the diverse influences that define a policy problem; thirdly, the 
Foucauldian concept of power suggests that by studying the details of dialogue can 
help understand everyday practices within the policy making area and finally, 
discourse analysis recognises the contingent nature of policy making with the 
evidence and information used in the process being created within the confines of the 
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discursive struggle.  This is particularly relevant to the current research in its 
investigation into the generating and testing on knowledge to support the decision 
making within this policy making. 
Furthermore, these approaches seek to link discourses to practices, on the basis that 
discourses emerge from everyday practices taking place within the social structures 
or institutions within which they take place.  It is important to point out that 
“Institutions” in this sense mean rules and social norms, rather than specific 
organisations.  Conversely, the struggle between discourses is also reflected in 
changes in everyday practices, (Fischer, 2003).  Accordingly, any policy analysis also 
faces the challenge that those meanings are constantly changing (Gottweis, 2003). 
Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) set out five contemporary challenges facing policy 
implementation and governance in a network society.  Firstly, the new space of 
politics termed as the “institutional void” where the rules, authority and accountability 
between parties is unclear.  Secondly, there is constant uncertainty and insufficient 
time and knowledge with which to make decisions.  Thirdly, the advent of increased 
cultural diversity means groups have different languages and values, requiring 
translations of meaning and a challenge to mutual understanding.  Fourthly, an 
awareness of interdependence between groups requires a need for collaboration 
between groups and between policy makers and groups.  Finally, there is a greater 
dynamic of trust and identity, between parties, the trust once held in policy makers 
can no longer be assumed as in the past and the collaboration between policy 
makers and groups generates identities which in turn influence the implementation of 
policy (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). 
In addressing these challenges of policy implementation and analysis thereof Hajer 
and Wagenaar (2003) go on to advocate a deliberative policy analysis approach 
which is built on three elements, interpretation, practice and deliberation.  A range of 
different alternative methodological frameworks are available to implement this 
approach and those considered in the research are now briefly discussed. 
4.5 Alternative methodological frameworks 
There were several Deliberative or Interpretive Policy approaches considered, firstly 
Interpretive Policy Analysis (Yanow, 2000), which sets out to uncover communities of 
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meaning and practices, this methodology is particularly appropriate to uncover local 
knowledge and works well with processes of collaboration.  Whilst this methodology 
could have provided some benefits, the CIL policy involving a limited numbers of 
powerful actors, (most with specialist knowledge), in a contested discussion, it was 
considered that other methodologies may be more appropriate in this case. 
An example of a Foucauldian inspired analysis considered was that of Flyvbjerg 
(1998), this approach based on a 15 year analysis of transportation planning in 
Aalborg, Denmark, seeks to uncover the conflict between rationality and power in 
public policy decision making.  It therefore seemed to offer a useful approach to the 
research into CIL, with its seemingly rational approach to viability appraisals likely to 
conflict with the powerful interests of various actors.  The approach termed “Phronetic 
Planning Research” places power at the core of the analysis and is problem driven 
rather than method driven (Flyvbjerg, 2004). 
The decision not to choose that approach was due to two factors, firstly the lack of 
detail in the methodology which only provided very general guidance, but more 
importantly it was considered to be more applicable to a long term analysis.  The 
constrained nature of the timescale for the research project meant that this approach 
probably would also not be appropriate. 
Finally, consideration was given to a Foucauldian based analysis by Sharp and 
Richardson (2001), this methodology was again quite general in nature and whilst 
also seeking to analyse the discursive struggle and the impact of this on practices, it 
was considered it would be difficult to operationalise.  However, as discussed in the 
next section a Foucauldian based methodological framework was selected as the 
basis of the research methodology. 
4.6 Research Methodology 
As the nature of the research involved seeking to uncover meanings, involving non-
quantifiable data such as words from a variety of sources, including documents and 
interviews, a Qualitative Methodology was selected, as appropriate (Bryman, 2008).  
The research also sought to investigate the differences between people’s actual 
behaviours and what they say they are; this analysis of behaviours again required a 
qualitative methodology. 
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The research also sought to investigate the interaction and collaboration that can 
take place within a network of actors, as well as the conflict and use of power within 
networks as knowledge claims are contested (Rydin, 2007).  The nature of 
contemporary network governance requires interpretative and qualitative 
methodologies to be able to examine the underlying mechanisms that are active in 
these complex governance and decision making environments (Hajer, 2003). 
In contrast as mentioned earlier, research into property markets has been mainly 
quantitative in nature, often based on longitudinal analysis of data over time, 
reaching conclusions about trends in values with hedonic market analyses being an 
often used example (Bramley, 2013). However, there is an increasing interest in 
using qualitative methodologies in this area of research linking of property market 
and policy making analysis (Hincks et al., 2013).  Hincks et al. (2013) also suggest 
that adoption of differing perspectives and methodologies and greater diversity would 
be valuable; to use institutional and behavioural approaches to enrich the more 
traditionally used quantitative and econometric models. This research was seen as 
an opportunity to apply an institutional approach and qualitative methodology in 
property research which has been relatively rarely been undertaken (Leishman, 
2003). 
As mentioned earlier Foucauldian derived approaches where considered appropriate 
as they should be best able to deal with the analysis of the micro-political processes 
involved in contested policy making.  Argumentative Discourse Analysis developed 
by Hajer (2006) was selected, as it offered a detailed methodology developed from 
the theoretical perspective of Foucault, with the assumption that the dominant 
discourses positioned actors and that the discourse was the instruments determining 
this. 
This methodology and its discursive mechanisms have been employed in the 
analysis of several areas of public policy; in environmental policy looking at Acid rain 
(Hajer, 1995; Hajer, 1996) where much of the detailed discursive mechanisms of the 
methodology were initially identified.  These were developed into the full ten stage 
methodology later (Hajer, 2006).  The mechanisms have also been employed by 
Hajer to analyse the BSE policy in the UK (Hajer, 2010) and to look at the 
redevelopment of ground zero in New York (Hajer, 2010).  In addition, others have 
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also used the methodology to look at other policy areas such as Kern (2009) to 
compare environmental policies between the Netherlands and the UK relating to 
sustainable electricity systems and Hewitt (2011) on the policy and practice of rural 
development in the UK.. 
The application of the methodology to an area of policy making with a more confined 
area of specialist knowledge, but likely to involve significant contestation was 
proposed by this research.  It was considered that the methodology would assist in 
uncovering of meanings held by different actors, hidden beneath the more tangible 
negotiations of quantitative data and evidence which would clearly take place in the 
implementation of a policy such as CIL. 
As mentioned above Hajer (2006) has set out his ten step methodology for 
“Argumentative Discourse Analysis” which is shown below. 
(1) Desk research – general survey of the documents and positions in a given field, all to 
make a first chronology and come up with a first reading of events. 
(2) Helicopter interviewing – interviews with three or four actors that are chosen because 
they have an overview of the field from different positions.  They might comprise a well-informed 
journalist, a key advisor to the government, an expert-policy maker. 
(3) Document Analysis – analysing documents for structuring concepts, ideas and 
categorisations; employment of storylines, metaphors etc.  This should result in a first attempt at 
defining structuring discourses in the discussion.  At this stage one would get a basic notion of the 
process of events as well as the sites of discursive production. 
(4) Interviews with key players – on the basis of the preceding steps interviews can be 
conducted with central actors in the political process.  The interviews can be used to generate more 
information on causal claims (which led to what) that will always be the assumed core of the 
meeting on the part of the interviewees.  But interviews might also be used to get a better 
understanding of the meaning of particular events for the interviewees it then becomes a focused 
interview (Flick 1998).   
a. How did they interpret the event? 
b. By so doing one aims to reconstruct the discourse from which an actor approached the 
situation. 
c. We can also analyse how a particular cognitive shift came about. 
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d. What led to the actual “reframing”? 
e. Was it reading a report, was it a meeting, a confrontation with a question to which the actor 
did not have an answer. 
It might also be possible to use an interview to find out what made a person recognise another 
perspective as valuable.  What was the shift about, was it about learning to know the people that 
uttered a particular point of view?  Did it have to do with the practice in which people engaged 
(Forester 1999). 
(5) Sites of argumentation – searching for the data not simply to reconstruct the arguments 
used but to account for the argumentative exchange.  Examples, parliamentary debates, minutes of 
inquiries, presentation and interpretation of evidence presented to a particular research 
commission, panel discussions at conferences. 
(6) Analysis for positioning effects – actors can get “caught up” in interplay, they might force 
others to take up a particular role, but once others are aware of what is going on they might also try 
to refuse it (indicators are, that is not what I meant, that is not what it’s about at all).  This 
positioning not only occurs at the person level it can also be found at the institutional level. 
(7) Identification of key incidents – this would lead to the identification of key incidents that 
are essential to understand the discursive dynamics in the chosen case.  As much as possible 
these key incidents are then transcribed in more detail allowing for more insights in which 
determined their political effects. 
(8) Analysis of practices in particular cases of argumentation – rather than assuming 
coherence on part of particular actors, at this stage one goes back to the data to see if the meaning 
of what is being said can be related to the practices in which it was said. 
(9) Interpretation – on this basis one may find a discursive order that governed a particular 
domain in a particular time.  Ideally one should come up with an account of the discursive structures  
within a given discussion, as well as interpretation of the practices, the sites of production that were 
of importance in explaining a particular course of events. 
(10) Second visit to key actors – discourses are inferred from reality by the analyst.  Yet when 
respondents are confronted with the findings they should at least recognise some of the hidden 
structures in language.  Hence to revisit some key actors is a way of controlling if the analysis of the 
discourse space made sense. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Hajer 10 step methodology (Hajer, 2006) 
98 
 
The operationalisation of this methodology is considered later, in the sections on data 
collection and data analysis.  Using an interpretive policy perspective to the research 
as referred to earlier, it was also appropriate to use an inductive or grounded theory 
approach to the research, which is briefly discussed below. 
4.7 Grounded Theory Approach 
Grounded theory emerged in the book by Glaser and Strauss, “The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory” in 1967 (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) it is an approach that starts 
with data and seeks to build theory from the data, on an inductive basis.  This 
contrasts with the testing of a theory by using data on a deductive basis (Bryman, 
2008).  The benefits of using a grounded theory or inductive approach, is that it 
encourages a dialogue between empirical data and theory development (Wagenaar, 
2011).  This is in alignment with the main aims of interpretive policy analysis which 
also seeks to move from empirical material to generalisations and to model building 
(Wagenaar, 2011). 
The general approach of using the coding of data to help build theory and develop 
generalisations has been employed in the data analysis, within the structure of the 
Hajer methodology which again aligns well with grounded theory.  The approach of 
coding data as actions, using the words and actions of respondents to try and 
interpret matters from their viewpoint reflect a grounded approach (Charmaz, 2014).  
They also relate well with the requirements of the Hajer methodological framework, 
which tries to reconstruct the chain of events in the sites of argumentation, the 
interpretation of their meaning to the various actors involved and in turn the impact 
on their policy practices.  All require a close consideration of the empirical data as 
required by the Hajer framework and advocated by Grounded Theory. 
Theorising from data using grounded theory is also useful, as it focusses on 
relationships, it accommodates the dynamic quality of the explanatory chain of 
events and promotes that explanations are cast in terms of the behaviours of actors 
(Abbott, 2004).  From the descriptions of actions identified in the data the intentions 
and meanings of actors are inferred (Wagenaar, 2011). 
Finally, the grounded theory based approach also fits well with a case study design 
as it involves seeking a depth of knowledge in data collection and analysis and to the 
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collection and analysis of situated knowledge, this is also in line with the 
requirements of the context based nature of interpretive policy analysis. 
4.8 Research Design 
The research design selected was Case Study; this was considered particularly 
appropriate as the research was seeking to uncover situated knowledge within a 
specific setting. 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context especially when the 
boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” 
(Yin, 2009, p. 18). 
The research was also investigating a series of decisions taken by a LPA, and again 
this is appropriate for a case study approach. 
“The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case 
study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were 
taken, how they were implemented and with what result” (Schramm, 1971 as 
cited in Yin, 2009, p. 17) 
The need to uncover in depth data and analysis also supported a case study design, 
“distinctive need for case studies arise out of the desire to understand complex social 
phenomena” (Yin, 2009, p. 4). 
The choice of a case study design whilst particularly appropriate, also presented 
limitations, primarily that they can be more descriptive in nature, presenting an 
understanding of a social situation rather than explanations.  In addition case studies 
struggle to provide any predictive conclusions which could be generalizable to other 
locations or circumstances (Yin, 2009). 
The selection of case studies is another important consideration, Yin (2009) sets out 
five rationales for the selection of cases as follows, a critical case to support or 
challenge a proposition, an extreme or unique case, a representative or typical case 
where lessons can be learned, a revelatory case and a longitudinal case (Yin, 2009). 
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In this research, time constraints and resources generally excluded the possibility of 
the longitudinal case.  The initial selections of cases were chosen to illustrate a 
representative or typical cases, in areas with a poor property market such as the 
north east of England.  There was also the potential objective that a comparison 
could be made in the future between these two case studies and other case studies 
in differing geographical areas, with contrasting property market conditions. 
Whilst a comparative study with cases in contrasting property areas was considered, 
this was discounted as it was considered that the depth of research that was carried 
out in the two north east case studies would not be able to be replicated in another 
location.  Therefore the concentration on the two north east case studies was 
considered the best approach, within the available resources and timescale.  The 
researcher’s previous experience of working in the area was partially the reason why 
a significant number of interviewees could be secured in the cases studies; this also 
enabled the depth of research to be carried out as required for this research design.   
The case studies can therefore be considered to be representative in nature, 
although within the context of poor market conditions in contrast to case studies in 
the south east which could be more representative of typical CIL implementation 
across the UK, as CIL has been more actively introduced into the South East.  The 
research however was not merely intended to investigate the CIL policy, but to use 
CIL as a lens to investigate policy making in the area of value capture (including s106 
agreements).  The more challenging context of poorer market conditions was of 
interest as this was likely to influence the relationships between different actors in the 
process and may be make the micro-politics more observable. 
4.9 Data Collection 
Three main sources of data collection were used in the research, firstly the review of 
the policy and literature as discussed in the last two chapters, these have provided 
insights that have framed the data collection from the case studies, secondly policy 
documents analysis at both a national level and at a local case study level and lastly, 
a series of semi-structured interviews with a range of actors involved in the two case 
study areas.  Considered together the use of three sources of data can assist with 
triangulation to support the validity of the data analysis as discussed later. 
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4.9.1 Policy and Literature review 
The review of the history of policy mechanisms in value capture in the UK in chapter 
2 provided some important issues which have framed the later research.  In 
considering the success of previous mechanisms several general points can be 
derived which can inform research into new policy mechanisms such as CIL. 
These include, the distinction between explicit and implicit taxation approaches and 
the perception of the mechanism, this in some ways can be considered to be the 
conceptualisation of the value capture.   In addition the transparency, predictability 
and efficiency of the mechanism also all emerge as factors impacting on the success 
of the mechanism.  The challenge with all of the previous value capture mechanisms 
of actually being able to calculate the development value generated, which in turn 
then leads to the next challenge, of how this value can be shared out between the 
various actors in the process, including any value that can be captured to fund 
infrastructure provision. 
The spending of the captured funding also raises some issues, the hypothecation 
issue in the matching spatially of the value captured with spend, also the certainty of 
the spend, termed the rational nexus issue.  The value capture policy cannot be 
considered in isolation from other policies, its interrelation with other polices needs to 
be considered, together with who benefits and who loses from the policy mechanism 
and finally the governance of the policy making and implementation itself which is an 
important element of the research. 
These issues emerging from the policy review, were considered in relation to the 
literature review of research in the field of value capture.  The shift from theoretical 
assumptions about rational decision making to the need to consider a more detailed 
context specific institutional approach.  The need to consider models of the 
development process and the decision making of actors in the development process 
which planning tools such as value capture mechanisms seek to influence. 
The governance arrangements for policy making, the shift in governance from 
government and hierarchies to market and networks has influenced the nature of the 
research and the selection of the methodology as set out above.  Finally, the 
research sought to investigate the use of knowledge in decision making by local 
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authority planners, research literature in this area has also been influential in the data 
collection and analysis. 
4.9.2 Policy Documents 
In the Hajer (2006) 10 step methodology set out above, there are two stages 
involving data collection from policy documents, the first stage Desk Research, and 
the third stage Document Analysis, these are both now considered. 
The desk research involved a review of the policy documentation for the two case 
studies, together with a national policy document review.  This took place in early 
2014 and was able to take account of the significant number of national policy 
changes that had taken place from 2010 up to 2014.  In relation to the case studies 
the position was that in 2014 Durham had reached the point of having submitted their 
draft charging schedule to the Examiner and were waiting for the CIL Examination in 
public in September 2014, following the Local Plan Examination in Public which took 
place over the summer of 2014.  In relation to Newcastle/Gateshead, again in the 
summer of 2014 the Local Plan Examination in public took place. The CIL process 
however, having had two short periods of activity in September 2012 and September 
2013 when a draft preliminary charging schedule had been published, and some 
follow up work in 2013, had been put on hold by the local authorities until after the 
Local Plan process was completed.  This desk research provided an outline of the 
main issues and timeline for the CIL process in each case study area. 
The third step in the Hajer methodology is the document analysis, which was 
undertaken from summer 2014 until spring 2015, during which the two case studies 
were relatively inactive in progressing CIL whilst the Local Plans were progressing 
through that process.  This was helpful as it allowed a period of analysis of a whole 
range of documentation, including formal committee reports, minutes of meetings, 
and formal documents from the CIL process such as Charging Schedules and 
Viability Assessment reports, more details about which are discussed in the case 
study chapters.  The changes in these documents were studied over the period as 
different versions were issued with differing emphasis and content, this helped reveal 
underlying meanings which were being sought by the discourse analysis. 
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This process involved the analysing of the key documents for ideas, notions and 
categories and for structuring concepts, and the use of storylines and tropes which 
will be discussed further in the section on analysis later.  The key documents were 
placed into a chronology with the main events in the process identified, some of 
these were formal consultations but others were less formal and more difficult to 
identify, this was something investigated further in the key interviews.  The sites for 
the discursive production were also identified based on the production of three key 
documents which formed the core of the policy making process and all of which were 
contested to varying extent by various actors. 
4.9.3 Semi-structured Interviews 
In the Hajer 10 step methodology there are two stages of data collection involving 
interviews, step two “helicopter interviews” and step 4 Interviews with Key Players, 
these are now considered.  
There were 5 helicopter interviews carried out in April 2014 to supplement the 
background for the research and with interviewees not involved in the case studies 
themselves.  These semi-structured interviews were with a national policy expert on 
CIL, two local agents working in the north east one with involvement in CIL policy and 
one not, a former senior officer of a public agency in the north east and a local 
authority planning officer dealing directly with CIL policy in the north east but not in 
the case study areas.  These helicopter interviews assisted in identifying issues that 
had not been highlighted by the desk research, to frame the more detailed data 
collection from the document analysis discussed above and the semi structured 
interviews with key players as will now be considered. 
The fourth step in the Hajer methodology is the interviews with key players, again 
they were undertaken by way of semi-structured interviews, as this presented the 
opportunity to probe in further detail concerning points that emerged in the interview 
itself.  The selection of interviewees was based on a mixture of using existing 
contacts and snowball sampling, whereby an interviewee suggests another 
interviewee.  It was important to ensure that the selection of interviewees reflected 
opposing viewpoints across the policy making area, with those inside and those 
outside the policy making process, also actors at different levels in the policy making 
process, those at the strategic level and those at the operational “hands on” level for 
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the CIL policy.  In addition balance was also sought by involving different groups who 
were involved in the process, such as property agents, consultants, developers and 
different departments within local authorities. 
The purpose of the main case study interviews were to generate more information on 
the CIL decision making process and the causal claims of what events led to what in 
the chronological process of the policy implementation (Hajer, 2006).  If appropriate 
and possible in some of these interviews to ascertain the meaning of particular 
events for certain key players and whether this led to them “reframing” the policy or 
the decisions taken.  By being able to ascertain this, it was hoped to be able to 
reconstruct the main discursive mechanisms in the policy implementation.  These 
interviews were not just about the micro decision making processes of implementing 
the policy process by officers involved in the front line of implementation, but also 
about the strategic context in which the CIL policy is implemented and the wider 
factors that were being brought to bear upon the CIL policy making.  In turn to 
perhaps understand how the policy can be employed in a range of different ways 
reflecting local circumstances and objectives of the local authority as a whole, rather 
than something independent from other planning policy or indeed even other policy 
objectives. 
Between May 2014 and February 2015 a total of 23 interviews were carried out with 
a total of 28 interviewees, across the two case studies, some of which had an 
involvement in both case study areas, of these interviews 21 took place in person, (of 
which all except one were recorded), 2 were telephone interviews which were also 
not recorded.  It was not possible to interview every party who made a representation 
as part of the formal consultation processes nor every local authority officer involved 
in the policy implementation.  However, it is believed that a representative range of 
actors involved in the process were interviewed, based on their roles in the process 
and supplemented by a snowball sampling process to select later interviewees.  
There were a few potential interviewees who were not able to be interviewed such as 
a senior planning officer in Newcastle City Council, whilst this would have been 
useful, as the equivalent officers at both Durham and Gateshead were interviewed, it 
is considered that the impact of this on the overall data collection was very limited as 
the range of roles and levels within local authorities were satisfactorily covered. 
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Interview Reference Description 
Helicopter Interviews 
1 CA:NE:H1 Property Agent in NE 
2 LA:N/NE:H2 Senior LA representative 
3 LA:NE:H3 Planning Officer in NE 
4 CA:NE:H4 Property Agent in NE 
5 CA:N:H5 National Property Agent 
6 DV:N:H6 National Developer 
Case Study Interviews 
7 CA:NG1 Property Agent in NE 
8 CA:NG2 Property Agent in NE 
9 DV:D/NG1 Developer 
10 CA:D/NG1 Property Agent in NE 
11 LA:NG1 Senior LA Officer in NE 
12 LA:NG2 Senior LA Officer in NE 
13 LA:NG3 LA Property Surveyors in NE 
14 LA:D1 Planning Officer in NE 
15 LA:NG4 LA Property Surveyors in NE 
16 LA:D2 Planning Officer in NE 
17 LA:D3 LA Property Surveyors in NE 
18 LA:D4 Snr Planning Officer in NE 
19 DV:D/NG2 National Planning Consultant 
20 CA:D/NG2 National Property Agent 
21 DV:D/NG3 National Developer in NE 
22 LA:NG5 Planning Officer in NE 
23 LA:NG6 Planning Officer in NE 
24 LA:NG7 Planning Officer in NE 
25 CA:D/NG3 Planning Consultants in NE 
26 LA:NG8 Snr Planning Officer in NE 
27 DV:D/NG4 NE Developer 
28 DV:D/NG5 National Developer in NE 
Figure 4.2 Schedule of Interviewees 
Interviewees Naming Conventions 
CA – Consultant or Agent, DV – Developer, LA – Local Authority Officer 
D – Durham, NG – Newcastle/Gateshead 
N- National, NE – North East, H - Helicopter 
To ensure the range of interviewees did properly reflect different roles and levels 
within the local authorities and private sector parties who were involved in the CIL 
process the interview period was extended to longer than originally planned, due to 
the Local Plan Examinations in public, but this was accepted in order to secure the 
appropriate range of interviewees.  There was also a conscious decision not to 
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interview Council members due to their very limited knowledge of the CIL process 
and of viability assessments. 
All interviewees were informed about the nature of the research and agreed to be 
involved, this form sought the interviewees consent, and also offered to protect the 
confidentiality and anonymity of the interviewee and their contributions.  In most 
cases this was readily accepted without discussion.  Occasionally during the 
interviews some interviewees indicated that a particular comment was “confidential” 
but generally the interviews were very open and in some cases quite lengthy (from 
60 to 90 minutes long) and were quite in-depth in nature. 
As referred to above, key issues were identified from the desk research and 
helicopter interviews, in addition as the key player interviews proceeded in parallel 
with the document analysis there was also some interaction between these two data 
collection activities as well.  Reflecting the fact that some actors were involved in the 
day to day detail of policy implementation whilst other actors had a much more 
strategic role, accordingly there was some differentiation in the questions asked to 
reflect the role of the interviewee.  The key issues addressed in the interviews were, 
the role of the interviewee in the policy process, what were the key events in the 
process and their view of them, what were the key relationships with other actors, 
how did the CIL interrelate with other policies, what was the impact of policy 
guidance and what were the capacity and skills issues. 
Access to “elites” as key decision makers and to private sector actors is often 
problematic, yet this was believed to be a key element in trying to understand the 
varying perspectives of the different actors involved in the CIL policy.  The 
researchers personal experience and contacts meant that north east based case 
studies were most appropriate to exploit this opportunity.  The potential implications 
of this on the research in terms of ethics and the reflexivity of the researcher are 
however acknowledged and are discussed at the end of this chapter. 
4.10 Policy Analysis and Discursive mechanisms 
As discussed above the research seeks to investigate not just what is said but where 
and how and by whom it is said, (what is said within its context).  As part of this 
analysis Hajer (1995) identified several discursive mechanisms, which can assist in 
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trying to uncover the interpretations of meaning, within policy implementation.  These 
mechanisms are now briefly considered. 
4.10.1 Storylines 
The concept of storylines is that they condense and summarise a complex narrative 
and are used by actors as a short hand in discussions.  What they do reveal however 
is that actors don’t necessarily refer to a problem with a fixed identity but rather that 
this can change (Hajer, 2006).  Storylines enable different actors or groups of actors 
to talk and even agree, yet often they don’t have the same interpretation or meaning 
and in fact are talking at cross purposes not fully understanding one another. 
4.10.2 Discourse Coalitions 
Discourse Coalitions refer to a group of actors that share the use of a particular set of 
storylines within a set of practices over a period of time.  The storylines can 
sometimes be instrumental in the creation of a Discourse Coalition, but as the 
storyline changes then the coalition may also change, reflecting the dynamic nature 
of the process (Hajer, 2006). 
4.10.3 Tropes and Metaphors 
Tropes are figures of speech and arguments which influence understandings and 
meanings, they act as rhetorical devices and have persuasive power beyond their 
literal meaning (Fischer and Forester, 1996; Throgmorton, 1996).  Tropes as a 
general term can include metaphors, metonymy and irony all as figures of speech 
and types of trope (Fischer and Forester, 1996).  A Metaphor is understanding and 
experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), and 
can be helpful in understanding meanings.  They often play an emblematic role and 
also a key role in changing policy direction as they influence actor’s interpretation of 
meaning often in quite significant ways.  Within this research the trope as the more 
general term has been used rather than attempt to categorise figures of speech more 
specifically, the main purpose being to identify figures of speech that have been 
influential on the policy making process. 
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4.10.4 Change in policy practices and institutions 
The effects of these discursive mechanisms and storylines in particular on the 
implementation of policy, is reflected in the positioning of actors and the clustering 
knowledge claims, used to influence the construction of the policy problem and the 
meaning attributed to the policy.  These mechanisms can also influence the everyday 
practices of actors involved in the process.  Hajer defines practices as “embedded 
routines and mutually understood rules and norms that provide coherence to social 
life” (Hajer, 2006, p. 70). 
In this way by analysing the discursive mechanisms, their influence on the policy 
implementation can also be studied within a specific local context as envisaged in the 
case studies.  Interpretive policy analysis is a practice oriented approach seeking to 
understand the relationship between knowledge and action in practice within a 
specific context.  Obtaining knowledge cannot be seen apart from the setting nor 
from the relationships between the actors involved, the knowledge is anchored in 
those relationships and who is involved and who is excluded (Wagenaar, 2011).  If 
the planning decision making process (or CIL process) is conceptualised as a series 
of arenas in which knowledge claims are tested, with who’s are included and who’s 
excluded (Rydin, 2007) this again provides an appropriate framework for undertaking 
this research as the arenas link to the sites of argumentation within the Hajer 
methodology. 
4.11 Data Analysis 
In the 10 step Hajer (2006) methodology set out earlier, some initial data analysis 
was undertaken in the four steps discussed earlier under data collection, as it should 
be pointed out that the 10 steps were not entirely sequential with some running in 
parallel with each other.  Steps 5 to 9 are, sites of argumentation, analysis for 
positioning effects, identification of key incidents and Interpretation, these are now 
discussed. 
4.11.1 Steps 5 to 9 Hajer Methodology 
As part of the analysis undertaken in step 4 of the Hajer methodology, the Document 
Analysis sought to establish a basic notion of the process of key events and the sites 
of discursive production.  In the interviews with key players the key events were 
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discussed and the policy discourse reconstructed from the viewpoint of that actor to 
start the process of studying the impact of the policy on policy practices.  The Sites of 
argumentation involves searching underneath the arguments deployed to account for 
the reasons and meanings attached to the arguments used.  This information on 
meanings and causal mechanisms are useful to reconstruct the discourses, that 
actors then draw on and to analyse the reframing or cognitive shifts (Kern, 2009). 
In this research the reframing and cognitive shifts were easier to discern over the 10 
year period of the national policy analysis in chapter 5, from the Barker report 
(Barker, 2004) up to early 2015.  In the analysis of the two case studies this was 
more challenging, as the period of study was only three years with more subtle shifts 
and reframing having to be considered, as discussed in the two case study chapters 
later.  Using the three main sites of discursive production, the preparation of the 
viability assessment, the setting of the proposed rates and the preparation of the 
infrastructure delivery plan; an analysis of the discussions that took place were 
studied to ascertain the different meanings and ways of seeing the problem by the 
different actors. 
This involved the identification of discursive mechanisms such as storylines and 
tropes as set out above; this was a challenging exercise and involved identifying 
phrases that were regularly used in different documents and interviews, sometimes 
by key actors to make specific points.  Reading the documentation and interviews 
key events and arenas were identified showing the local policy making process.  As 
the policy making progressed the different versions of key documents changed, as 
did the wording and phrases within them.  These key phrases provided initially a long 
list of storylines and tropes, rereading of the source material via an iterative process, 
helped rationalise and reduce these to the key storylines and tropes.  The key 
storylines and tropes were the phrases and wording, which were considered to have 
been the most influential on the policy making process as it developed, which 
justified a change in direction in the policy proposals. 
National storylines and tropes were identified from an analysis of national policy 
documentation, the objectives and justifications set out in the CIL policy making 
process as it evolved thorough as series of events and versions of the 
documentation.  At a national level the main objective was to remove the barriers to 
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new development and to facilitate this with the provision of new infrastructure.  The 
main national storylines and tropes identified reflected this ambition to remove 
barriers and were considered to be the key influences on policy making at the 
national level and also influential at a local level. 
The positioning of actors in the policy process was also considered in the case 
studies, and was also quite challenging within the limited time frame for the two case 
studies.  The positioning of actors has been suggested, but it is recognised that these 
are often dynamic in nature and may not have much impact on the practices of the 
various actors in the policy process. 
In considering the key events in the policy making process it became clear at both 
the national level and at the local case study level some key incidents were 
particularly influential on the policy implementation.  Again at the national level some 
key decisions were made and set out in minutes of meetings and in formal policy 
documents.  In the case studies some of the key decisions again were set out in 
minutes of committee meetings or in policy documents setting out changes in the 
direction of the policy implementation, these are set out in the next three chapters. 
The analysis of practices involved in the CIL process and the key decisions that need 
to be taken, the argumentation influencing those decisions and can the meaning of 
what is said be related to the practices as required by the Hajer methodology.  These 
linked to the interpretation step, in which discursive mechanisms were identified to 
establish an explanation for the course of events as they unfolded, across the three 
key sites of production.  The national policy level is studied over a ten year period in 
chapter 5, setting out the discursive struggle at a national policy level with key 
national policy storylines and tropes identified, with the anticipated impact on policy 
practices also set out.  In the case studies at a local level and studied over a shorter 
period, the discursive struggle between the national and local storylines and tropes is 
considered and the impact on local policy practices also set out in chapters 6 and 7. 
The final step in the Hajer methodology is a second visit to the key actors, due to the 
rapidly changing policy background in both case study areas it was decided not to 
undertake this last step, it is not considered that much benefit would have been 
derived.  At the local level the national storylines and tropes remained powerful in 
influencing local policy making and practices, but local storylines and tropes also had 
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influence.  Having considered the methodology, it is now appropriate to consider the 
discursive mechanisms that underpin the Hajer analysis and the application of the 
methodology. 
Finally, as referred to earlier interpretive policy research involves the view that 
meaning emerges from the interaction of various actors between themselves and 
with the wider environment.  As part of the research process the researcher interacts 
with those involved in the research, this is integral to the research, but introduces the 
issues of reflexivity and the positionality and identity of the researcher, which are now 
considered in the next section. 
4.12 Researchers Biography and Reflexivity 
4.12.1 Reflexivity 
As the research involves an interpretive policy approach the concept of reflexivity 
becomes an important part of the process at different stages (Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow, 2012).  Reflexivity requires the researcher to explicitly consider their ways of 
thinking and acting in relation to the research (Hewitt, 2011).  As the researchers 
understandings develop, “the “practice” of reflexivity involves the self-conscious 
“testing” of these emerging explanations and patterns” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 
2012, p. 101). 
It is Foucault’s concept of discourse that implies that the researcher cannot be 
considered as separate from the discursive formations and that the relationships 
between the researcher and the researched is contingent and relational and is 
subject to power relations.  As Sharp and Richardson (2001) set out the position of 
the researcher needs to be explicitly acknowledged to assist the reader to 
understand the choices made in the research process.  In this way it brings 
legitimacy to the research process and is particularly relevant to the knowledge 
generation and analysis (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). 
The socially constructed nature of the researcher and their dual identity as both 
practitioner and researcher is a further element of the reflexivity issue, with 
consideration of how this may shape the discourses and narratives identified in the 
research.  This is considered further below following a brief biography of the 
researcher. 
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4.12.2 Biography 
The researcher has worked as a Chartered Surveyor in the North East of England for 
approximately 30 years up to 2011, in a range of organisations but for the last 25 
years within several public sector regeneration agencies, such as English Estates, 
English Partnerships, One North East and the Homes and Communities Agency.  
Whilst the remit of these agencies did change over the period in question, depending 
on the political and economic priorities of the Government at the time, in general 
terms the role of these central government agencies was to work in partnership with 
the public and private sectors to enable physical regeneration.  One Northeast had a 
wider role as the regional development agency, however the researcher’s main role 
was to assist primarily in the physical regeneration part of the wider economic 
regeneration role. 
Accordingly the researcher developed and maintained professional relationships with 
a range of professionals and officers across the north east, although primarily in the 
northern part of the north east region, Northumberland and Tyne and Wear rather 
than in Tees Valley and Durham.  The role placed significant emphasis on working 
with local authorities who would take the lead as the democratically accountable 
body, on priorities for regeneration.  The role involved undertaking appraisals of 
viability of projects in order to secure funding from the agency itself or sometimes 
from central government if above certain delegated levels.  The nature of the 
appraisals were in line with the requirements of the Treasury Green book (H M 
Treasury, 2003), and in house appraisal requirements based on this commensurate 
with the scale of funding requirement.  These appraisals whilst different from private 
sector appraisals did employ similar techniques and as required sometimes input 
was sought from private sector consultants and agents to support the appraisal 
process.  The main focus of the appraisals being to justify the need for the 
investment and to assess value for money of the public sector investment in terms of 
a range of outputs anticipated to be delivered by the project investment, such as 
numbers of houses, commercial floor space, land reclaimed for development and 
private sector money levered into the project. 
The justification of many of these investments by the public sector also sought to 
place the individual project investments into a wider strategic setting, such as wider 
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regeneration strategies such as the Grainger Town strategy, the Gateshead Quays 
strategy or the Sunderland ARC strategy.  This helped reduce the risk of investment 
for other partners in the area, particular the private sector, but presents a significantly 
different approach to an individual project and profit based approach employed by a 
private sector appraisal. 
The researcher has therefore worked with some of the key officers from Newcastle 
City Council, Gateshead Council and Durham County Council, even if they had been 
in different roles at the time.  In addition the researcher has worked with a range of 
chartered surveyors and other consultants who have been involved in the CIL 
process and made comments on the CIL appraisals.  Finally, the researcher has also 
dealt with developers and house builders in the North East who have been recipients 
of funding or been involved in procurement exercises for securing developers for key 
regeneration sites.  It is believed that this has been beneficial to the research not just 
in terms of access but also that the information was independently and honestly 
presented on the basis of trust and integrity between the parties, not just providing 
what the interviewee thought the researcher wanted.  The technical knowledge and 
background of the researcher also assisted in securing the depth of knowledge 
involved in some of the policy making practices. 
The researcher having worked in the north east has also some knowledge of the 
property market in the various sectors, but also of the history of the economic 
development priorities of the local authorities in the region.  The researcher also has 
knowledge of some of the governance issues and of the nature of some of the 
relationships between public and private sectors and between public sector agencies 
themselves, all of which have impacted on this research.  This insight is believed to 
be on balance helpful, allowing the researcher to save a considerable time having to 
investigate some of these matters prior to going into the field, also facilitating access 
to key interviewees some of which could be termed “elites”.  
However, it is recognised as referred to above that the professional relationship the 
researcher has had before and may have after the research, did present problems of 
potential conflicts of interest and the need for reflexivity in considering the data that 
emerged from the research. 
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4.12.3 Identities and Impact on the Research 
As referred to earlier the researcher has two identities in relation to the research, the 
biography above sets out the practitioner identity, but there is also the researcher 
identity.  A key part of acknowledging these twin identities is in relation to prior 
understandings of the subject domain from the past and how this may influence the 
interpretations made in the research.  The twin identities were present in the data 
collection, in the interviews both identities were present especially with interviewees 
with which the researcher had previously dealt with in practice.  This was explicit and 
acknowledged by both parties, however the two identities are less obviously apparent 
in the data collection and analysis of policy documents, in the selection of documents 
and in the reading and interpreting of them.  Reflexivity as mentioned earlier assists 
the researcher to consider the choices and selections made and to explain why they 
were made. 
In data analysis the positionality of the researcher as inside or outside the domain of 
the research is key.  In interpretive policy analysis approaches the objective is to 
secure understandings of meanings, to achieve this the researcher needs to became 
an “insider” and cannot realistically take an “outsider” position.  It is preferable to 
acknowledge the positionality rather than attempt to demonstrate a neutral position 
which would be impossible (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012). 
The positionality relates to the researcher researching a topic where there are likely 
to be preconceived views and knowledge about the subject prior to the research.  
Having worked for 30 years in a similar area to that being researched this has to be 
acknowledged, and to some extent is unavoidable in any social research, but 
perhaps is a greater risk here than usual.  The researcher has been aware of this 
throughout and whilst researching a subject of interest to him, the implementation of 
viability assessments within wider policy it is not one that the researcher has strong 
preconceived views about.  However, the researcher has a stance of considering 
value capture as a worthwhile exercise to support public policy objectives, but with an 
appreciation and understanding of the need for the private sector to secure a level of 
profit to make a project viable.  Using the CIL policy to investigate the viability 
assessment process and its relationship with wider policy implementation is one 
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aspect of the research; the other is to ascertain the key features of value capture 
policy to ascertain if any improvements can be made to make it more effective. 
As stated earlier virtually all of the interviewees could be considered “elites” in that 
they were professionally qualified actors with clear views on the area being 
researched and used to providing views.  In many cases they were also in senior 
positions in their organisations and sought to put a particular viewpoint across 
irrespective of the questions asked, this is reflective of Harvey (2011) in which he 
states that elite interviews differ from other interviews in that the interviewee may 
seek to control the interview and be selective on what questions they may wish to 
answer.  The interviews with some senior figures did also reflect the power relations 
between the parties, typical of “elite” interviews (Rice, 2010) and the nature of the 
interview was less structured than with other more junior interviewees. 
Nevertheless, this power balance can often be renegotiated (Rice, 2010) and the 
researcher’s previous experience and employment history was important in this 
respect.  Mikecz (2012) talks about the preparation for elite interviews and suggests 
using research to increase the interviewer’s positionality and reduce the imbalance.  
In this case the researcher’s attendance at various conferences on CIL and building 
a detailed knowledge of the policy and its guidance did reduce the status imbalance 
and increased the researcher’s positionality including during the interviews.  The 
tactics of impression management have also been identified as relevant in relation to 
interviews with developers and professionals in the built environment (Moore, 2015), 
this was apparent in a few of the interviews and reflected in the analysis of data from 
those interviews in the research. 
The positionality of the interviewer is a key determinant of the researcher’s success 
and key to this is establishing a rapport, gaining trust and a reputation for reliability 
(Mikecz, 2012), in this case the researcher’s reputation was beneficial in this respect.  
It is believed that both in terms of securing access, another challenge of “elite” 
interviews (Harvey, 2011) and in the depth of the information secured, the 
researchers previous relationships and reputation were important.  In terms of 
potential interviewees that were unable to be secured, they were generally less well 
known or unknown to the researcher before the research and indicate that the 
researcher’s positionality was an advantage in gaining access. 
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The positionality of the researcher is also effected by the researchers own 
professional status, as has already been stated the researcher has professional 
qualifications as a FRICS, in itself requiring certain levels of integrity and 
accountability especially in relation to potential conflicts of interest, see the RICS five 
ethical standards (RICS, 2015).  In addition the reputation of the researcher as a 
professional has been a key advantage to being able to undertake this research and 
secure access to and the cooperation of, key interviewees, some of whom could be 
categorised as “elites”.  This professional reputation is something which the 
researcher considers very important and has sought to preserve and protect 
throughout the research process.  Especially in relation to the potential conflicts of 
interest involved in this research, and any potential ethical considerations which are 
now considered. 
4.12 4 Ethical Considerations 
The nature of social research is that it requires trust between the parties and integrity 
on the part of the researcher.  Accordingly it is hoped that the previous professional 
relationship the researcher has had with some key interviewees in the research, and 
the existing levels of trust and integrity that exist as a result, will benefit the content 
and depth of data secured from the interviews.  However, the researcher due to 
those previous professional relationships, which are also likely to continue after the 
research is completed, will need to exercise significant caution, as it is recognised 
that potential conflicts of interest may arise.   
This can occur in several ways, firstly the researcher may acquire knowledge that he 
could use within a professional context during or after the research period, to date 
this has not been an issue, primarily as much of the interview discussions concerned 
data in the public domain and was of little commercial value.  
The second issue is more significant, that the researcher could use knowledge 
obtained from one interview and divulge this unintentionally in another interview to 
another party.  There are two potential issues from this firstly that some confidential 
information may be divulged, this has been discounted as being very unlikely due to 
the limited amount of confidential information discussed and the caution used by both 
researcher and interviewees regarding this type of information.  The second issue is 
more relevant for consideration, as over the quite lengthy period of the interviews 
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taking place undoubtedly the views of the researcher were shaped by the interviews 
and the content of earlier interviews and did influence the nature of the questioning in 
later interviews with some change of emphasis perhaps, although the same general 
topics and questions were asked.  In many ways this is the nature of all research and 
can be seen as a positive factor, although care was taken to try and cover all the 
topics in the original interview questions, even if not necessarily in the same order, as 
the researcher had to adapt to the nature and flow of the interview and probe or 
pursue depth or clarification when the opportunity presented itself.   
The third issue was the relationship between the researcher and the interviewee and 
could this influence the data secured from the interviews undertaken.  In reviewing 
the fieldwork interviews it is clear that access was secured to some interviewees that 
may not have been secured so easily or even at all otherwise, which is clearly a 
major benefit to the research.  The content of the interviews did sometimes include 
references to the researcher’s previous employment or expertise in the research 
area, but this was rare and there was no indication that interviewees had answered 
questions in a particular way so as to provide an answer the researcher may want to 
hear.  Similarly the researcher often sought to probe interviewees for explanation or 
depth but only very occasionally offered any opinion on the subject area and it is not 
believed that this unduly influenced the data secured from the interviews.  As many 
of the interviewees could be considered “elites”, in that they were professionally 
qualified actors with clear views on the area being researched, it is believed that the 
researcher had a limited influence on the data generated, but it is acknowledged that 
some influence was unavoidable.  It is acknowledged that this may potentially impact 
on the outcomes of the research, but it is believed that this can be satisfactorily 
managed and that the potential benefits outweigh the problems of conflict of interest. 
Another challenge relates to the researcher’s objectivity, having previously worked in 
the field and with some of the key interviewees, the researcher may not be able to 
take as detached position as other researchers.  However, Social research by its 
very nature always presents challenges of this type and again it is believed that this 
can be satisfactorily managed by the researcher being reflexive in relation to the 
research data as it emerges.  Again the advantages of the researchers existing 
knowledge of the field, outweighs the problems of lack of objectivity. 
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4.13 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the basis of the approach to the research, from the 
ontological and epistemological position leading on to the selection of an interpretive 
policy approach as appropriate for this research and the selection of the 
methodological framework as a basis of the research (Hajer 2006).  The details of the 
data collection and analysis were also set out, including the key discursive 
mechanisms involved in the discourse analysis which are key to uncovering the 
meanings involved in this approach to policy analysis.  The case study design fits 
well with the aim of recovering situated and context based knowledge and to secure 
a depth of data to support an understanding the policy making process in a specific 
context.  
Finally, the positionality of the researcher and its potential impact on the research is 
considered, including potential ethical issues, and the use of reflexivity as a concept 
to assist in addressing those potential issues.  What is apparent is that the viability 
assessment process and the wider policy making process are both socially 
constructed in nature, they are constructed by the various actors involved and the 
interactions between them.  This is why the interpretive policy approach has been 
employed, it assists in uncovering the meanings attached to policy proposals and 
how they influence the practices of actors in the process and in turn the outcomes on 
the ground. 
It is now appropriate to consider the findings and analysis of the data generated 
beginning in the next chapter with a consideration of the national policy context 
followed by the findings from the two case studies. 
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Chapter 5 National Policy Perspective (From Value Capture to Supporting 
Growth) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As part of the research is to consider how policy making is implemented at a local 
level in comparison with the objectives set out at a national level, before considering 
the locally based case studies, it is worthwhile looking at the policy perspective at a 
national level.  To analyse how CIL as a policy emerged, its objectives and effects, in 
addition its relationship with other related policies, such as s106, the viability 
assessment of Local Plans, the SHLAAs and the policy context surrounding the CIL 
policy.  The history of the CIL as a policy has been set out earlier in Chapter 2, 
setting out the changes to the regulations and guidance that have taken place since 
2008 and its formal introduction in 2010, this chapter seeks to consider the 
background influences to those changes. 
The origins of the policy have been traced back to the Barker Review into Housing 
Supply (Barker, 2004) commissioned in 2003, which is where the timeline for this 
policy analysis will start, this report recommended value capture via the Planning 
Gain Supplement, which was then later replaced by the CIL.  From the wider value 
capture view this is a good point to start, as it reflected a growing dissatisfaction with 
the s106 system, as a result Barker (2004) justified an explicit tax on land value uplift, 
which had been abandoned in the UK for virtually 30 years.  Furthermore, it linked 
value capture to the provision of infrastructure to support growth and to increased 
housing supply; this was the start of a reconceptualization of value capture as will be 
discussed later. 
5.2 National Policy Timeline 
The timescale of the CIL as a policy is set out below and has three different phases, 
the period from 2004 and the Barker Report proposals up to October 2007 when the 
Planning Gain Supplement (PGS) was replaced by the CIL, then the period from 
October 2007 up to May 2010 when CIL was developed and introduced by the 
Labour Government and finally the last phase from May 2010 up to May 2015 when 
the Coalition Government retained the CIL policy but made a series of amendments 
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to the policy over the period.  A review of national policy documentation was carried 
out from the Barker report (Barker, 2004) through to 2015, considering the evolution 
of the policy over the period, from this review of policy material the key events from 
the national perspective were identified as shown in table 5.1. 
5.2.1 Key Events National Perspective 
Key Event Date 
First Phase 2004 to October 2007 
Delivering Stability: Securing our Future 
Housing Needs: Final Report—
Recommendations 
March 2004 
Government’s response to Barker 
review of Housing Supply 
December 2005 
Planning Gain Supplement – A 
consultation 
December 2005 
DCLG Committee – Planning Gain 
Supplement 
26 October 2006 
Governments Response to DCLG 
Committee 
December 2006 
DCLG Homes for the Future: more 
affordable more sustainable 
July 2007 
Ministers Statement re PGS 9 October 2007 
Second Phase October 2007 to May 2010 
DCLG Community Infrastructure Levy January 2008 
DCLG the Community Infrastructure 
Levy 
August 2008 
DCLG CIL Detailed proposals and draft 
regulations for the introduction of CIL – 
Consultation 
July 2009 
DCLG CIL Detailed proposals and draft 
regulations for the introduction of CIL – 
Consultation – Summary of responses 
February 2010 
DCLG CIL Final Impact Assessment February 2010 
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DCLG CIL Regulations March 2010 
Third Phase May 2010 to May 2015 
Greg Clarke – announced retention of 
CIL by Coalition Government 
18 November 2010 
DCLG Localism Bill – CIL Impact 
Assessment 
January 2011 
CIL (Amendments) Regulations April 2011 
CIL Detailed Proposals Consultation October 2011 
DCLG Committee – Regeneration 19 October 2011 
DCLG National Planning Policy 
Framework 
March 2012 
CIL (Amendments) Regulations  April 2012 
CIL Rate Setting Guidance December 2012 
Harman Report – Viability Testing Local 
Plans – Advice for Planning 
Practitioners 
June 2012 
RICS Financial Viability in Planning August 2012 
Ministerial Announcement 10 January 2013 
CIL (Amendments) Regulations April 2013 
CIL Rate Setting Guidance April 2013 
DCLG Consultation CIL Further 
Reforms 
April 2013 
DCLG Governments Response October 2013 
CIL Getting it Right – Savills & HBF January 2014 
CIL (Amendments) Regulations  February 2014 
National Planning Policy Guidance March 2014 
Formal Review into CIL  March 2015 
Table 5.1 Key Events National Policy Perspective 
Having set out the key events concerning the emergence and development of the 
CIL policy over the period, it was important to then set out the key sites of discursive 
production or argumentation, these are set out in the table 5.2.  These key sites of 
discussion and debate, will have been supplemented with many more meetings and 
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discussions which have not been recorded with publicly available material, this 
analysis has studied the high level publicly available material to track the main 
influences on the policy development at a national level as context to the subsequent 
case study analysis of how the CIL policy has developed and been implemented 
within specific locations. 
5.2.2 Key Sites of Argumentation National Perspective 
Key Sites of Argumentation Dates and Sources of Secondary 
Data  
First Phase 2004 to October 2007 
Delivering Stability: Securing our Future 
Housing Needs: Final Report—
Recommendations 
March 2004 
Government’s response to Barker 
review of Housing Supply 
December 2005 
Planning Gain Supplement – A 
consultation 
December 2005 
DCLG Committee – Planning Gain 
Supplement 
26 October 2006 
Governments Response to DCLG 
Committee 
December 2006 
DCLG Homes for the Future: more 
affordable more sustainable 
July 2007 
Ministers Statement re PGS 9 October 2007 
Second Phase October 2007 to May 2010 
DCLG Community Infrastructure Levy January 2008 
DCLG the Community Infrastructure 
Levy 
August 2008 
DCLG CIL Detailed proposals and draft 
regulations for the introduction of CIL – 
Consultation 
July 2009 
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DCLG CIL Detailed proposals and draft 
regulations for the introduction of CIL – 
Consultation – Summary of responses 
February 2010 
DCLG CIL Regulations March 2010 
Third phase May 2010 to May 2015 
Greg Clarke – announced retention of 
CIL by Coalition Government 
18 November 2010 
CIL Detailed Proposals Consultation October 2011 
DCLG Committee – Regeneration 19 October 2011 
DCLG National Planning Policy 
Framework 
March 2012 
CIL Rate Setting Guidance December 2012 
Harman Report – Viability Testing Local 
Plans – Advice for Planning 
Practitioners 
June 2012 
RICS Financial Viability in Planning August 2012 
Ministerial Announcement 10 January 2013 
DCLG Consultation CIL Further Reforms April 2013 
DCLG Governments Response October 2013 
CIL Getting it Right – Savills & HBF January 2014 
National Planning Policy Guidance March 2014 
Formal Review into CIL March 2015 
Table 5.2 Key Sites of Argumentation National Policy Perspective 
As can be seen there has been a considerable amount of discussion about the 
policy, from the initial proposals to introduce a levy or tax in addition to a scaled down 
Planning Obligations (s106) policy, up to the CIL policy position in 2015.  The 
proposal for an additional planning gain measure to generate income to pay for extra 
strategic infrastructure was proposed as one of a range of measures to address the 
issue of inadequate housing supply and in turn the impact of volatility of house prices 
on the national economy and growth (Barker, 2004).  Hence, the selection of the 
Barker Review as the starting point for the analysis and the focus on value capture 
policy from that point up to 2015.  It is clear however, that even focussing on value 
capture policy and the mechanisms involved, the PGS/CIL policies cannot be seen in 
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isolation from other policies and how they have changed over the period, not least 
the s106 legislation and guidance and the Local Plan preparation regulations and 
how they interrelate with the PGS/CIL value capture policy. 
5.3 The Main Events in the National PGS/CIL Process 
5.3.1 First Phase 2004 to October 2007 – The PGS Proposals 
The commissioning of the Review of Housing Supply in 2003 (Barker 2004) was 
based on the concern that the supply of new housing was inadequate and a review 
was set up on 9th March 2003, with the following terms of reference  
"Conduct a review of issues underlying the lack of supply and responsiveness 
of housing in the UK.” (Barker, 2004, p3) 
The objectives of the review were related to not just a lack of supply, but to issues of 
volatility in the housing market which “exacerbated problems of macroeconomic 
instability and had an adverse effect on economic growth” (Barker, 2004 p11) and of 
lack of affordability.  The report went on to state  
“A key factor underlying the lack of supply and responsiveness is an 
inadequate supply of developable land.  More land will need to be released or 
made viable for development, if housing supply is to increase.  Better use of 
existing or previously developed land and buildings can be achieved through 
bringing derelict and contaminated land back into use.  Many of the Review’s 
recommendations aim to secure this objective” (Barker, 2004 p12). 
The report considered the challenge under five headings, planning for development, 
delivering development, contributing to development, accessing housing and the 
development industry.  In terms of the capture of value this is primarily considered in 
the section “contributing to development”.  Under this section recommendation 26 
stated the following regarding value capture  
“Recommendation 26 
Government should use tax measures to extract some of the windfall gain that 
accrues to landowners from the sale of their land for residential development.  
Government should impose a Planning-gain Supplement on the granting of 
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planning permission so that landowner development gains form a larger part 
of the benefits of development.  The following principles might be considered: 
• Information would need to be gathered as to the value of land proposed for 
development in each local authority. Sources of data could include actual 
transactions and/or Valuation Office Agency estimates as to the land prices in 
various local authority areas. 
• Government would then set a tax rate on these values. This tax should not 
be set so high as to discourage development, but at a rate that at least covers 
the estimated local authority gain from Section 106 developer contributions 
and provides additional resources to boost housing supply. 
• The granting of residential planning permission would be contingent on the 
payment of the Planning-gain Supplement of the proposed development. 
• Government may want to consider the operation of a (substantially) lower 
rate for housing development brownfield land, and the possibility of varying 
rates in other circumstances, e.g. for areas where there are particular housing 
growth strategies, or where other social or environmental costs may arise. 
• A proportion of the revenue generated from the granting of planning 
permissions in local authorities should be given directly to local authorities. 
Government should also amend the operation of Section 106 planning 
obligations, as set out elsewhere in Chapter 3, to take account of this new 
charge. 
• The Government may want to consider allowing developers to pay their 
Planning gain Supplement in instalments over reasonable time periods so as 
to ensure that house builder cash flow pressures are sufficiently accounted 
for. 
The introduction of a tax would need to be accompanied by transitional 
measures to ameliorate the impact on developers already engaged in land 
sales contracts that were drawn up before this charge was introduced, or for 
those who hold large amounts of land already purchased, but where planning 
permission has yet to be secured” (Barker, 2004 p87). 
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What is significant in the review is the justification of the value capture in terms of the 
windfall gains (economic rent) accruing to the landowner from the granting of 
planning permission to develop the land and how capturing this windfall gain was a 
key justification for value capture.  Also that this income was needed to fund 
infrastructure provision and in turn to provide some greater certainty to infrastructure 
provision.  It was however clearly presented that the PGS should not be seen in 
isolation but part of a wider policy package.  As PGS was a tax on land value, this 
could potentially be a disincentive to landowners to bring forward sites for 
development, this was to be offset by other policy benefits such as the certainty of 
infrastructure provision and a more proactive planning system providing a supply of 
sites for development (Barker, 2004). 
In December 2005 the Government commenced a consultation on introducing PGS 
(ODPM, 2005c) alongside a wider justification of its response to the Barker Review 
(ODPM, 2005b).  Whilst the proposals in the latter document are set within the wider 
context of a step change in the provision of infrastructure and in the planning system, 
the PGS document presented a mechanism to capture the uplift in land value 
resulting from the grant of planning permission.  This was also presented as part of a 
wider growth based strategy to bring forward more sites for housing development 
and more rapidly, supported by infrastructure provision, partially funded by the 
money collected from the PGS itself and with a more flexible and proactive planning 
system.  The suggestion is also made that the PGS should be reflected in lower land 
values and lower bids for land by developers. 
There were still further details to be worked up, but in Chapter 2 (ODPM, 2005c) the 
calculation of the charge was discussed; the difference between current use value 
(CUV) and planning value (PV) was a key issue.  The proposals would need to be 
calculated based on market evidence this was a change from the average value for 
an area approach, proposed in the Barker review (Barker, 2004). 
The other key concern was that the planning system by restricting the supply of sites 
had slowed down and stopped development.  In addition, the restriction on the supply 
of sites by the planning system had also increased the value of land and therefore 
provided some justification for the capture of some of that increased value for the 
public sector. 
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The impact of the institutional structure of the British house building industry, being 
concentrated in a small number of volume house builders, who are focused on 
competing for a restricted supply of housing sites due to the planning system, was 
also considered.  It was considered that the effect of this was to force up land values, 
but also potentially to slow down development as house builders try and keep a 
supply of sites flowing, if the securing of sites takes too long, this will lead to land 
banking and a slower pace of development overall (Barker, 2008). 
The House of commons DCLG Committee in October 2006 (CLG, 2006b) also 
discussed the PGS and it again made reference to the fact that it was only fair that 
communities should share in wealth created by planning decisions made in their 
area.  Whilst this was conceptually different from the s106 process, it was 
acknowledged that the existing s106 system had sometimes been used as a means 
of compensating communities for the negative consequences from new development 
in their area, and had therefore been used as an informal, variable and unpredictable 
tax on land value uplift (CLG, 2006b). 
In December 2006 the Government published its response to the committee (CLG, 
2006a), the Government still considered the PGS as appropriate and a fairer means 
of capturing land value, because it was based on land value uplift rather than on the 
costs of infrastructure.  It went on to state that PGS was more proportionate and 
should not inhibit development on marginal sites.  Whilst tariff based approaches 
such as that used in Milton Keynes had previously been supported, they didn’t have 
the same potential as PGS (CLG, 2066a). 
Issues had also been raised about the calculation of PGS and the valuation 
methodology, it was agreed that using actual valuations would be fairer to developers 
for the calculating of CUV and PV, but that standard definitions would need to be 
agreed and understood by various stakeholders including the development industry, 
this would be crucial (CLG, 2006a).  The detail of the implementation of PGS would 
continue to be discussed, including two specific elements, the need to reflect actual 
site conditions, but also to assume a freehold vacant possession, rather than involve 
complex and costly valuations of different legal interests in land (CLG, 2006a). 
However by July 2007 and the Housing Green Paper – “Homes for the future – more 
affordable, more sustainable” (CLG, 2007a), the Government whilst still stating that 
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PGS was its preferred option, wanted to be sure that it was the best option and 
consulted on four alternatives.  Whilst still advocating that developers required 
reduced uncertainty regarding infrastructure delivery and that local communities 
should share in the benefits from planning gain.  The four alternatives proposed were 
as follows: 
(a) Lower rate of PGS and reduced scaling back of s106, so no need for PGS to 
replace lost s106 income, to be additional income. 
(b) PGS limited to Greenfield sites, this would require EU state aid approval. 
(c) Charging system based on an expanded s106, this would be a standard 
charge to mitigate the impact of development and be set out in the LDF and 
clearly linked to infrastructure need and be evidence based justifying the 
charge level for different types of development 
(d) Statutory Planning Charge – local authorities to require standard charges to 
be paid for infrastructure need, enabling capture of planning gain more 
systematically.  Developers would be required to pay an average standard 
charge based on total costs of infrastructure in their area.  It had the 
advantage of easier collection and the collection of additional funding of a 
large proportion of developments of a small scale (CLG, 2007a). 
After continued discussion with stakeholders and consideration of the feedback 
received by a range of organisations on 9th October 2007, the Minister for DCLG 
made a statement that PGS was to be withdrawn and replaced by a “statutory 
planning charge” (CLG, 2007b).  The details were still to be prepared, but that this 
would be tested as part of the LDF process and would be based on the infrastructure 
proposals therein and taking account of land values. 
The Pre-budget report in October 2007 (HMT, 2007) also confirmed that the PGS 
was to be replaced by a new planning charge.  The Government published its 
response to the consultation as well, which highlighted its concerns with the PGS, 
which were about the calculation of the current use value (CUV) and planning value 
(PV), and the rate that would be charged, as no rate was ever set out (HMRC, 2007).  
A range of objections were raised to the PGS, some of which had been highlighted in 
the original Barker Report, that landowners would just wait to sell land and so supply 
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would fall, also there was concern about the impact on brownfield development.  This 
new planning charge would be later named the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) 
and is now considered. 
5.3.2 Second Phase October 2007 to May 2010 - CIL replaces PGS 
In January 2008 the first proposals were published for CIL (CLG, 2008) these still 
reflected the main justifications for the PGS, namely to capture increases in land 
value resulting from the granting of planning permission and that this should mitigate 
development impacts and provide infrastructure for communities, this was also set 
within a framework of making development more sustainable.  The CIL was still also 
seen as a policy to “unlock development” and ensure more development is delivered, 
not just by funding infrastructure but also in providing more certainty to developers of 
what they may be expected to contribute.  The reasons why new development should 
make a contribution were set out, based mainly on the research that most small and 
medium sized developments made no contribution and yet still impacted on 
infrastructure requirements (Crook et al., 2008).  Only large scale developments had 
s106 agreements negotiated and the time and costs involved precluded negotiations 
on smaller schemes.  It was argued that the new CIL was therefore both fairer in 
spreading the burden more widely, but also by providing developers with more 
certainty on what they would be required to pay and speed up the planning system. 
The support of various stakeholders to CIL was also set out; BPF, RICS and HBF 
were all quoted as supportive and that whilst the Planning Bill provided the overall 
powers, the details would be issued in regulations which would be discussed with the 
stakeholders.  The CIL was also proposed to be a “Plan-led” policy very much tied 
into the LDF process, something very different to the previous proposals and also 
very much related to the infrastructure planning process as well.  The ability of local 
authorities to use CIL income alongside other funding flexibly to fund infrastructure 
provision was also set out (CLG, 2008).  Finally, the setting of the CIL rates was also 
discussed, again the link to the increases in land values resulting from the granting of 
planning consent was at the core of the thinking, and that if an affordable rate was 
set it would capture a proportion of the land value for infrastructure provision but also 
leave a sufficient incentive to develop.  Some commentators had stated that this may 
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not be the most appropriate indicator upon which to set the CIL rate and this would 
be discussed further before proposals came forward (CLG, 2008). 
In August 2008 a longer document on CIL was issued by DCLG (DCLG, 2008b), and 
whilst much of it was similar to the January document, it did set out more details on 
the setting of the CIL rates.  The link to infrastructure planning and to the funding of 
infrastructure to support growth were still key elements, but the uncertainty around 
the setting of the rate too high was also raised and the need to ensure that the 
process for setting the charge achieves the right balance (see paragraph 3.25) 
(DCLG, 2008b).  A whole section was included titled “setting charges to reflect 
development viability”, if set at too high a level CIL would not be delivering its 
objective of helping to unlock development.  The identification of the uplift in land 
value from the grant of planning permission was again suggested, but with 
reservations from some stakeholders.  With alternative assessments of level of 
developers profit or return on investment, impact on land supply or impact on delivery 
of the development plan proposed.  There were proposals to develop a standard 
methodology, but acknowledged that several methodologies were already available 
that developers use to make development decisions on viability.  The issue of skills 
within planning departments was also raised, although the Swindon Viability Study 
indicated that CIL as a policy could be delivered (DCLG, 2008b). 
Also in August 2008 DCLG issued “common starting point for s106” (DCLG, 2008a) 
as changes to the s106 system was part of the proposed changes running alongside 
the CIL as envisaged by the Barker report.  In fact the relationship between CIL and 
s106 was an important issue requiring clarification, identified by the Killian Petty 
Review of Planning System in November 2008 (DCLG, 2008c) and in the DCLG/NAO 
Planning for Homes; Speeding up planning applications for major housing 
developments in England published on 11 December 2008 (NAO and DCLG, 2008). 
Over 2009 there were several reports issued about how to respond to the credit 
crunch and the downturn in the market, in July 2009 the detailed proposals and draft 
regulations for CIL were consulted upon, with the summary of the responses 
published in February 2010 (DCLG, 2010c).  Much of this consultation was about the 
procedural detail of its implementation but one issue raised under the setting the CIL 
charge was a need for clarity as to what is intended by the term “economic viability of 
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development” in Question 7.  The relationship with s106 and its proposed scaling 
back was also an issue, especially as the introduction of CIL was a voluntary choice 
by LPAs, but scaling back s106 too far would put pressure on LPAs to introduce CIL 
(DCLG, 2010c). 
Also in February 2010 DCLG introduced CIL: Final Impact Assessment (DCLG, 
2010a) which would support the CIL regulations, the document suggested that CIL 
had several advantages over the s106 system, simplicity, predictability, transparency, 
fairness and efficiency.  A major feature of CIL highlighted was the loosening of the 
relationship between a development and the amount charged, as the charge would 
be an average distributed evenly across a number of developments.  It also offered 
LAs a flexible tool to secure finances to fund infrastructure, also the charge should 
not place at serious risk the development of an area, and finally the expectation 
remained that  
“Ultimately, it is expected that the liability for CIL will fall on landowners, 
because developers would negotiate a discounted value for land when they 
put it to offset heir CIL liability” (DCLG, 2010a p10) 
The CIL Guidance: Charge setting and charging schedule procedures were issued in 
March 2010 (DCLG, 2010b) and came into force on 6th April 2010 and set out some 
detail on deciding the rate of CIL.  The regulations set out that the charging authority 
must  
“aim to strike what appears to the charging authority to be an appropriate 
balance between the desirability of funding infrastructure from CIL and the 
potential effects (taken as a whole) of the imposition of CIL on the economic 
viability of development across its area” (DCLG, 2010b p4) 
The regulations introduced the “striking the balance”, the “area wide approach” and 
“economic viability” of development all as parts of the calculation of the CIL rates, 
“appropriate available evidence” was also required to support the draft charging 
schedule.  Charging authorities should avoid setting a charge right up to the margin 
of economic viability across the vast majority of sites in their area, with for residential 
development the SHLAAs should inform their approach (DCLG, 2010b). 
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What has become apparent is that the Barker report proposals for a tax on land value 
uplift have gradually changed to become a plan led levy linked to infrastructure 
planning at a local level and based on an area wide economic viability assessment of 
development.  Although the main effect is still anticipated to be a lowering of land 
values, as developers factor this into their negotiations with landowners, this is now 
less prominent than the need to secure funding for infrastructure still to support 
growth.  The viability issue which was never really addressed in PGS as the rate was 
never calculated, is now at the centre of the whole CIL proposals.  The challenge of 
the detailed implementation, of the valuation methodology which was a factor in the 
demise of the PGS is now emerging as an issue with CIL even in the early stages 
and with the apparent support of various stakeholders.  Finally, the relationship 
between a reduced s106 and CIL is an issue, as is the relationship between the CIL 
and other policies to stimulate growth. 
5.3.3 Third Phase May 2010 onwards - CIL is retained then amended 
In May 2010 there was a change of Government which in the previous occasions of 
national property taxes has often led to a repeal of the legislation, but somewhat 
unexpectedly the Coalition Government decided to retain the CIL, with an 
announcement made by DCLG Minister on 18th November 2010 that the CIL would 
be retained.  As it provided a fairer system to fund new infrastructure and more 
certainty to developers cutting the costs of lengthy negotiations.  There would 
however be amendments to the regulations, with a proportion of CIL passed directly 
to communities; also the system would be more transparent than s106 as the rates 
would be set in consultation with communities and developers, to make sure 
communities benefit from development in their area.  “It will help change the debate 
about development from opposition to optimism” (DCLG Speech 18th Nov 2010). 
The amount of CIL legislation and supporting guidance by the Government and by 
other organisations has been significant over the period from 6th April 2010 when the 
initial CIL regulations (DCLG, 2010c) came into force and 2015, when the CIL policy 
is the subject of a formally review.  In fact the CIL regulations have been amended 
virtually every six months from April 2011 to February 2014 and the final version of 
the amendments. 
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The 2011 amendments were part of the Localism Act 2011, and the main changes to 
the original proposals related to the requirement to pass a significant proportion of 
the CIL income directly to the local communities; this was later specified as 25% if a 
neighbourhood plan was in place for the area.  It also allowed the CIL funds to be 
spent on ongoing costs of infrastructure, this to allow extensions of existing 
infrastructure (Localism Act, 2011).  The justification for these amendments was to 
support local communities and to give them more control as part of the Governments 
localism agenda.  The restrictions on the s106 system was also progressed with a 
pooling of receipts under these limited to five planning applications and with a 
deadline set for these changes at 1st April 2014 (DCLG, 2011). 
The justification for the CIL policy was presented in a similar way to the March 2010 
document, the detailed guidance on how to set the CIL charging rates remained 
unchanged initially but various amendments and consultation exercises were 
undertaken between 2010 and 2014 resulting in the CIL guidance in 2014 (DCLG, 
2014a).  The major difference was in relation to the wording of the test which became 
more onerous on the local authority, but in the 2013 consultation document was 
“informed by practice experience to date from the development industry and local 
government” (DCLG, 2013b, p. 4). 
The new wording in the CIL guidance was also a reflection of the National Planning 
Policy Framework issued in 2012 (DCLG, 2012b) which had also strengthened the 
viability testing of Local Plans, as set out in more detail in Chapter 2.  Essentially the 
removal of the words “what appears to the charging authority to be” also removes the 
discretion of the LPA in determining the balance appropriate to its area and policy 
objectives.  It seems to suggest a specific point at which economic viability and the 
collection of CIL funding can be balanced. 
Other amendments related to being able to set differential CIL rates, by both use and 
scale of development, as well as spatially, the ability to accept payment in kind 
through the provision of infrastructure and the change to the deadline for the s106 
changes from April 2014 to April 2015 (DCLG, 2014a). 
These amendments over the four year period of CIL being in force as a policy, have 
moved away from the original objective of simplicity and the notion of value capture 
from land value increase from the granting of planning permission, a shift from the 
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original proposals by the Barker report.  The policy is no longer a “land value tax”, it 
is a levy to pay for infrastructure, with a strong link to strategic infrastructure planning, 
also a link to the viability testing of the Local Plan and the SHLAA with the viability 
assessment for the CIL being much the same work.  The relationship with s106 has 
been clarified to some extent, but remains a problem as any viability assessment has 
to take into account the “cumulative policy burden”. 
The discussion now seems to focus on the delivery of development, the persuading 
of communities to support new development and the viability of development as key 
to delivery by the private sector.  The increased emphasis on the need for evidence 
to support the viability assessment and the requirement in the National Planning 
Policy Guidance issued in March 2014, for “competitive returns to a willing land 
owner and willing developer to enable the development to be deliverable” (DCLG, 
2014b), all reflect this shift to delivery of new development. 
Having considered the evolution of the CIL policy over the period of 2003 to 2015, it 
is apparent that this CIL policy has developed within the context of a shortage of 
housing supply and the need to provide infrastructure to support growth generally.  In 
parallel the role of the planning system is implicitly considered and related to this 
policy development, with an apparent need to make the planning system more 
flexible to support growth and housing provision.  The changes in Government over 
the period and the dramatic macro-economic impact of the credit crunch and 
recession from 2008 onwards have also impacted on the policy, but nevertheless the 
problem and issues highlighted in the commissioning of the Barker review remain, 
even if the policy proposals have evolved and continue to evolve. 
5.4 Discourse Analysis 
Having set out the national policy time line in this area, in order to uncover the 
underlying meanings behind the changes and to consider the potential impact on 
policy making practices resulting therefrom, an Interpretive Policy Analysis has been 
undertaken employing the Hajer (2006) methodology as set out in chapter 4. 
5.4.1 Identification of Discourses 
The identification of the main discourses is critical to the discourse analysis process 
and can depend on either identification from theory and literature before entering the 
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field or alternatively from the actual fieldwork itself (Sharp and Richardson, 2001).  At 
a national level the discourses emerged from a detailed analysis of a range of data 
sources, primarily national policy documentation, supported by committee reports, 
and comments made in the consultation exercises.  As discussed earlier in chapter 4, 
discourses are defined by Hajer as a “discourse is a specific ensemble of ideas, 
concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed to give 
meaning to physical and social relations” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44).  As such the key 
discourses identified from the national policy documentation will give meaning to the 
conceptualisation of value capture and how that has evolved over the period from 
2003 to 2015. 
The development of the policy of capturing value from planning or “planning gain” as 
it is sometimes termed, in a strategic way as opposed to the capture of value to 
mitigate site specific impacts of a particular development, is a new policy area in the 
UK.  As discussed above it emerged from the need to address the shortage in 
housing supply and its effect on the growth of the national economy.  The first 
discourse structuring the policy making in this area is therefore “supporting growth” 
this has been the discourse influencing the role of planning for some time and clearly 
influences any new planning policy.  The second discourse is more specifically 
related to the policy area, and is termed “value capture”, this is a discourse which 
was first proposed at the beginning of the planning system in the UK in 1947, and 
has been something of an intermittent proposal over the period since then, with 
several attempts at a national land value tax all of which failed.  Since 1985 the 
reliance on s106 as an unofficial and informal tax, but largely avoiding the funding of 
strategic infrastructure provision, rather than site specific mitigation measures, was 
changed again by the adoption of the proposals in the Barker report, with proposals 
for a tax in the form of the PGS which has subsequently changed into the CIL as type 
of impact fee. 
The CIL policy has therefore emerged within the context of two discourses, 
“supporting growth” which has been a discourse influencing planning and its role 
generally, it has influenced the role of planning to be one of supporting and enabling 
the market to deliver and the second discourse “value capture” which has resulted 
from concern about s106 as a policy, and the return to a taxation of land value uplift 
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as a policy objective. Using the two main discourses of “supporting growth” and 
“Value Capture”, the development of policy in this area has been considered, 
storylines within these discourses have been identified, and an analyse of their 
discursive struggle and policy making impact analysed. 
5.4.2 Identification of Storylines 
As mentioned earlier in chapter 4, the Storyline is an important concept in analysing 
policy, it is defined by Hajer as “a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to 
draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social 
phenomena” (Hajer, 1995, p. 56).  They are reductive discursive devices that simplify 
complex debates through simplified narratives, as such they can often disguise 
contradictions and areas of misunderstanding with both positive and negative effects.  
They can legitimise policy whilst at the same time disguising incomplete arguments 
and institutional biases (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005, p. 177). 
Several “storylines” have been identified which have influenced the development of 
the PGS/CIL policy over the period and these are shown in tables 5.3 and 5.4.  
These are based on an analysis of national policy and guidance documentation, as 
shown above in the key events and key sites of argumentation tables, and on how 
these storylines have influenced policy implementation at a national level.  The 
storylines have been identified by studying the objectives and justifications made for 
the policy proposals overtime and how they have changed and the outcomes and 
impacts that are anticipated to result therefrom. 
The justification of the policy is one element of the analysis, but the calculation of the 
charge is an important second element to be considered as it is inextricably linked to 
the policy making.  This is apparent in two respects, firstly the challenge of making 
the necessary calculations for any charge and the discussion around this and the 
detail involved, secondly it also introduces the role of various actors in the policy 
making process and the assumptions that the national policy makes about that and 
the behaviours of those actors, in delivering the policy.  The justification of the policy 
is based on economic theory and its assumptions about the behaviour of key actors, 
the calculation of the charge is about valuation methodologies and the role of actors 
within that process.  The interrelation between these two aspects of policy making is 
a key aspect of this research. 
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5.4.3 Supporting Growth Discourse 
Storyline  Description 
Encouraging Developers Encouraging developers to develop by allowing 
acceptable return in assessing level of levy 
Viability = Delivery a new tax but with overall viability 
assessment as constraint 
Incentivising Landowners In assessing any levy need to allow acceptable return 
for landowners as an incentive to sell 
Facilitating Local 
Authorities 
Enabling Local Authorities to provide infrastructure to 
support growth as identified in Local Plan and IDP, a 
Plan-led approach  
Persuading Communities Persuading communities to accept new development 
Table 5.3 Supporting Growth Storylines 
The four main storylines have been identified from the policy documentation and 
debates that have taken place around consultations on the proposals as they 
changed over time.  This discourse is about unblocking barriers to development, 
enabling the various actors to support and deliver new development, encouraging 
developers to increase the amount of development by assuming in any assessment 
of the CIL charge that a commercial return is required, that development has to be 
commercially viable to be able to be delivered.  The second storyline is about 
“incentivising landowners” to release land for development by requiring an 
appropriate level of return to be included in the assessment of any charge.  The local 
authorities has two roles firstly, providing the certainty of delivery of the extra 
infrastructure to support growth assessed as part of a Plan-led approach as part of 
the Local Plan process. 
The second part of the local authority role is the collecting of the CIL income, this is 
constrained by the use of the viability assessment and the requirement to “strike the 
balance” between collecting funding and making development unviable, also the 
cumulative policy burden, means overall policy requirements also need to be 
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considered not just s106 and CIL but other policy requirements, such as 
sustainability requirements.  This means that the CIL income collected will actually 
only fund a small part of the total infrastructure provision, potentially exposing the 
local authority to greater financial risk.  Finally, the need to persuade communities to 
accept new development partly facilitated by the 25% share of CIL income, this is 
more relevant to areas where development is driven by high demand and where 
resistance to more development is likely to be greatest. 
5.4.4 Value Capture Discourse 
Storyline Description 
Making Development 
Contributions more 
predictable, simpler, and 
more transparent.  More 
efficient collection of 
contributions 
Taxing new development to mitigate impact and make 
it more sustainable, this resulting from dissatisfaction 
with the s106 system, justifying a new additional tax or 
levy and scaling back s106.  Some of this income 
would provide strategic infrastructure in the area 
collected. 
Windfall Tax on Land 
Value 
Windfall Tax on Land Value Uplift on the unearned 
income accruing to landowners but also as part of tax 
to incentivise land sales to higher value uses such as 
a residential 
Raising more income to 
fund more infrastructure 
provision 
Collecting income to fund public goods and for 
community benefits and for strategic infrastructure  
Compensating 
Communities with wealth 
generated from new 
development in their area 
Compensating Communities with value from wealth 
generated in their area 
Table 5.4 Value Capture Storylines 
The four storylines under the value capture discourse (table 5.4) are more as a result 
of dissatisfaction with the s106 system; they are more reflective of the proposals of 
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the Barker report and the proposals for PGS and perhaps have been less reflected in 
the more recent changes to the guidance for CIL. 
The first storyline emerges from the s106 system criticisms and the proposals and 
justification for an additional mechanism to collect more funding in a more 
predictable, transparent and simpler way, initially a tax and later a levy.  This storyline 
whilst offering benefits to developers in terms of a simpler, more predictable and 
transparent system also introduces an additional mechanism, with the prospect of 
additional payments.  The second storyline is the proposal that the impact of the levy 
would be passed from the developers to the landowners in reduced bids for land, 
should the development industry be willing and able to do so.  The assumption is that 
the uplift in land values from granting planning permission even if reduced by the levy 
would still leave enough uplift to incentivise landowners to sell land for development.  
The third storyline reflects proposals for PGS, whilst collecting funding for additional 
infrastructure to support growth this wasn’t specific about its distribution and seemed 
to imply it was not only for strategic infrastructure but other benefits.  Finally, the last 
storyline is reflected in proposals to compensate communities for the impact of new 
development on their area by making it more sustainable and for the community to 
share in the benefit of wealth generated in their area. 
5.5 Analysis of the impact of Discourses and Storylines 
Storylines are important and influential discursive mechanisms as discussed earlier in 
Chapter 4, they are employed by actors to influence the course of policy making and 
development, by influencing the meanings given to certain knowledge and how it is 
used in the policy making process.  Storylines changed over the period and have 
three main affects, firstly, they can be used to position actors into certain roles, 
secondly, they can lead to the creation of discourse coalitions which are groups with, 
often only temporarily, shared aims and objectives in influencing policy development, 
they can be actors and groups which on the face of it would be unlikely allies but 
through the discourse have become so for shared objectives.  Thirdly, storylines are 
used to cluster knowledge sources and can lead to a discursive mechanism known 
as “Black Boxing”, where certain knowledge is placed into a “black box” where it is 
accepted as the norm and is beyond any challenge (Hajer, 1995). 
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The discursive struggle between discourses can lead to the dominance of one 
discourse, which is termed “discourse structuration” and if this starts to solidify into 
practices with institutional effects this is termed “Discourse Institutionalisation” (Hajer, 
2010).  The discursive struggle between the two discourses and their storylines was 
considered across four main areas, considering the impact on the main actors 
involved and how the conceptualisation of value capture shifted over the period. 
The discursive struggle between the two different conceptualisations of value capture 
reflects the change in emphasis, from the Barker Review proposals of capturing a 
share of land value increases as a tax to redistribute value to communities as the 
main driver.  To a different type of mechanism which is about collecting some value, 
determined by a Local-Plan setting out what infrastructure is needed to support 
growth and taking account of an appropriate level of return to developers and 
landowners and providing an income for communities enhanced if they organise at a 
local level, and capping public sector policy requirements in any assessment of the 
CIL rate. 
5.5.1 Encouraging Developers 
The “encouraging developers” storyline is about trying to get developers to build 
more development and removing barriers to that, the most important part of this is 
the emphasis placed in the policy documentation on viability.  The need to provide a 
commercial return to developers to encourage development and this is established 
as a key part of the setting of the CIL rate.  This reflects the dominance of the 
“supporting growth” discourse over the “value capture” discourse in defining the 
policy meaning in this area. 
The developer oriented storyline of the “value capture” discourse is about 
dissatisfaction with the s106 system and trying to make a new mechanism more 
predictable, simpler, more transparent and more efficient, which should reduce the 
costs and uncertainties to developers and so assisting in reducing their costs and so 
making more development viable.  CIL will offer several advantages over the current 
system of planning obligations: Simplicity, Predictability, Transparency, Fairness and 
Efficiency (DCLG, 2010a, p. 8). 
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The policy development from 2003 onwards, has not been particularly successful in 
these areas, the retention of the s106 alongside PGS and later CIL, has not made 
policy more predictable, nor simpler.  Whilst transparency in relation to CIL is 
improved, as s106 continues, the original criticism still applies.  The efficiency of 
collecting value has increased in areas where CIL is introduced as it applies to all 
new development rather than only those where an s106 is negotiated, but the CIL is 
not mandatory requirement and may not be introduced everywhere. 
The new mechanism of value capture (CIL) is very much about encouraging 
developers to build to support growth and by protecting the commercial viability in 
any assessment of the value capture mechanism, the assumption is that viability 
equals delivery.  The assumption is that all development is undertaken by the private 
sector and all require a commercial return for the risk involved. 
“The levy is expected to have a positive economic effect on development 
across a local plan area. When deciding the levy rates, an appropriate balance 
must be struck between additional investment to support development and the 
potential effect on the viability of developments.” (DCLG, 2014a p12) 
This is in contrast to the initial ambitions of the Barker review and response about a 
more efficient collection of income and criticism of the s106 system causing 
uncertainty and delays.  The “encouraging developers” storyline becoming more 
dominant over time has positioned developers as key deliverers in the policy area, it 
also positions local authorities as having been inconsistent and not particularly 
effective in implementing the s106 system, hence the criticisms and perceived need 
for a new system to capture value.  The storyline has also positioned local authorities 
as not always having appropriate knowledge of the development industry and having 
unrealistic expectations. 
The clustering of knowledge sources has involved being knowledgeable of the 
decision making of developers and what will encourage them to develop.  The 
problem is that the business models and decision-making of developers is highly 
confidential, also developers are not a homogenous group with differing objectives, 
business models and attitudes to risk. 
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The change in the conceptualisation of the value capture process over the period is 
reflected in the guidance as to how to implement the policy and how that has 
changed over the period.  Part of that change reflects the shift to “encouraging 
developers” storyline to build and make more profit, rather than “a more predictable, 
simpler and efficient way of collection” storyline, which declined in importance, even if 
it could also be seen as trying to encourage developers as well.  The impact of these 
storylines on practices in terms of the guidance is considered later. 
5.5.2 Incentivising Landowners 
The second discursive struggle is about ensuring that a supply of land comes forward 
to support new development and growth, again the conceptualisation of this reflects 
the shift towards the dominance of the “supporting growth” discourse over the “value 
capture” discourse.  The shift in conceptualisation of value capture to support new 
development, rather than to redistribute wealth or promote more sustainable 
development, as envisaged in the Barker Review and policy proposals up to 2010. 
“Government should actively pursue measures to share in windfall 
development gains accruing to landowners so that increases in land values 
can benefit the community more widely. Capturing part of these values will 
provide a funding stream for a number of other policies that will support 
increasing housing supply.” (Barker, 2004 p69) 
The initial proposals were about a windfall tax on the unearned income to 
landowners, but whilst the later CIL guidance did still acknowledge that the impact 
could be on lowering land values, this was a very much reduced aspect of the policy.  
The intention had been to redistribute the unearned land value uplift to local 
communities, with the view taken that the uplift in land Values would be more than 
enough to pay the “tax” as well as incentivise the landowner to sell his land 
“One option could be to use taxation as a method of incentivising land to be 
brought forward for development in the first place. Land could be taxed 
according to its market value and land that had a high value, and was 
therefore in greatest demand for use, would attract a higher tax liability to 
encourage its development, or its most efficient use. Since the most profitable 
of these possible uses would often be residential development, this could 
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increase the amount of land that landowners wish to sell for housing 
development overall.” (Barker, 2004 p71) 
The Report did go on to say that this was still something which had to be considered 
in detail and implementation had been challenging in the past. 
“As with any government intervention, there would remain difficulties and 
issues to consider. Government will need to give these particular attention in 
order to make the contribution regime a success:  
• Permanence: Government would need to make – and win – the case for 
sharing development gains and build a national consensus on the merit of 
such a system. It is, however, worth noting that Section 106 has come to 
operate in a way similar to capturing development gain, and its core principles 
command widespread support. 
• Transitional measures: contributions levied at the planning permission stage 
would need to involve some transitional measures “ (Barker, 2004 p 86) 
The later guidance has shifted towards the assessment of the CIL having to take 
account of a premium over existing use value to incentivise landowners to sell land 
for development, this is clearly a shift in emphasis in the policy towards delivery 
rather than any value capture prioritisation. 
The result of these storylines is that landowners are positioned as key enablers of 
development along with their advisors whether planning or property professionals 
and consultants and even developers as all key intermediaries in the process.  
Somewhat different from the initial positioning of landowners as undeserving 
beneficiaries of “unearned income”. 
“Taxes can extract economic ‘rents’ – the unearned windfall that accrues to 
landowners when land is designated for residential use. This has primarily 
been the rationale for development and land taxes in the past. Capturing this 
‘development gain’ could, in principle, allow it to be used to deliver the benefits 
of development to the wider community and support other housing policies.” 
(Barker, 2004 p70) 
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The clustering of knowledge sources around these storylines are about knowledge of 
land values, which are difficult to ascertain, also knowledge of land ownership 
patterns in an area and how that may influence supply and on the objectives, 
motivations and business models of land owners bearing in mind they are not a 
homogenous group and vary significantly. 
The change of the conceptualisation of the value capture process as determined by 
the discursive struggle between the discourses and storylines again reflects the 
dominance of delivery as a driver of policy change.  This dominance of the 
“supporting growth” discourse and “incentivising landowners” storyline has not only 
changed how land value capture has been conceptualised, but also in the practices 
set out in national guidance and regulations for the assessment of this value capture. 
Shifting from how to assess the land value uplift in order to tax it, to how to 
incorporate via the TLV assessment, an appropriate return to the landowner to 
incentives him to sell for development, which will be discussed later. 
5.5.3 Facilitating Local Authorities 
The discursive struggle between the “supporting growth” and “value capture” 
discourses is also reflected in the way the supporting storylines conceptualize the 
capture of value to fund infrastructure provision.  The policy making initially was 
couched in terms of increasing value capture to provide more infrastructure to 
support new development and growth, but also to compensate communities and 
provide more sustainable development, it also provided greater certainty of 
infrastructure provision for developers. 
“Policies should reflect better both the positive and negative externalities 
associated with housing. This means the environmental costs of housing 
should be considered alongside the social and economic benefits, ensuring 
that land is used efficiently, that the most valuable undeveloped land is 
preserved and that development promotes sustainable communities.” (Barker, 
2004 p27) 
There was clearly a shared objective of facilitating local authorities to provide 
infrastructure for growth but with a wider objective around redistribution of wealth.  
Over time the storyline of “facilitating local authorities” has become more dominant in 
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terms of defining the meaning of the policy making over the “raising more funding” 
storyline.  The emphasis has been again on facilitating delivery of development over 
other policy objectives.  The CIL policy introduced three important points in this 
respect which were significant changes to the PGS proposals. 
Firstly, the Plan-led” approach, this tied the provision of infrastructure to the Local 
Plan process and to the growth strategy within those proposals.  But this also 
restricted the flexibility of the local authority over what to spend the money on, to that 
of specific infrastructure to support specific development. 
“The CIL should be ‘plan led’. This means that it should support the delivery of 
(for example) the homes and jobs envisaged in an authority’s development 
plan. CIL spending will need to be underpinned by a costed list of 
infrastructure projects that are needed to support development. The Bill allows 
Regulations to set out the procedure which should be followed in preparing 
such a list, which may include consultation with those affected, including the 
infrastructure providers themselves.”(CLG, 2008 p13) 
In later CIL policy the introduction of the 123 list was a further tightening of this 
defining of the infrastructure in terms of what it can be spent on. 
“When a charging authority introduces the levy, section 106 requirements 
should be scaled back to those matters that are directly related to a specific 
site, and are not set out in a regulation 123 list. For transparency, charging 
authorities should have set out at examination how their section 106 policies 
will be varied, and the extent to which they have met their section 106 targets”. 
(DCLG, 2014a p52) 
“The charging authority’s proposed approach to section 106 contributions 
should be set out at examination and should be based on evidence. Where a 
regulation 123 list includes project-specific infrastructure, the charging 
authority should not seek any planning obligations in relation to that 
infrastructure.” (DCLG, 2014a p53) 
Secondly, “striking the balance” also reflects a shift, from a general tax proposal of 
PGS, where no tax rate was actually proposed, although reference was vaguely 
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made to the need to strike a balance even then, but from the outset was relevant to 
CIL. 
“The Government wants CIL funds to unlock development. But if the levy is set 
too high, it might cause some development to become unviable. Because it is 
the purpose of CIL to ensure that more development is delivered, the level of 
CIL must be set to ensure it supports and does not prevent development. In 
setting charges, charging authorities will therefore need to take account of 
land value uplifts in their area.” (CLG, 2008 p 4) 
When the CIL proposals were introduced the notion of striking a balance emerged 
and effectively restricted the local authority to take account of the impact on viability 
and deliverability which in 2010 was in the local authorities view, later restricted 
further to a balance based on evidence. 
Finally, the “cumulative policy burden” was introduced as a further emphasis on 
delivery and capping value capture for policy objectives in a wider sense, initially set 
out in paragraph 173 for the National Planning Policy Framework (DCLG, 2012b).  
This also featured in the Harman Report guidance and has become an important 
influence on policy practice. 
“Some may be deemed to be critical for development to be acceptable in 
planning terms and some may be more discretionary and/or only applied to 
certain types of development or geographies. Through discussing this, 
appropriate trade-offs can be made to ensure that the cumulative policy 
burden does not make the plan undeliverable.” (Local Housing Delivery 
Group, 2012 p 33) 
The outcome of the discursive struggle in this area of policy development has again 
been dominated by the “supporting growth” discourse in defining the meaning of the 
policy and establishing “discursive closure” (Hajer 2006).  The storyline positions the 
local authority as facilitators of developers as key deliverers by providing certainty 
over infrastructure provision.  The clustering of knowledge sources are around the 
Plan-led need for growth, identifying the growth and new development needed and 
the infrastructure required to support that growth, as set out in the Infrastructure 
Delivery Plan (IDP) and 123 list.  Knowledge sources about the viability of 
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development and of policy impacts also become relevant when assessing the CIL 
rate to set. 
The change in national policy guidance in this area has been quite extensive and 
accordingly the impact on practices have been significant on how the local authority 
seeks to secure its value capture income and facilitate the provision of infrastructure.  
Policy practices around the Plan-led approach, the preparation of the Infrastructure 
Delivery Plan, the “striking the balance” and “cumulative policy burden” in setting the 
rates are discussed below. 
5.5.4 Persuading Communities 
The fourth area of discursive struggle at the national policy making level is in relation 
to local communities, the “supporting growth” discourse again strongly oriented 
towards delivery looks at persuading communities that may oppose new 
development into accepting new development.  In the speech on 18th November 
2010 the Minister not only confirmed CIL was to be retained, but also changed the 
emphasis from the notion from the sharing of wealth and compensating communities 
for accepting development in their areas, which was based on the more redistribution 
justification of the PGS, to the idea of persuading communities who may resist new 
development to instead accept it. 
The introduction of the Community percentage also further emphasises this point of 
the shift more towards persuading communities to accept new development. 
“Alongside the New Homes Bonus, this is another way to make sure 
communities benefit from development in their area. It will help change the 
debate about development from opposition to optimism” (Communities to 
share in the advantages of development – Ministers Speech on 18th 
November 2010) 
The discursive struggle in this area over the meaning attributed to the policy is less 
significant than in some of the other areas, but there still has been an impact on 
practices, not least the implementation of the community share.  
“Neighbourhoods that take a proactive approach by drawing up a 
neighbourhood development plan, and securing the consent of local people in 
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a referendum, will receive 25% of the revenues from the Community 
Infrastructure Levy arising from the development that they choose to accept.” 
(Planning Minister Nick Boles announces new cash incentives. 10th January 
2013) 
The positioning of communities as potential victims of and objectors to new 
development leads to them being perceived as a barrier to new development that 
needs to be addressed.  The clustering of Knowledge sources relates to the impacts 
of new development in terms of new infrastructure requirements, but then also the 
control over the spend and what it is spent on and who decides. 
Having considered the national level discursive struggle and the prevalence of the 
“supporting growth” discourse and its supporting storylines in reconceptualising what 
is meant by value capture between 2004 and 2014, it is now worthwhile considering 
the impact of this on the practices involved in policy implementation as set out in 
national policy regulations and guidance, before considering these again in a local 
context in the case studies. 
5.6 Policy Impact of the Discursive Struggle 
The effects of storylines on the implementation of policy in terms of positioning actors 
and clustering knowledge claims to influence the construction of the policy problem 
and the meaning attributed to the policy have been outlined above, this can also 
influence the everyday practices of actors involved in the process.  Hajer defines 
practices as “embedded routines and mutually understood rules and norms that 
provide coherence to social life” (Hajer, 2006, p. 70).  He goes on to state on his 
website “If discourse analysis is the analysis of language-in-use then practices are 
the sites where language is used.” (Hajer, 2016). 
Accordingly, as this analysis is at the national policy level the focus has been on the 
changing guidance over the period and how this has proposed changes in practices 
as influenced by the storylines as discussed above.  This can only be a partial 
analysis of the practices based on the codified knowledge set out in the guidance, it 
is important however, to establish the anticipated practices as seen from a national 
level and in formal guidance before looking at practices within a local context.  How 
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the storylines have interacted within a local context and how they have influenced 
practices at a local level are considered in the case studies. 
At the national level the value capture concept has shifted towards one of supporting 
growth and delivery of development with the capture of value being subordinated to 
this as an objective.  The capture of value is seen as worthwhile provided it doesn’t 
jeopardise delivery of new development. 
There are four areas of practice that have been identified from the national policy 
documentation and these are now considered as to how they have changed over the 
period. 
5.6.1 The preparation of the IDP (How will the income be spent) 
The initial proposals for PGS didn’t specify how the income would be spent other 
than on infrastructure to support new development, the introduction of CIL as a policy 
introduced the “plan-led” approach which linked the levy to specific infrastructure 
provision in support of growth and as set out in the Local Plan. 
“The CIL should be ‘plan led’. This means that it should support the delivery of 
(for example) the homes and jobs envisaged in an authority’s development 
plan. CIL spending will need to be underpinned by a costed list of 
infrastructure projects that are needed to support development.” (CLG, 2008 p 
13) 
This establishes a clear new practice to the UK of capturing value for infrastructure 
provision from the planning process via a plan-led approach, instead of either a site 
by site negotiated approach such as the s106 system, or a tax collected at a national 
level.  The CIL process was specifically to support growth and new development as 
set out in the Local Plan and to help fund that specific infrastructure requirement as 
set out in the IDP. 
It differs from the s106 system in that it seeks to fund strategic infrastructure rather 
than site specific infrastructure and affordable housing provision which remain to be 
funded from s106 agreements.  The national taxation approach as advocated by the 
PGS and several earlier proposals were not linked to any specifically identified 
infrastructure projects. 
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This change to a “plan-led” approach places an increased importance on the Local 
Plan and its status, the CIL either having to follow an approved and adopted Local 
Plan or running in parallel with the Local Plan process. 
“The Government expects that charging authorities will implement the levy 
where their ‘appropriate evidence’ includes an up-to-date relevant Plan for the 
area in which they propose to charge. As set out in the National Planning 
Policy Framework in England, where practical levy charges should be worked 
up and tested alongside the Local Plan. (DCLG, 2012a p 6) 
Of course the CIL will only provide a small proportion of the IDP requirement, which 
is the total infrastructure provision to support the Local Plan.  It is also a requirement 
that there is a funding gap identified to be filled by the CIL, with the funding of this 
infrastructure being an important aspect of providing certainty to developers. 
“The role of the list is to help provide evidence on the potential funding gap – it 
is not the purpose of the examination to challenge the list.  A charging 
authority may undertake additional infrastructure planning to identify its 
infrastructure funding gap, if it considers that the infrastructure planning 
underpinning its relevant Plan” (DCLG, 2014a p 15) 
The growing importance of the IDP and what the money would be spent on is 
reflected in the changes in the guidance for CIL, with the February 2014 version 
including a specific section regarding advice on preparing the IDP something not 
included in any earlier guidance (DCLG, 2014a). 
The CIL guidance regarding setting the rates was significantly different in February 
2014 compared to the earlier versions of March 2010, December 2012 and April 
2013.  The emphasis in the final version was much more on the requirements for the 
CIL examination process and particularly about the relationship between what was 
spent through the s106 and what spent through CIL. 
“At examination, the charging authority should set out a draft list of the 
projects or types of infrastructure that are to be funded in whole or in part by 
the levy (see Regulation 123). The charging authority should also set out any 
known site-specific matters for which section 106 contributions may continue 
to be sought. This is to provide transparency about what the charging authority 
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intends to fund through the levy and where it may continue to seek section 
106 contributions.” (DCLG, 2014a p13) 
This reflects the concern over time by developers, as the CIL started to be 
implemented nationally, about potential double payments by developers for the same 
infrastructure. The 123 list which sets out a specific list of items which will be either 
wholly or partially funded from the CIL income and which is a sub selection of the 
IDP. 
The shift in policy guidance over the period and in turn on the practices of local 
authorities implementing CIL is to reduce the local authority flexibility and to provide 
more constraints on how the money is spent and by whom, with a whole additional 
section in the February 2104 guidance (DCLG, 2014a). 
Finally, the introduction of the involvement of local communities in the spending of 
15% of the CIL receipts and up to 25% in areas which have a Neighbourhood Plan 
has been set up, the CIL receipts will then be passed directly on to the Town or 
Parish Council.  The complexities around the spending of the CIL income and 
practices are still being resolved in specific areas, but clearly this is another change 
of practice in the guidance and set out in some detail in the February 2014 guidance. 
5.6.2 The Viability Assessment (including the Assessment of Threshold Land 
Value) 
Having considered what the funding is needed for, the next area of practice is how to 
assess how much money may be available, and again this is an area of guidance 
that has changed significantly over the period.  The initial proposals for the PGS 
didn’t really need to look at the effect of the tax or levy on the viability and by 
extension the deliverability of development.  Although it is acknowledged that the 
PGS proposals did state that care must be taken not to set the tax too high so as 
stop development coming forward. 
“The property industry, including both commercial developers and house 
builders, has been working over the last ten weeks to prepare a response to 
the invitation contained in the Housing Green Paper to consider a number of 
alternative approaches to a Planning-gain Supplement (PGS). 
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Our alternative is a tariff based system with the tariff set at the local level 
according to planned infrastructure needs and levied on all but the most minor 
development. Payment would be made directly by the developer to the local 
authority and there would be provision for essential site mitigation needs to be 
met under a simplified Section 106 arrangement. We set out, in the attached 
paper, more details on how we believe this system would work. 
We have also sought the views of local authorities, both individually and 
through their representative bodies, and have been re-assured to find that all 
those we have contacted also favour a tariff-based approach in preference to 
PGS. 
The property industry has accepted the Government’s wish to have a more 
comprehensive approach to contributing to infrastructure than is provided for 
by the variably applied Section 106 process. Moreover, there is a growing 
body of real evidence that tariffs can be implemented effectively by local 
authorities in a way that does not discourage development.” (Home Builders 
Federation et al., 2007) 
The change to CIL required a major change in approach with the levy linked to a 
local authority area and determined within that local context, with even the option for 
a local authority not to introduce CIL. 
The switch from PGS to CIL was at least partially instigated by consultation with the 
development industry who had strongly opposed the PGS.  But who also considered 
the CIL a better approach in principle at least, although again concern about the 
method of assessment was an important detail to be resolved satisfactorily. 
“There has to date been a consensus among stakeholders in favour of CIL. 
The Confederation of British Industry identified the benefit of “greater certainty 
for businesses” offered by the CIL,15 while in its briefing to MPs in advance of 
the Commons Report stage of the Bill, the British Property Federation (BPF) 
highlighted “the property industry’s continued support for the Community 
Infrastructure Levy (CIL).” The BPF went on to say that “significant progress 
has been made with the practical detail. CIL remains the most sensible 
approach towards obtaining a contribution from developers to support the 
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infrastructure requirements which are a consequence of new development.” 
(DCLG, 2008b p23) 
The value capture concept and idea is always inextricably involved with the issues 
about how the tax or levy is calculated, and the important challenges around that 
issue and as flagged up by the Barker report.  The initial proposals were to assess 
land value increases due to the grant of planning consent, based on land registry 
data, this is very different from the assessment of land values from a residual 
valuation approach, advocated by CIL as considered later.  In fact the challenge of 
finding a satisfactory method of calculation for PGS may in itself have been a factor 
in its abandonment as well as the opposition and criticisms. 
“The Planning-gain Supplement (PGS) remains the Government’s preferred 
option for securing more of the benefits conferred by the planning system to 
support housing growth. However, before legislating, the Government wants to 
be sure this is the best option.” (CLG, 2007a p44) 
In paragraph 34 on page 55, four alternatives were set out for consideration, and the 
Government were clearly prepared to changes PGS (CLG, 2007a). 
“Hold discussions prior to the Pre-Budget Report with key stakeholders to 
discuss possible changes to the design of PGS, particularly focusing on the 
proposed scale back of section 106 and on whether the alternatives they have 
proposed might be better.” (CLG, 2007a p56) 
The CIL as a policy however placed the assessment of viability at the heart of its 
assessment  
“It is for charging authorities to decide how to present appropriate evidence on 
how they have struck an appropriate balance between the desirability of 
funding infrastructure from CIL and the potential effects of the imposition of 
CIL on the economic viability of development across their area.” (DCLG, 
2010c p8) 
The methodology to assess economic viability has been an area about which the 
national policy has been rather unspecific, even though initially a standard 
methodology was considered 
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“John Calcutt’s recent report to the Government on housing delivery 
recommended that the Government should work with the Homes and 
Communities Agency, the development industry and local government to 
develop or adopt a standard methodology to assist local planning authorities in 
assessing what level of developer contribution is viable for any particular 
development. Several methodologies or ‘tool kits’ already exist to help inform 
decision-making on the level of developer contributions where viability is an 
issue and, as Box 3.3 shows, some local authorities are commissioning 
detailed analyses to assist viability judgements at the plan level rather than on 
individual sites. The Government is considering what further support and 
guidance could be given to assist charging authorities to make plan-level 
viability assessments, and chapter 6 considers further the skills issues that this 
requirement may raise.” (DCLG, 2008b p52) 
Whilst this led to the HCA area-wide model in 2011 (HCA, 2011), in fact no 
methodology has been advocated, leaving this to the local authority to decide upon, 
with which to defend its decisions. 
“There are a number of valuation models and methodologies available to 
charging authorities to help them in preparing evidence on the potential effects 
of the levy on the economic viability of development across their area. There is 
no requirement to use one of these models, but charging authorities may find 
it helpful in defending their levy rates to use one of them.” (DCLG, 2013a p8) 
This position on the economic viability section has remained relatively unchanged 
throughout the guidance from 2010 to 2014, “the appropriate available evidence” to 
be included, the economic viability to be included in a separate document, the history 
of s106 contributions and whether affordable housing targets have been met, are 
also to be included as evidence.  Some additional sections were added in February 
2014 reflecting the increase in the prescription of what is required and reduced 
flexibility for local authorities, there has been an increased emphasis on using 
evidence to support the viability assessment over time. 
“A charging authority must use ‘appropriate available evidence’ (as defined in 
the Planning Act 2008 section 211(7A)) to inform their draft charging schedule. 
The Government recognises that the available data is unlikely to be fully 
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comprehensive. Charging authorities need to demonstrate that their proposed 
levy rate or rates are informed by ‘appropriate available’ evidence and 
consistent with that evidence across their area as a whole.” (DCLG, 2014a p 
16) 
The impact on the viability assessment process has therefore been influenced by 
other guidance issued over the period, the HCA guidance in 2011, the Harman 
guidance in June 2012 and the RICS guidance in August 2012.  As discussed earlier 
in chapter 2, this has not always been helpful nor consistent with conflicts between 
the guidance. 
There are two main areas of practice to be influenced by this guidance, the 
assessment of the TLV (which is the assessment of the land value at which a 
landowner will sell land for development) and the Economic or Area Wide Viability 
Assessment (which attempts at a high level to model the residual land values for 
different uses and locations across a local authority area). 
The assessment of the threshold land value is an area of much conflict in the 
guidance and potential impact on practice.  The main areas are about how to 
measure the uplift above existing use value to incentivise the landowner to sell land, 
and secondly how evidence is used in any assessment and finally using the 
proportion of the estimated value of the completed development as check. 
The calculation of the uplift is a challenging area and the simplest approach is one of 
the existing use value plus a premium, usually a percentage decided by the valuer.  
This is included in the HCA guidance as well as the in the Harman Guidance.  It is 
problematic for several reasons set out by (Wyatt and McAllister, 2013) the lack of 
any empirical basis to support the incentive premium, it is not linked in any way to the 
final end use value of the development, it doesn’t necessarily reflect landowners 
expectations based on their knowledge of other transactions and the use of a static 
model to incentivise landowners to sell doesn’t take account of changing market 
conditions over time and in any event the deal in selling land may not be based 
purely on price but be more complex factors. 
The RICS guidance is more related to comparable evidence and adjusting it to take 
account of planning policy assumptions in making those adjustments.  This leads to 
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the second area, the use of evidence, all the sources of guidance talk about 
evidence, even the Government guidance talks about “appropriate available 
evidence”, this is one of the problems, the lack of land value evidence.  The Harman 
and HCA guidance also advocate the use of comparable evidence, the differences 
are in respect of what is relevant evidence, in terms of local markets, but perhaps 
more crucially in how that comparable evidence is adjusted. 
The third issue is included in the Harman guidance and is a useful double check or 
sense check on the other calculations.  The Harman guidance suggests that the time 
horizons of landowners should be considered, plus the structure of landownership in 
an area, the nature of the location as rural or urban, the differing levels of “hope 
value” in an area over existing use value and the Development or Local Plan 
allocations.  The RICS guidance suggest a wider view of market value rather than 
just local market evidence and that market evidence based on Development Plan 
policies that have now changed should be disregarded or adjusted.  The site value 
should reflect emerging policy proposals that may affect market values, including the 
CIL policy itself.  This last point is the main area of significant difference between 
Harman and the RICS guidance. 
What is clear is that this impacts on practice and in turn on the CIL viability 
assessments, it also implicitly requires local authorities to have an understanding of 
the structure of landownership in their area as well as some understanding of 
landowners decision-making as well as sources of evidence.  The practice of trying to 
assess the uplift in land value resulting from the grant of planning consent advocated 
in the original Barker proposals is still in some ways present, but it has been changed 
round to say what uplift does the landowners need to sell rather than, the landowner 
will gain an uplift in value some of that should be shared by the public sector and 
community who have generated value. 
The other element of the assessment is the area wide appraisal to determine a range 
of residual land values across the local authority area to show differing viability in 
different locations and for differing uses, this is vital to support differential CIL rates, 
to comply with EU State Aid regulations. 
“However, charging authorities should be mindful that it is likely to be harder to 
ensure that more complex patterns of differential rates are State aid compliant, 
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so for example, charging authorities need to be consistent in the way that 
appropriate available evidence on economic viability informs the treatment of a 
category of development in different zones.” (DCLG, 2012a) 
The CIL guidance (DCLG, 2014a) has become more prescriptive over time about the 
selection of hypothetical sites and the process required prior to CIL examination. 
The residual valuation process again is a standard valuation approach of subtracting 
development costs from development values to produce a residual site value.  The 
assumptions made about the development costs have been influenced by the 
Examiners Reports as they are released, they are also influenced by what are seen 
as industry standards such as developers profit should be 20% of Gross 
development value, which has been established as a standard.  This reflects the 
change in guidance to include a “competitive returns to a wiling landowner and willing 
developer to enable the development to be deliverable” as stated in paragraph 173 in 
the NPPG in March 2014. 
“Pursuing sustainable development requires careful attention to viability and 
costs in plan-making and decision-taking. Plans should be deliverable. 
Therefore, the sites and the scale of development identified in the plan should 
not be subject to such a scale of obligations and policy burdens that their 
ability to be developed viably is threatened. To ensure viability, the costs of 
any requirements likely to be applied to development, such as requirements 
for affordable housing, standards, infrastructure contributions or other 
requirements should, when taking account of the normal cost of development 
and mitigation, provide competitive returns to a willing land owner and willing 
developer to enable the development to be deliverable.” (Para 173 DCLG, 
2014b) 
The building cost assumptions are also based on certain standards and the BCIS are 
a major source of evidence, but then so is the development industry in a local area 
and hence the importance of consultation and engagement as discussed later.  The 
market value assessment is based on market values in a local area and these may or 
may not be easy to obtain, they often require adjustment, and again they may be 
supplied by developers in a local area. 
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The changes in the guidance as relating to practice in this area have been more 
about the detail of specific assumptions rather than the general approach, as the 
residual method of valuation is long established.  The biggest impact on practice is 
whether the residual method of valuation which traditionally has been applied to a 
specific site to ascertain its value, usually for a specific client for their specific 
proposals, can be satisfactorily adapted to work effectively over an area wide basis 
across a local authority area. 
The use of hypothetical sites with hypothetical assumptions is the approach 
proposed (DCLG, 2014a) and sometimes this is supplemented by the evidence of 
residual valuations of specific sites in the Local Plan or SHLAA to assess their 
viability for development, but again these are at least partially based on hypothetical 
assumptions.  Even the use of actual site based viability appraisals from actual s106 
negotiations whilst useful, as these have been undertaken prior to development 
starting on site, still don’t always reflect the real development position. 
The challenge of trying to map across a local authority area the zones of different 
value for different property sectors is challenging as to how boundaries are drawn 
and values derived from available evidence, clearly an area of conflict between 
actors.  Added to this is the assessment of cost variations across individual sites for 
different forms of development proposals, these are in reality very site specific, but 
for the area-wide viability assessment need to be averaged out based on generalised 
assumptions as to costs, this is clearly also an area for conflict between actors in the 
process. 
The Comparison between the TLV and the residual valuations in each zone across 
the area wide appraisal determines the available headroom for charging CIL in that 
area and will inform the setting the rate practice which is now considered. 
5.6.3 The Setting of the Rate (Striking the Balance and Cumulative Policy 
Burden) 
The practices of establishing what the CIL income will be spent on in the IDP and of 
undertaking the viability assessment are brought together in the practice of setting 
the rate.  This has also been the subject of significant changes in national policy 
guidance over the period, this is the practice of deciding what will actually be payable 
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in the tax or levy.  It is a political decision but based on a more technical assessment 
as discussed above, in the initial proposals for PGS a national tax rate was never set, 
but figures of 20% were suggested, perhaps learning the lessons from previous 
proposals of 100%, 80% and 70% tax rates, which stopped development proceeding. 
“If applied at a sensible rate, landowners could still enjoy significant potential 
development gain and thus land sales can still profitably proceed. This is in 
contrast to both the tax rates of some previous DGTs, which were frequently 
punitively high, and to VAT, where the effective tax rate on land can often 
surpass 100 per cent of land value.” (Barker, 2004 p85) 
The switch to the CIL is partially as a result of concern over the whole approach to 
the calculation of the PGS, with some commentators suggesting the whole 
calculation approach was flawed. 
“The Government agree that it will be important to strike the right balance 
between raising additional revenues and preserving incentives for 
development in setting the PGS rate. As proposed in Planning-gain 
Supplement: a consultation (HM Treasury, HMRC & Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister 2005), PGS would be set at a modest rate across the UK in 
order to generate additional revenue for investment in infrastructure at the 
local and regional levels while preserving incentives for development to come 
forward. This principle will guide decisions about the PGS rate. The 
Government will continue to work with stakeholders to consider the impact of 
PGS on development.” (CLG, 2006a p6) 
Even with the CIL proposals the details of how it would be calculated was from the 
outset an issue and concern. 
“Some commentators, particularly from the commercial development sector, 
have argued that land value uplift arising from the grant of planning 
permissions in an area may not be the right indicator to which charging 
authorities should have regard in setting CIL levels when they prepare their 
charging schedule. The Government’s view is that the increase in value 
arising from commercial development will be reflected in a land sale price 
eventually” (CLG, 2008 p 19) 
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“However, commercial developers have argued that it may not be necessary 
or desirable to carry out an assessment of land value change in order to 
decide what level of CIL is affordable, and that there could be other more 
immediate proxies. The Government is in discussion with the industry to 
establish whether other measures or proxies might be appropriate.” (CLG, 
2008 p 19) 
The issue of “striking the balance” was set out from the early stages and has become 
a key phrase or trope in the process in placing viability at the heart of CIL 
assessment.  The initial guidance for setting CIL rates (DCLG, 2010b) stated 
“Regulation 14 requires that a charging authority, in setting CIL rates, ‘must 
aim to strike what appears to the charging authority to be an appropriate 
balance between’ the desirability of funding infrastructure from CIL and ‘the 
potential effects (taken as a whole) of the imposition of CIL on the economic 
viability of development across its area” (DCLG, 2010c p 4) 
This provided the local authority with some flexibility in determining what was 
appropriate for its local area, but as highlighted earlier this wording has changed 
through the various versions of the setting the rates guidance in (DCLG, 2012a; 
DCLG, 2013a) and, (DCLG, 2014a) with the most significant change being in the 
February 2014 guidance with the removal of “what appears to the charging authority 
to be” and replace it with “should use evidence”. 
“Charging authorities should use that evidence to strike an appropriate 
balance between the desirability of funding infrastructure from the levy and the 
potential impact upon the economic viability of development across their area.” 
(DCLG, 2014a p12) 
This is a clear change in emphasis and potential influence on practice, this is also 
reflected in the minor changes of wording to the section on “what is meant by the 
appropriate balance” (April 2013) becomes “what is meant by an appropriate 
balance” (February 2014) and from “support development of their area” (April 2013) 
becomes “support development across their area” (February 2014).  These reflect a 
change in the local authority’s level of control and leadership of the CIL rate setting 
process as set out in the guidance. 
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Also added to the guidance in February 2014 was the need to justify rates based on 
evidence much more strictly than in the earlier guidance, shown by the contrast 
between the two quotes below, with the 2014 quote added to the 2013 quote. 
“there is no requirement for a proposed rate to exactly mirror the evidence, for 
example, if the evidence pointed to setting a charge right at the margins of 
viability. There is room for some pragmatism.” (DCLG, 2013a p 9) 
“It would be appropriate to ensure that a ‘buffer’ or margin is included, so that 
the levy rate is able to support development when economic circumstances 
adjust. In all cases, the charging authority should be able to explain its 
approach clearly.” (DCLG, 2014a p 16) 
This again restricts the freedom of the local authority to set rates especially when as 
acknowledged the availability of evidence is problematic and contested.  The latest 
guidance becomes much more formalised around the CIL examination, what is 
required and the consideration of evidence in that arena. 
The other major change is the emphasis placed on the term “cumulative policy 
burden”, whilst this was introduced by paragraphs 173 to 177 in the NPPF in 2012, it 
was not referred to in the December 2012 or April 2013 CIL guidance which stated in 
regulation14 (1) 
“In meeting the requirements of regulation 14(1), charging authorities should 
show and explain how their proposed levy rate (or rates) will contribute 
towards the implementation of their relevant Plan and support the 
development of their area.” (DCLG, 2012a p 6)  
“As set out in the National Planning Policy Framework in England (paragraphs 
173 – 177), the sites and the scale of development identified in the plan 
should not be subject to such a scale of obligations and policy burdens that 
their ability to be developed viably is threatened.” (DCLG, 2014a p 12) 
Again, whilst clearly the NPPF was in place and needed to be taken into account in 
any CIL rate setting before February 2014, the emphasis on the term “cumulative 
policy burden” seeks to change the meaning, it refers to the fact that a whole range 
of other policies impact on viability, not just development contributions such as s106 
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agreements or CIL, but also policy requirements relating to design or sustainability to 
be included in new developments.  The quotes below were also added to the 
February 2014 guidance illustrating the point. 
“A realistic understanding of costs is essential to the proper assessment of 
viability in an area.  Development costs include costs arising from existing 
regulatory requirements, and any policies on planning obligations in the 
relevant Plan, such as policies on affordable housing and identified site-
specific requirements for strategic sites.” (DCLG, 2014a p 17) 
“Differential rates should not be used as a means to deliver policy objectives.” 
(DCLG, 2014a p 17) 
The overall impact of these on the viability and therefore deliverability of development 
needs to be explicitly considered, this places a cap on the policy objectives as a 
whole as required by local authorities, determined by an economic viability 
assessment. 
5.6.4 Consultation and Engagement Process 
The change in the guidance and its potential impact on practice is also apparent in 
the change in how consultation and engagement is undertaken in the CIL policy 
process.  Again in the PGS proposals this was not a particular issue, but the change 
to the Plan-led approach of the CIL required consultation in a similar way as to that 
required by the Local Plan process. 
The CIL guidance set out a formal process with two formal stages of consultation, at 
the publication of the Draft Preliminary Charging Schedule stage and at the Draft 
Charging Schedule stage.  This would then be followed by the CIL Examination itself 
and the Inspectors Report, before formal adoption by the local authority.  In the 
guidance on setting the CIL rate little or no reference was made to the consultation or 
engagement process up to the February 2014 guidance. 
“charging authorities should consider views of developers at an early stage.” 
(DCLG, 2013a p10) 
In the February 2014 guidance a whole section on how the Charging Schedules 
should be prepared, including engagement with and requiring support from local 
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developers.  This clearly will likely have an impact on the practices required to 
implement the CIL policy and reflect the relationship the local authority has with local 
developers and property professionals in its area, this is something which is new in 
the implementation of CIL compared to s106 or earlier national taxation mechanisms. 
“Charging authorities should seek early engagement with local developers, 
others in the property industry and infrastructure providers when preparing 
their charging schedules.” (DCLG, 2014a p14) 
“a charging authority should directly sample an appropriate range of types of 
sites across its area, in order to supplement existing data. This will require 
support from local developers.” (DCLG, 2014a p16) 
There is also a whole section on what the CIL can be spent on and by whom and the 
impact of Neighbourhood portion of the levy, which was introduced by the Localism 
Act in 2011 but only included in the CIL guidance for setting the rates in February 
2014.  This requirement to pass a proportion of the income from CIL directly to a 
Town or Parish Council or where a Neighbourhood Plan has been prepared, will 
clearly also require a change in practice and an implicit requirement to consult and 
engage over the priorities for spending in a local area.  There will be a need to align 
future spending plans between the community and the local authority and to engage 
in planning future infrastructure provision. 
Many of these changes in the national CIL policy regulations and guidance are still 
relatively recent, the full impact on practices are still being considered, what is clear 
is that as in the change in the conceptualisation of value capture that has taken place 
over the period 2003 to 2015, the CIL guidance on setting rates has also shifted over 
the period and requires changes in practices around the implementation of the policy, 
how they will translate into practices at a local level will be considered in the Case 
studies. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The emergence of the CIL as a value capture policy is part of the need to secure 
more funding to support the provision of infrastructure to in turn support growth.  The 
Barker review into the provision of housing supply (Barker, 2004) identified the need 
for an additional value capture mechanism to Planning Obligations, to fund strategic 
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infrastructure to support growth.  Initially the Barker review proposed a new land tax, 
the Planning Gain Supplement (PGS) but this eventually became the CIL which in 
itself has evolve since its initial proposals in 2008, but the whole rationale was to 
support growth and new housing supply. 
This was the start of the reconceptualization of value capture from one of a 
redistribution of unearned land value to one of funding infrastructure, from explicit 
taxation in terms of PGS to implicit taxation via CIL.  This was reflected in the 
discursive struggle between the storylines promoting the “value capture” discourse 
and the storylines promoting “supporting growth” discourse over the period.  The 
storylines related to the key actors involved in the discursive struggle and the 
storylines of “encouraging developers”, “incentivising landowners”, “facilitating local 
authorities” and “persuading communities” became dominant supporting the 
“supporting growth” discourse, as they were based on removing the barriers to the 
delivery of new development and growth. 
The changes in the national policy increasingly emphasised the need to remove 
barriers to development and the change from PGS to CIL.  This increased in CIL to 
ensure a supply of land via the “incentivising landowners”, to promote development 
via “encouraging developers” by protecting the viability and deliverability of projects 
within the assessment of CIL, the provision of funding for strategic infrastructure in 
addition to S106 funding to “facilitate local authorities” and finally the “persuading 
communities” by the 25% payment to neighbourhoods.  These storylines were 
identified in national policy guidance and its changes over the 10 year period from 
2005 to 2015; they also envisaged impacts on policy practices. 
In tracking the changes to national policy regulations and guidance it is clear that the 
three challenges faced by all value capture mechanisms persisted; the assessment 
of the development value, the sharing out of this between the various actors including 
what amount to capture by the public sector and finally how that funding would be 
spent, these were the key areas of policy practice.  In addition, the consultation and 
engagement process was a key fourth policy practice and important in how the policy 
would be implemented involving key actors in the process. 
The national policy guidance changed in relation to the four areas of policy practice 
changing the emphasis and restricting the discretion of local authorities.  Firstly, the 
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IDP would set out the infrastructure needed to support the growth identified in the 
Local Plan and on which the funding would be spent, this was further restricted by 
the subsequent requirement to provide a 123 list setting out the specific items the 
envisaged income would be spent on.  The policy practices were envisaged to 
restrict local authorities to spending of CIL on growth related infrastructure only.  
Secondly, the Viability assessment was to assess the amount of development value 
available to be shared between the various actors, the viability assessment was 
placed at the heart of the CIL policy, with the threshold land value assessment 
protecting the landowner’s value and the 20% profit level protected for the developer 
for taking the risk in undertaking the development.  Thirdly, the setting the rate policy 
practice influenced by key metaphors “striking the balance” and “cumulative policy 
burden”, also restricted the discretion of local authorities in setting a CIL rate, with 
increasing emphasis on evidence in the decision making process, it also forced local 
authorities to make policy choices within the viability assessment headroom.  Finally, 
the consultation and engagement process over time increasingly emphasised 
collaboration with developers, in turn increasing the influence of developers on the 
CIL process and the asymmetry of knowledge and power between the parties. 
The national policy guidance and its codified knowledge provided a context for local 
policy implementation outlined above, how this translated into policy practices at a 
local level is considered in the case studies in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 6 Durham Case Study (Business not as usual) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The research undertaken considered two case studies in the north east of England, 
Durham and Newcastle/Gateshead, these were selected for several reasons, firstly 
the ability to secure a depth of primary data collection by being able to gain access to 
key actors in the case studies, this partly as a result of the contacts the researcher 
had in the field of research having worked in the north east for over 25 years.  
Secondly, the fact that they were the only two CIL proposals that had been 
progressed in the north east, which stood in a clear contrast to other areas of the 
country, illustrating the challenge of implementing such a policy in the north east. 
This challenge made it of particular interest to research, as an appropriate context in 
which to study the micro-political processes involved in the implementation of the CIL 
policy, as these would be more apparent and observable than in other contexts 
where the policy implementation was less contested.  The choice of two case studies 
also afforded an opportunity to compare features between the two case studies 
themselves and to make comparisons with the national perspective of the policy and 
its objectives and how they worked out in practice. 
6.2 Methodological Approach and Link to the research questions 
As set out earlier in chapter 4 the research sought to investigate the policy making 
process using the argumentative discourse analysis approach of Hajer (1995) and 
his 10 stage methodology (Hajer, 2006) to undertake the research process.  The 
research has used an interpretative policy discourse analysis in a similar way to that 
employed in the national policy analysis in chapter 5, analysing the dominant 
“supporting growth” discourse and it’s supporting storylines and their impact within 
the context of the Case Study of the Durham CIL.  Attempting to uncover the main 
discursive mechanisms used in the policy making process at the micro-political level 
and their impact on policy practices in a local context. 
This analysis assists in the consideration of the research question about the 
relationship of planners with other actors in the policy making process, in trying to 
uncover their understanding of the behaviour and decision making of the other actors 
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in the process, such as developers and landowners and how that has influenced the 
policy implementation. 
The other research question is more concerned with the production and use of 
knowledge claims within the process and the use of knowledge by planners in their 
decision making within the policy making process.  This analysis will attempt to show 
how various actors have used various knowledge claims within their storylines and 
how this in turn has influenced the policy implementation.  It is hoped this will assist 
in understanding how the planners use knowledge in their decision making process. 
6.3 Description of County Durham 
Durham County Council in terms of population is the fourth largest Council in the 
country and the largest in the north east, with a population of over half a million.  It 
was established as a unitary authority on 1st April 2009, when the seven district 
councils were abolished and the powers transferred to the new unitary authority 
(Durham County Council, 2011).  It is a varied council with former industrial areas 
mainly in the east of the County in the former coal mining area, in the south and west 
it is mainly agricultural and rural, with the northern part being part of the commuter 
area into Newcastle and Tyneside.  Durham City is the main settlement and 
administrative centre; it is famous for its cathedral and university and is growing as a 
tourist destination.  Durham City is 18 miles south of Newcastle and on the main east 
coast rail line some 233 miles north of London. 
 
Figure 6.1 Location Map for Durham 
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The diverse nature of the County is illustrated by the fact there are 250 separate 
settlements, there are 13 town councils, 91 parish councils and 22 parish meetings 
where no formal local council exists (Durham County Council, 2011).  As will be 
discussed later, this is also reflected in the varied housing market conditions across 
the county and the difficulties in establishing property market boundaries. 
6.4 The County Durham Plan 
The County Durham Core Strategy (The County Durham plan) has been in 
preparation since the creation of the new unitary authority and went to examination in 
public in September 2014.  It is an ambitious plan looking over a 20 year timescale; it 
seeks to promote economic growth, with a “focus on tackling the worklessness 
problem and rebalancing the labour market taking into account demographic and 
commuting patterns” (Durham County Council, 2012d).
 
Figure 6.2 Map of delivery areas in County Durham Plan 
Durham City is the main driver for that growth, which involves growing the working 
population of the County and attracting high value jobs into the County around 
Durham City and building housing to attract and retain people employed in those 
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jobs.  This is seen as the only way to turn around the long term decline that the 
County has experienced and has manifested itself in ambitious growth plans for 
38000 new homes up to 2030 and with 29000 homes identified in the Plan, many of 
these new homes being executive homes.  The delivery of the Plan has been split 
over 5 areas as shown on the plan below and comprises north, south, east, west and 
central Durham. 
In order to bring forward these housing sites requires a significant amount of 
infrastructure and this is also how the requirement for the introduction of the 
Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) has emerged, to part fund this infrastructure 
alongside s106 contributions.  It is important to stress that the introduction of the CIL 
is as a direct consequence of the nature of the County Durham Plan.  It also directly 
relates to one of the main discourses analysed in the research, that of “supporting 
growth”, which has emerged nationally impacting on the role of planning and locally 
on the County Durham Plan. 
6.5 Timeline for the CIL process in Durham 
The CIL stakeholder event on 2nd March 2012 has been identified as a key event in 
the CIL process where Durham made public its intention to proceed with a CIL 
charge; it was well attended in numbers although many organisations had rather 
junior representation.  Many of the issues which featured in later debates were raised 
here.  Following this event, there was also a formal response by the Home Builders 
Federation (HBF) and again this was indicative of their stance going forward.  A draft 
preliminary charging schedule was prepared in July 2012 (Durham County Council, 
2012b) and this was in fact amended before its formal issue in September 2012 
(Durham County Council, 2012a) (see figure 6.3), A formal consultation took place 
between 10th September and 26th November 2012 and these responses as they 
related to the subject of viability, were very limited in number and mainly restricted to 
house builders, surveyors and planning consultants, these were analysed to 
determine the main storylines within the policy making process as discussed later. 
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Figure 6.3 Draft Preliminary Charging Schedule (September 2012) 
The response and pressure from the HBF did lead to two changes, firstly the role of 
the consultant HDH seemed to change and be enhanced to deal with the challenge 
to the planners and secondly also to the establishment of a panel or working group to 
engage and work with the HBF.  It should be pointed out that the proposal to 
introduce a CIL charge of £250/sqm on the Durham City Strategic zone in the draft 
preliminary charging schedule was ambitious and was as high as any local authority 
was proposing anywhere across the country.  This appears to have galvanised the 
house building industry to work together to respond and strongly challenge what they 
believed to be a serious threat to the delivery of housing development in Durham, 
and perhaps setting a precedent to other local authorities in the area.  The prospect 
of CIL as a generator of significant income was also an important expectation of 
some Council members and local communities at this time. 
Between November 2012 and October 2013 there was a period of delay until the 
issuing of the draft charging schedule in October 2013 (see figure 6.4), which was 
now preceded and supported by a substantial report by consultants HDH (Durham 
County Council and HDH, 2013), which prepared several detailed appraisals of sites 
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and provided key justifications and evidence in support of the CIL charge proposals 
and informed the CIL rationale document (Durham County Council, 2013a).  The 
other important change was the removal of the proposals for the Durham City 
Strategic zone and replacement by a west Durham area at £30/sqm and a reduction 
in the rate proposed for the northern area of Durham and Chester-le-street from 
£80/sqm to £60/sqm.  As can be seen other changes were made to the retail rates 
and for student housing but the discussion and comments on these were rather 
limited compared to the engagement with the house building industry.  Once again 
these proposals went out to formal consultation from 16th October 2013 to 9th 
December 2013 with a greater number of responses to those for the draft preliminary 
schedule, but broadly similar in nature. 
 
Figure 6.4 Draft Charging Schedule (October 2013) 
In December 2013 the Council’s Scrutiny Committee (Durham County Council, 
2013b) also investigated the progress of the CIL and introduced some new areas of 
discussion relating to the proposed CIL charge rates and competition with 
neighbouring local authorities.  It’s not clear if the change in proposed rates was part 
of that discussion, or whether members had become aware of developers concerns 
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about proposed rates and the risk of stopping development, or that with the reduction 
in the proposed CIL rates there would be an impact on expected receipts and that 
CIL was not going to be the same source of funding as initially hoped. 
Finally on 19th March 2014 the Cabinet confirmed the CIL should be submitted to the 
Inspector for Examination in public (Durham County Council, 2014a) and that this 
would be undertaken jointly with the Local Plan process, although at the end of a 
three stage process.  Following approval by the full Council the submission was 
made in April 2014 with a revised rationale report and supported by a full report from 
HDH (Durham County Council and HDH, 2014).  In that report and confirmed in the 
semi-structured interviews, the role of the working group/panel with the HBF was 
discussed, as a problematic arena for discussion that it appears to have been.  With 
seemingly amicable meetings haven taken place, with in the Council’s opinion, some 
tentative agreements having been reached, to find repeatedly after the meeting the 
HBF representative indicating that there had in fact been no agreement reached.  
This remained the position up to the Local Plan Examination in Public, in spite of 
some attempts to reach agreement on some points before the expected CIL 
Examination.  The role of this group and that of some of its members will be 
discussed later as it is a key factor influencing the implementation of the CIL policy in 
Durham. 
The Examination in Public of the Local Plan commenced in September 2014 with the 
CIL examination anticipated to take place in early 2015, in the event the Interim 
Inspectors Report issued on 18th February 2015, placed the CIL process along with 
the Local Plan process on indefinite hold and unfortunately the CIL Examination was 
not able to be included in the research (Harold Stephens – Development Plan 
Inspector, 2015). 
6.6 Key events and sites of argumentation 
It typically takes around two years to progress through these stages and Durham 
progressed broadly in line with that timescale up to the stopping of the process in 
February 2015, the main events set out in the table 6.1. 
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Key Event  Date 
CIL Stakeholder Event 2nd March 2012 (meeting with minutes) 
Formal response of HBF to CIL discussions 2nd April 2012 
Draft CIL Rationale and Preliminary Charging 
Schedule & Cabinet Report 
24th July 2012 (report and document) 
Cabinet Report with Affordable Housing & CIL 
Development Viability Study (HDH) & CIL 
Rationale& Preliminary Charging Schedule 
12th September 2012 (report and documents) 
Formal Consultation on Draft Preliminary Draft 
Charging Schedule 
10/9/12 to 26/11/12 (schedule of responses) 
Meetings with HBF and Panel  March to October 2013 (minutes of some 
meetings) 
Cabinet Report with Local Plan & CIL 
Development Viability Study (HDH) & CIL 
Rationale and Draft Charging Schedule  
9th October 2013 (report and documents) 
Formal Consultation on Draft Charging Schedule 16/10/13 to 9/12/13 (schedule of responses)  
Cabinet Report re CIL 19th March 2014 (report) 
Submission to Examiner - Local Plan & CIL 
Development Viability Study (Pre-submission 
Notes) (HDH) & CIL Rationale and Draft 
Charging Schedule (Schedule of Changes) 
25th April 2014 (documents) 
Local Plan – Inspectors Interim Report  18th February 2015 
Table 6.1 Key Events in Durham 
In terms of the research and the methodology, in addition to identifying key events in 
the process, it was also important to identify key sites of argumentation to try and 
identify the ideas and concepts which shaped the discussions and debates. 
As the research was on the use of knowledge by planners in the CIL implementation 
process in relation to the capture of value, there was initially more focus on the 
discussions regarding the assessment of viability and on the setting of the CIL rates 
rather than on the spending of the money collected.  However, as the nature of the 
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process was investigated it became apparent that three sites of argumentation or 
arenas were key (as shown in table 6.2) and that the spending of the funding whilst 
perhaps less contested nevertheless was an integral part of the CIL process and that 
the three arenas overlapped and interrelated to each other. 
Site of Argumentation Description 
What is the funding to be spent on Preparation of the Infrastructure Delivery Plan 
(IDP) what infrastructure needed for Local Plan 
and the 123 list setting out what infrastructure 
items CIL to be spent on within IDP 
Viability Assessment Preparation of the Viability Assessment Report 
comprising area wide appraisal and assessment 
of Threshold Land value (TLV) to establish 
headroom available for CIL rates 
Setting of the Rates Preparation of the Draft Preliminary Charging 
Schedule and Draft Charging Schedule setting 
out the proposed CIL rates 
Table 6.2 Key Sites of Argumentation in Durham 
The data from these sites of argumentation have been studied together with the data 
from a series of semi-structured interviews with key actors in the process.  To 
ascertain the key ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to 
the discussion and arguments made, to help identify the discourses and storylines 
structuring these discussions and which in turn have influenced how the policy 
becomes implemented. 
6.7 Discourse Analysis 
6.7.1 Identification of Discourses 
As mentioned earlier the identification of the main discourses is critical to the 
discourse analysis process and can depend on either identification from theory and 
literature before entering the field or alternatively from the actual fieldwork itself 
(Sharp and Richardson, 2001).  The discourses emerged from a detailed analysis of 
a range of data sources, including policy documentation (which often quoted from 
national CIL policy documents), committee reports, comments made in the 
consultation exercises undertaken in the process and importantly in semi-structured 
interviews with key actors in the CIL process from the County Council and outside 
organisations.  In identifying discourses it is important to consider that a discourse is 
defined as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is 
given to social and physical phenomena and which is produced and reproduced 
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through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44) it is not a discussion it is 
more a set of concepts that structure the contributions of the actors into the process. 
As stated earlier the discourse of “supporting growth” has become particularly 
influential and dominant at a national policy-making level.  Using discourse analysis 
and the Hajer (2006) methodology the impact of this discourse was analysed in 
chapter 5, it can be argued that the discourse has achieved “Discourse Structuration” 
as the meaning of value capture in policy terms has been has been reconceptualised 
from one of being driven by redistribution to one of supporting delivery and growth.  
Accordingly this is acknowledged within the case study as being the dominant and 
only discourse, the more pertinent point to consider is the impact of the four national 
storylines identified earlier, each seeking to remove barriers to delivery and growth, 
and how they interact with the locally generated storylines and influence policy 
making in the local area. 
6.7.2 Identification of Storylines and Tropes 
As mentioned earlier the Storyline is an important concept in analysing policy, it is 
defined by Hajer as “a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon 
various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social 
phenomena” (Hajer, 1995, p. 56).  Tropes are similar they are figures of speech that 
simplify debates and influence the meanings attached to problems and also influence 
policy practices.  They are both reductive discursive devices that simplify complex 
debates through simplified narratives, as such they can often disguise contradictions 
and areas of misunderstanding with both positive and negative effects.  They can 
also legitimise policy whilst at the same time disguising incomplete arguments and 
institutional biases (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). 
The storylines and tropes identified within the Durham case study are shown in the 
table 6.3, these comprise a mixture of national storylines identified in the last chapter 
together with national tropes identified in the national policy documentation (both 
shown underlined), that have been employed by actors in the policy making process 
in Durham these are both shown underlined.  In addition, there are locally generated 
storylines and tropes which have emerged from a consideration of the local data 
sources and interviews. 
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Site of Argumentation 
 
Storylines 
 
Tropes 
 
What is the funding to be spent 
on 
 
Why the CIL is needed 
 
Facilitating Local Authorities 
 
CIL policy not being applicable 
to the north east 
 
Why is CIL needed 
 
Plan led approach 
 
double counting of developer 
contributions 
Viability Assessment 
 
Artificial Process 
 
Incentivising Landowners 
 
Robust Viability Assessment 
 
Encouraging Developers 
  
Playing Games 
 
Granular Property Market 
 
Appropriate Available Evidence 
Setting the Rate 
 
Reasonable CIL proposals 
 
Unrealistic proposals 
 
Business not as usual 
 
Reduced Ambition 
Cumulative Policy Burden 
 
Striking the Balance 
 
Table 6.3 Storylines and Tropes in Durham 
The discursive struggle between the national and local storylines and tropes has 
been considered across three sites of argumentation as key arenas where policy 
debate and decision making took place in the production of key documentation to 
support the CIL process.  The “what is the funding to be spent on” arena prepares 
the IDP setting out the infrastructure needed to deliver the new development and 
growth in the County Durham Plan, the “viability assessment” arena prepares the 
viability assessment document to support the third decision in the final arena “setting 
the rate” in which the CIL rates are decided and included in the formal preliminary 
draft charging schedule and draft charging schedule. 
The discursive struggle between the storylines and tropes is now considered within 
the three different sites of argumentation. 
6.8 Analysis of Storylines and Tropes at Key Sites of Argumentation 
Storylines and tropes are important and influential discursive mechanisms as 
discussed earlier, they are employed by actors to influence the course of policy 
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making, by influencing meanings attached to knowledge claims and how this in turn 
influences policy making practices. 
According to Hajer (1995) storylines can have three main affects, firstly, they can be 
used to position actors into certain roles, secondly, they can lead to the creation of 
Discourse Coalitions which are groups often only temporary in nature with shared 
aims and objectives in influencing policy development, they can be actors and groups 
which may seem to be unlikely allies but through the storyline have become so due 
to shared objectives.  Thirdly, storylines are used to cluster knowledge sources and 
can lead to a discursive mechanism known as “black-boxing” where knowledge 
claims become accepted as the norm and beyond challenge (Hajer, 1995). 
Operational storylines and tropes achieve these impacts, firstly by influencing the 
problem definition, seeking to achieve “discursive closure” whereby a definition is 
produced and accepted and thereby prevents consideration of alternatives (Hajer, 
1995, p. 22).  Secondly, by “mobilisation of bias”, this is where an actor via the use of 
a storyline or trope attempts to influence what is included or omitted in the policy 
debate (Hajer, 1995, p. 42). 
Finally, actors may use three methods to support their construction of reality, firstly, 
credibility, this is not just the plausibility of the argument but the authority of the 
authors, secondly acceptability, which implies the position is attractive or at least 
necessary and finally trust, this can refer to the procedure by which the definition of 
reality was reached and can suppress doubts (Hajer, 1995, p. 59).  These can be 
used positively as above or negatively to discredit arguments, cast a position as 
unattractive or to establish doubts and thereby undermine trust, this in turn can also 
positon other actors. 
Having set out the main national and local storylines and tropes within the Durham 
case study it is now appropriate to consider the nature of the discursive struggle 
within each of the three main sites of argumentation. 
6.8.1 What is the funding to be spent on? 
The discursive struggle between the national and local storylines and tropes have 
been analysed over the period from the start of the CIL process in Durham in March 
2012 up to the Inspectors Interim report stopping the process in February 2015.  This 
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site of argumentation dealt with the production of the IDP setting out the 
infrastructure needed to support the delivery of the new development sites included 
in the new Local Plan. 
In this site of argumentation the local authority employed a combination of both local 
and national storylines and tropes to justify the introduction of CIL as a policy, 
bearing in mind it was not mandatory for a local authority to introduce CIL.  As 
mentioned earlier the Council proposed an ambitious growth oriented Local Plan 
reflecting the nationally dominant “supporting growth” discourse. 
In County Durham the Durham Local Plan outlined an ambitious growth agenda as 
set out earlier.  This in turn generated a requirement for strategic infrastructure in 
particular the two relief roads around Durham City.  The County Council employed a 
combination of local storyline “why the CIL is needed” together with the national 
policy trope “plan-led approach” as it sought to establish credibility, acceptability and 
trust for the this policy of promoting growth as a new approach to regenerating the 
county as a whole.   The “why the CIL is needed” is reflected in 
“Funding received from the CIL contributes to the key infrastructure which is 
required to deliver the Plan.  The overarching priority of the Plan is to improve 
the economic performance of County Durham. The Plan seeks to create 
conditions to provide development and the right infrastructure so a greater 
proportion of the working age population can be in employment and so 
improve the resident’s health, wellbeing and economic potential.” (Para 1.21 
Durham County Council, 2012a) 
 “also national government were pushing us at the time we started looking at 
this we were really worried about where s106 was going until got guidance 
etc., felt compelled to investigate it (CIL), on small community and political 
side again, national government big signs, neighbourhood planning you will 
get your percentage, this rationale for neighbourhoods to get together and 
provide the basis for new housing sites coming forward” (LA:D4 Interview) 
The promotion of a growth based strategy requiring infrastructure to support it as set 
out in the IDP reflected the national policy trope of a “plan-led approach” and 
supported the national storyline to “facilitating local authorities”.  
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There was some resistance and opposition to the proposals, by a local storyline 
about the “CIL policy not being applicable to the north east” due to low land values 
and a poor property market.  The second, challenge was more specifically about the 
need for some of the infrastructure and the need for CIL to fund it, in the local 
storyline “why is CIL needed”. 
The principle of the applicability of the policy to the north east was raised in a very 
limited way, but as the Councils ambitious growth proposals were generally well 
supported, this storyline as a general comment on national policy was not particularly 
influential.  More opposition came more from the “why is CIL needed” storyline, which 
argued why the need for the infrastructure proposed and whether the CIL or s106 
should be used to fund the infrastructure provision. 
The justification for the CIL was linked to the green belt release around Durham City 
and in particular the Northern Relief Road.  The house builders were generally 
supportive of the new housing proposals and of the growth proposals. 
“we have been involved in the formulation of policy particularly in Durham 
which is our home county, is more than we just want our sites to work we want 
the Plan to work for Durham” (DV:D/NG4 Interview) 
There was also a concern in the early stages from the development industry about 
potential “double counting of developer contributions”, but the national policy trope 
tightened up this area, with the provision of the 123 list resolving many of those 
concerns. 
An argument can be made that discursive closure was established by the local 
authority that CIL was needed to fund the infrastructure to support growth, this was 
however undermined later by the problems raised by the draft Planning Inspectors 
Report following the Local Plan Examination in Public and which has caused both the 
Local Plan and CIL processes to be stopped (Harold Stephens – Development Plan 
Inspector, 2015).  The Inspector questioned the need for the ambitious growth 
proposals, accordingly much of the credibility, authority and trust built and 
established from this storyline over the period from March 2102 until February 2015 
has been severely weakened and the initial achievement of Discursive Closure has 
been undone. 
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As a result of this discursive struggle the local authority has been positioned as the 
facilitator of the infrastructure even if only partly funded from the CIL income.  The 
clustering of knowledge claims from this discursive struggle were around the Local 
Plan process, establishing the case for growth, and in turn the infrastructure needed 
and therefore the need for CIL, whilst that appeared to have been established during 
the Local Plan process this was later completely undermined after the Local Plan 
Examination in public and Inspectors Report. 
6.8.2 Viability Assessment 
This was an important and highly contested site of discursive struggle, to produce the 
area wide viability assessment document for County Durham.  The Council sought to 
employ the storyline of “robust viability assessment” to support its promotion of this 
viability work and to support its overall ambitious proposals for growth and CIL 
proposals.  There are two parts of the viability assessment calculation process, the 
area wide assessment and the assessment of the threshold land value, both of which 
were challenging in the Durham case study. 
Firstly, the area wide assessment involving the residual valuation of a series of 
hypothetical sites across the county, for a series of different uses, to attempt to map 
the variations in property markets and therefore viability across the county.  This was 
particularly challenging in Durham due to the nature of its geography 
“whereas in Newcastle/Gateshead you are able, probably just the quantum’s 
of the areas and the conurbation factor you are able to supposed to do a bit 
…… more able to identify the markets as larger chunks of land” (LA:D3 
Interview) 
“it’s the way Durham is, whereas Newcastle/Gateshead does operate as one 
area (conurbation) there is a sort of relationship between even Rowlands Gill 
and Gateshead centre there is a link people will go from Rowlands Gill to 
Gateshead centre catch the metro or bus to it.  Whereas the relationship of 
even the big towns in Durham just isn’t there in the same way, there is 
probably not a relationship between Barnard Castle and Seaham, Newton 
Aycliffe is linked to Darlington (a neighbouring unitary authority) in how it 
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operates day to day, Sedgefield has not got a lot to do with Chester-le-street 
and that’s with the bigger places” (LA:D3 Interview) 
“yes, we took 7 sites which were actual developments which have been 
anonymised we have put the first round appraisals we did were hypothetical 
sites, which the house builders weren’t quite happy because they weren’t 
providing a realistic reflection of what was going on in the market so we took 7 
sites that had planning approval and we have put each of these 7 sites into a 
delivery area NE, SW etc., applied the values in those areas to those sites to 
arrive at the residual value and we calculate the CIL from that the 7 notional 
sites each in a different area obviously each has got a different density we 
have worked out the residual value, the existing use value, the additional profit 
and that’s where the CIL rate is derived from” (LA:D3 Interview) 
The local trope “granular property market” was used by HDH to illustrate the 
challenge of mapping very localised spatial variations in the housing market, with 
significant differences of residential values within even one small settlement, this 
made it practically impossible to draw boundaries for different areas and led to the 
county wide CIL rate proposal. 
“interesting point Simon Drummond Hay made he has done 6 or 7 CILs for 
other counties, he said he has never come across this problem anywhere as 
bad as us, everywhere else has a really clear valuation pattern and Durham 
hasn’t hence the “granular market” (LA:D3 Interview) 
Secondly, the threshold land value calculation is one of the most difficult aspects of 
the viability assessment and has been the subject of varied and sometimes 
conflicting national guidance which has changed over the period. 
“There is considerable common ground between the RICS and the Harman 
Guidance but unfortunately they are not consistent. The RICS Guidance 
recommends against the ‘current/alternative use value plus a margin’ which is 
the methodology recommended in the Harman Guidance.” (Para 1.44 Durham 
County Council and HDH, 2013) 
In the early stages of the period studied the local authority sought to promote its local 
storyline of “robust viability assessment” and local trope of “granular property market” 
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indicating the specific challenges of the area wide viability assessment process in 
Durham.  The ambitious proposals for the CIL rates discussed in the next section 
supported by the early versions of the viability assessment reports were however the 
subject of a strong challenge by private developers. 
Using national storylines “encouraging developers” and “incentivising landowners” as 
well as the national policy trope “appropriate available evidence” private developers 
challenged the viability assessment work by the Council and its “robust viability 
assessment”.  This can be considered in three broad areas linked to the three 
discursive mechanisms highlighted above, the “encouraging developers” which 
challenged the assumptions within the area wide appraisal, the “incentivising 
landowners” which challenged the threshold land value assessment and the national 
policy trope “appropriate available evidence” which challenged the evidence base to 
the work. 
The assumptions in the viability assessments were strongly challenged particularly by 
the HBF, with assumptions about developers profit and marketing costs also 
disputed, this relates to the national policy storyline of “encouraging developers”. 
“contradictions between Viability appraisals and what’s happening on the 
ground because been too lenient with the house builders may be should have 
held our ground and said we disagree with that assumption we think it should 
be 20% profit on cost not on GDV, but been trying to work with them and try 
and reflect their views as much as we can but swung the other way round and 
is not reflective of what’s on the ground we are getting permissions and sites 
developed out in certain areas where not viable” (LA:D2 Interview) 
“I think one of the biggest issues was the profit margins when we started out 
we put 20% of total development costs, as developers return, went down 
badly, weren’t happy. We backed down on that and used 20% of gross 
development value” (LA:D3 Interview) 
The main challenge by developers using the “encouraging developers” storyline was 
that there was a lack of understanding by the local authority planners and of the in-
house surveyors of the economics of development.  This reflects the use of the 
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storyline to undermine the credibility and trust attached to the Councils storyline of 
“robust viability assessment” and is illustrated by: 
“Development Economics is absolutely vital I went for 5 years to Town 
Planning and never touched an economics course surprises me how little 
taught on viability, if you want to deliver, you have to deliver, the government 
is giving you no choice” (DV:D/NG3 Interview) 
The planners however considered that their knowledge of viability was in fact 
improving over time, but lacked confidence and required the support of an 
independent external consultants view on values and market conditions, this will be 
considered further when the impact on practices is considered. 
In challenging the TLV calculation the volume house builders and the HBF on their 
behalf were particularly concerned that too low a land value had been included in the 
assessment and that this wouldn’t provide enough “incentive for landowners” to sell 
land and that this would stop development coming forward.  Volume house builders 
as the term would suggest rely on a significant supply of sites to maintain the scale of 
development their business model requires, hence their especially strong concerns 
about land value assumptions. 
“I think at the land values set just in Durham, nobody will sell the land, land will 
not come forward to the market in values set out in Durham’s Local Plan” 
(DV:D/NG3 Interview) 
As discussed earlier evidence was given greater emphasis over time in national 
policy guidance as illustrated by the national policy trope “appropriate available 
evidence” and this also played a key part in the discursive struggle.  The Council not 
having credible evidence in the eyes of the developers, and the evidence provided by 
the developers not being completely trusted by the local authority officers. 
“evidence have had challenges from industry stating (developer) “I know the 
abnormal cost on that site you (the council) don’t” but then not prepared to 
give it to the council, but will at examination here’s the evidence that you have 
under estimated abnormal costs” (LA:D2 Interview) 
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“Local authorities don’t believe the evidence or don’t get access to it” 
(DV:D/NG3 Interview) 
The discussion about values and evidence was difficult as a result and the issue of 
using second hand values as comparable evidence for new housing development 
appraisals, was an issue.  The issue of build costs also was disputed in great detail 
and was considered to be a bigger issue in some respects than the market values 
evidence.  This was something where the developers clearly had much more detailed 
information from specific sites, although the Council did use its own evidence from 
s106 negotiations as evidence. 
“The additional evidence of actual development land transactions support the 
assumptions used around viability thresholds and land values.” (Para 8.8 
Durham County Council and HDH, 2013) 
Following the strong challenge to the proposals the local authority sought to build 
credibility, acceptability and trust by presenting detailed and transparent 
documentation showing all the assumptions and evidence supporting the viability 
assessment. 
When this was challenged strongly by the HBF in early 2013, a small panel or 
working group was established to try and resolve the areas of dispute, this was an 
important arena in which viability was contested, including both the assumptions 
used in the calculations and the evidence upon which these assumptions were 
based.  Whilst the working group had been established to build trust and 
acceptability, in fact this was not particularly successful. 
“House builders need them on board cannot do with, cannot do without them 
its where get a lot of evidence from, same time mindful are pushing 
assumptions in a direction they want them to go” (LA:D2 Interview) 
The outcome has been that the County Council and their consultants have stated 
that agreement was reached on specific matters and the HBF representatives have 
disputed that, stating that matters were not agreed. 
“Importantly the methodology and assumptions were confirmed through an 
open and transparent consultation process. Where there was not a consensus 
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or the consultees have subsequently made further or different points we have 
considered these in the context on more recently available information.” (Para 
8.3 Durham County Council and HDH, 2014) 
“the truth is we don’t understand them and they don’t understand us” 
(DV:D/NG3 Interview) 
This has also been reflected in the local authority’s frustration and disillusionment 
with the viability assessment process with local storyline of “artificial process” 
together with the local trope of “playing games”. 
The clustering of knowledge claims are based on the knowledge of building 
economics and viability and are developed from training and experience, the house 
builders and agents have training in this area and have day to day experience, the 
planners in the local authority have neither, and lack confidence as a result when 
challenged.  Hence the need for both consultant and peer group support, it has also 
revealed a difference in values, as the local authority think the viability assessment is 
“an artificial process” and doesn’t reflect reality on the ground, and it is developers 
“playing games” as they have more knowledge and evidence. 
“Surely the viability appraisal is not fit for purpose and you know the 
developers will always be one step ahead of the local authority because even 
though our understanding of viability appraisals has gone up massively since 
viability became part of planning, we still will never be able to do a viability 
appraisal like a developer will, who knows every little detail, how to reduce 
cost of development” (LA:D1 Interview) 
The trust between the actors is eroded to the point where the Council don’t believe 
the information and evidence from the developers thinking they are hiding something 
and the developers think it is a waste of time providing the information as the Council 
ignore it, so don’t want to waste their time, hence the resolution at the CIL 
Examination. 
“the house builders know they are playing the assumptions to their advantage 
and so think the Council must be as well.  Which clearly we the Council are 
not, as we would be still using asking prices.  Different cultural viewpoints 
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negotiation position v finding the right answer [the house builders] didn’t trust 
the Council, but did the agents on evidence.” (LA:D2 Interview) 
There were several attempts to try and resolve this conflict but these were only partly 
successful, a key final meeting on 1st October 2013 for example. 
“The above results were presented to the HBF working group on the 1st 
October 2013. There was universal agreement that there are sites across the 
whole County that are able to bear some affordable housing and that it was 
appropriate to have an affordable housing policy in all areas and to do so 
would not put the development plan at serious risk. Through drawing on the 
findings of this study, recent planning consents, the industry’s’ detailed 
knowledge of the market and officers’ experience it was concluded that the 
following affordable housing targets are appropriate and viable providing that 
the policy continues to be worded in such a way which would allow flexibility 
and for site by site negotiations where viability issues arise.” (Para 9.12 
Durham County Council and HDH, 2013) 
As mentioned earlier this discursive struggle is yet to be resolved as the dispute has 
been left to be resolved at the CIL Examination if and when that takes place.  What 
has been evident from the discursive struggle from 2012 to 2015 is that the 
positioning effects have been to positon developers and consultants as experts on 
development economics and viability with the local authority being less 
knowledgeable and having less evidence. 
The clustering of knowledge is at the heart of this discursive struggle with sources of 
evidence and knowledge claims disputed by the storylines.  The process of 
assessing viability is an imprecise exercise involving making judgements about the 
future based on evidence from the past, it also involves trying to anticipate the 
decision making and behaviour of key actors, landowners in assessing the TLV and 
of developers in the overall viability assessment. 
6.8.4 Setting the Rate 
The final area of discursive struggle is about the setting of the CIL rates, this is a 
process which brings together information from the other sites of argumentation; on 
what infrastructure is needed to support growth and its funding requirements in the 
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form of the IDP and the available headroom within which to set the CIL rates derived 
from the area wide viability assessment. 
The setting of the rate is however essentially a political decision and the local 
authority has a range of matters to consider, what level of risk it is prepared to take, 
the managing of expectations by both Council members and of communities, the 
impact of relationships with developers, the track record of the local authority in 
delivering development in its area and in securing s106 income.  The other factors 
are the impact of CIL on other policies, including s106 and affordable housing 
provision and even other policy objectives such as design or sustainability 
requirements.  Finally the CIL rate proposals compared to neighbouring and 
competing local authorities elsewhere in the country. 
The proposals by Durham were always presented as cautious and reasonable but a 
proposed residential level of £250/sqm, which is one of the highest rates in the 
country this was somewhat contradictory to the perception of other actors in 
particular the house builders.  
“at one point we had the highest in the UK, and we had the HBF nationally 
challenging us on this, as again setting a precedent, and this is the problem in 
the planning is the dangers of setting precedents of on the one hand, not 
being the only authority not to set one, or look at one, on the other to have 
actually set the largest and it being in the north east of England, what does 
that say to the south east etc” (LA:D4 Interview) 
The storyline of “unrealistic proposals” promoted by the developers was successful in 
reducing the proposals considerably over time and illustrates that the storylines 
influenced policy practice as will be discussed in more detail later. 
“what happened in Durham was they published a plan that would have in 
effect have crippled the house building industry no doubt about it, in terms of 
its policy requirements it was death for me” (DV:D/NG3 Interview) 
The debate about the rates whilst primarily around the residential development 
impacts also was disputed in relation to student accommodation and was contested 
around retail proposals, both of which were also changed over the period. 
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The length and robustness of a formal Local Plan process was also important in 
establishing its authority in promoting the growth based strategy and the change in 
approach from previous County Durham strategies.  Also indicating a new ambition 
to national Government this reflects the “business not as usual storyline”. 
“it’s about a proactive strategy again you have to have the right governance 
behind it, you have to get the right politicians the right management etc. but 
once you have got that and the plan itself aligned we have gone from a 
position of talking down Durham to get money oh it’s so hard up here, the 
health’s bad the jobs bad to actually selling Durham as the best place outside 
of London to be the best place to be part of” (LA:D4 Interview). 
Another element of this was that County Durham was a relatively new unitary 
authority, since 1st April 2009 and wished to establish a positive new relationship with 
national Government.  As well as being something of a frontrunner with its early 
adoption of the CIL policy within the north east region, this also illustrated the 
“business not as usual” storyline.  Towards the end of the period studied the 
“reduced ambition” storyline emerged, as the influence of the discursive struggle in 
the other two arenas reduced the level of CIL rates and therefore accordingly the 
amount of funding to be collected and in turn the amount of infrastructure able to be 
funded. 
The discursive struggle between the storylines remains unresolved as the proposed 
rates of CIL will be considered at the CIL Examination if and when it takes place in 
the future.  There remains a fundamental disagreement about whether they are 
affordable at proposed rates in some sectors. 
The positioning effects from these storylines reinforce those of the other storylines, 
that developers are deliverers of development and therefore require a commercially 
viable return for the risk they are taking, the developers and consultants are experts 
on viability and the local authority is the facilitator of infrastructure provision all of 
which broadly reflect the national positioning effects.  The clustering of knowledge is 
on the balance between the need for CIL income and the potential headroom 
available for securing that income.  But other knowledge about policy priorities, 
judgements about developer’s perceptions and decision making and about 
competition with other areas are also relevant to this area. 
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The struggle between the storylines and tropes outlined above can lead to the 
dominance of one definition of the meaning of the problem, this is termed by Hajer as 
“Discourse Structuration” (Hajer, 2006).  At this stage it is difficult to conclude that 
Discourse Structuration has completely been achieved in Durham, however it was 
apparent that national storylines have been influential on the discursive struggle.  
When the impact of the dominant discourse starts to influence practices and has 
institutional effects this is termed as “Discourse Institutionalisation” (Hajer, 2006) and 
the impact of the policy storylines and tropes on policy practices are now considered. 
6.9 The impact of the discursive mechanisms on the CIL process 
The effects of storylines on the implementation of policy in terms of positioning actors 
and clustering knowledge claims to influence the construction of the policy problem 
and the meaning attributed to the policy have been outlined above, this can also 
influence the everyday practices of actors involved in the process.  Hajer defines 
practices as “embedded routines and mutually understood rules and norms that 
provide coherence to social life” (Hajer, 2006, p. 70).  Accordingly, the impact of the 
main storylines and tropes used in the three sites of argumentation and how they 
have impacted on the policy practices in Durham over the research period are now 
discussed. 
6.9.1 The identification of what CIL spent on 
There are two areas of practice in this category, the preparation of the IDP required 
to support the delivery of the Local Plan, this is based on the “Plan-led” approach set 
out in the national policy guidance, and secondly the demonstration of the need for 
the funding from CIL to fill the funding gap, linked to the preparation of the 123 list, 
which sets out the specific items in the IDP that CIL will actually fund. 
The first area of practice is the preparation of the IDP document which sets out the 
infrastructure requirements to support the Local Plan and this changed over the 
period, the CIL Rationale summarises the position of the IDP, the original IDP 
document was produced in June 2012 (Durham County Council, 2012c), was 
updated in October 2013 and with a final version in April 2014.  Initially the total IDP 
cost was £165m of which the CIL income would be a £104m contribution (Durham 
County Council, 2012a), this was changed in October 2013 to a total IDP cost of 
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£297.43m of which CIL would contribute £49.251m (Durham County Council, 2013a) 
and in the final submitted version in April 2014 the IDP total was £93.570m with the 
CIL income still at £49.251m (Durham County Council, 2014b), (part of the change in 
cost figures reflects the fact some costs were not included as not finalised as well as 
changes to what was included). 
The second area of practice was from the national guidance that required local 
authorities to provide evidence that there was a gap in existing funding provision for 
the IDP from other sources, for the CIL to help fill.  Hence the need to show how 
projected CIL income contributes to the larger funding requirement.  As the national 
CIL guidance was tightened up in response to the development industries concerns 
about double counting and double payment, the 123 list requirement was introduced 
which specifically set out which infrastructure projects were to be funded by CIL.  
This was also amended during the Durham CIL process and was reduced to a small 
specific list (Durham County Council, 2012a; Durham County Council, 2013a; 
Durham County Council and HDH, 2014). 
“Regulation 123 list is very limited very tightly drawn, if not for the northern 
relief road wouldn’t have a CIL, but traffic model showed a benefit to the whole 
county, wider benefit implication for all sites and development to contribute as 
all benefit, if not then wouldn’t have bothered with CIL” (LA:D2 Interview) 
The other aspect of practice and how this changed over the CIL period researched 
was in relation to the justification given as to why developers should pay for strategic 
infrastructure, the wording was amended between September 2012 (Durham County 
Council, 2012a) and October 2013 (Durham County Council, 2013a) with the removal 
of “making development acceptable and sustainable” which indicated a general 
change in tone of the later document, to being more formal an example is shown 
below. 
 “This consultation document is the second formal step in setting a CIL for 
County Durham. Stakeholder responses to this CIL Rationale and Preliminary 
Charging Schedule have been considered and can be viewed in the 
Statement of Consultation for the Preferred Options Local Plan against the 
Developer Contributions Policy. These responses together with a working 
group nominated by the Home Builders Federation have informed the Draft 
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Charging Schedule together with an update of the Local Plan and CIL Viability 
Report.” (Para 1.2 Durham County Council, 2013a) 
As the national CIL policy became more complex and formalised, this increased the 
importance of the CIL examination in the process and the Durham CIL process 
reflected this even though it has not reached that stage.  The practices in this arena 
became more formalised and specific over the actual CIL spend and reduced any 
discretion the Council had over future spending with CIL income. 
6.9.2 Calculation of Viability 
The practices in relation to the above contain two elements, firstly the establishment 
of the threshold land value and secondly the residual valuations of a range of 
hypothetical sites to establish an area wide viability assessment. 
The HDH Viability Assessment used the term of “additional profit” which is defined as  
“Additional Profit is the amount of profit over and above the normal profit made 
by the developers having purchased the land, developed the site and sold the 
units (including providing any affordable housing that is required). In this case 
‘normal profit’ is the 20% of GDV (as discussed above) we used in the 
appraisals. The additional profit is the maximum available from which any 
financial contribution can be made whilst paying for the land at the thresholds 
land value and providing the developer with a competitive return.” (Para 7.41 
Durham County Council and HDH, 2013) 
“Our approach to calculating this was to complete the appraisal using the 
same base cost and price figures, and other financial assumptions, as used in 
the preceding chapters. However, instead of calculating the residual value, we 
incorporated the viability threshold value (alternative use value plus uplift) into 
the cost side of the appraisal, as a land cost, to show the resulting profit (or 
loss).” (Para 7.42 Durham County Council and HDH, 2013) 
The main issue around the TLV was that the uplift in land value for residential land 
included in the viability assessment was considered to be much too low by the 
volume house builders, who were concerned that it would stop sites and housing 
coming forward in the County. 
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“I think at the land values set just in Durham, nobody will sell the land, land will 
not come forward to the market in values set out in Durham’s Local Plan which 
is £110,000/acre might be a little bit here and there” (DV:D/NG3 Interview) 
“but in Durham the biggest worry for me was they wouldn’t listen to us they 
kept listening to Simon Drummond-hay and if I don’t get the land value at least 
up to £200k/acre or something like that landowner will not sell its fundamental” 
(DV:D/NG5 Interview) 
The Viability Reports produced by HDH were very detailed and set out in great detail 
the national regulations and guidance and the County Council placed much reliance 
on this to support its proposals and accordingly required greater involvement from 
HDH to defend them when challenged. 
In relation to the second element there was a change in the number of and 
configuration of the hypothetical sites in response to the consultation process.  The 
establishment of boundaries for housing markets and values was particularly 
challenging with the term of “granular property market “coined by HDH 
“a large proportion of the sites in the County are not viable in the current 
market. This is not a surprise, County Durham has some of the lowest house 
prices in England and therefore experiences very challenging circumstances 
in terms of achieving viable residential property development. Having said this 
it also has a granular housing market with high and low values being found in 
very close proximity to each other.” (Para 9.15 Durham County Council and 
HDH, 2013) 
The interesting thing to note from a look at the change in proposed CIL rates 
between the draft CIL rationale report in July 2012 (Durham County Council, 2012b) 
and the formally issued September 2012 report with DPCS, was that the proposed 
CIL rate for large food retailing which was reduced between from £400 to £200.  The 
influence of the September Viability Appraisal work by HDH (Durham County Council 
and HDH, 2012) had changed some of the available CIL headroom for various uses, 
in particular showing more CIL headroom for the Durham City Strategic Zone (where 
the £250 rate was proposed) presumably providing the Council with greater 
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reassurance about that ambitious rate at that stage, but only changes one of the 
proposed CIL rates in the PDCS itself. 
The hypothetical nature of the area wide assessment exercise was an issue, the 
local authority officers in the process of engagement with developers would amend 
and adjust the assumptions in the model.  As greater and greater parts of the county 
became unviable for housing development as the developers assumptions were put 
into the model, there began to emerge a rather sceptical view of the appraisals, as 
just an “artificial” and “academic” exercise that didn’t reflect what was happening on 
the ground in the real world.  As actual housing development was taking place in 
areas that the model indicated were not viable. 
“because a lot of work is unviable, doesn’t reflect what is on the ground 
interesting to see how the inspector interprets that” (LA:D2 Interview) 
“and that’s the problem of viability it’s not based on real appraisal it’s based on 
an academic consideration of the issues” (LA:D1 Interview) 
This reinforced the earlier view that the developers were just playing games, it also 
eroded the engagement process as the model became viewed as also not reflecting 
the Council’s own evidence from its own site sales and from s106 negotiations. 
“The Council is a very significant landowner within County Durham and owns 
much of the land that has been included within the Plan (over 50% in the East 
Delivery Area). This gives the Council a greater insight into the reasonable 
competitive returns expected by landowners. The Council, based on its land 
disposal strategy can have greater confidence that development will come 
forward, even in the lowest value areas”, (Para 8.4 Durham County Council 
and HDH, 2014) 
“This is supported by the past patterns of delivery and development activity on 
the ground which indicate that throughout the economic cycle development 
has come forward in all parts of the County and importantly, even in the lowest 
value areas affordable housing and other policy requirements have been 
delivered.” (Para 8.5 Durham County Council and HDH, 2014) 
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The viability assessments did change over the period and with changes to the 
boundaries of the proposed CIL rates as well between the DPCS in September 2012 
and the DCS in October 2013.  This reflected local factors and the consultation, it 
also resulted in a reduction in the projected CIL income. 
The assumptions used in the residual valuations were challenged, with two examples 
provided below, firstly the use of asking prices rather than actual sale prices which is 
not evidence and the use of a single second hand house price as in the developers 
view not being reflective of the likely house prices achievable for a whole new 
development in that location. 
“we just looked at house price data rather than values to inform the 
development appraisals to try get the pricing correct before we did the 
appraisals new build as well, more difficult as there were very few transactions 
back in 2011” (LA:D3 Interview) 
“we gave Barrett a list of our anticipated sales revenues, went through in 30 
seconds and crossed them all out, but the actual sales achieved, or what he 
told us the sales process were, - even though we got our data from “Right 
Move” worked out the size of the house and translated to a rate per sqm 
crossed them all out, rubbish they are all wrong and put his rates in which 
were 25% lower or something like that” (LA:D3 Interview) 
“and I found this with Durham that Durham would just pluck a value from an 
individual house and say well that house sold for £300/sqft, it might have done 
I can take you to a house in Consett sold for £300/sqft but do they all sell for 
£300/sqft” (DV:D/NG3 Interview) 
Secondly a major area of conflict was over build costs, and one aspect of that was 
the availability of evidence, of which the developers had much and the Council little 
instead relying on BCIS.  This evidence when provided by the house builders was not 
always trusted by the Council.  Conversely the house builders considered that the 
Council should have had the skills to have understood the measurement of areas 
such as gross internal and net internal in assessing costs and values. Also that the 
Council should have had enough capacity to do the analysis itself rather than to have 
it all provided by them which often was not trusted. 
195 
 
“had assumed all measuring in the same way, House builders net saleable 
and Council using GIA, NM been teaching us, but because of that we have got 
stronger and got to the point where he is now a bit threatened because we 
have built up this information” (LA:D2 Interview) 
These perceived inadequacies in practice by the local authority supported the house 
builder’s view of the lack of skills and capacity within the local authorities to support 
the implementation of the CIL policy.  The use and role of consultants by the local 
authority and the skills and capacity of the local authority as related to this. 
The County Councils initial decision to appoint HDH as consultants reflected its view 
that it didn’t have the capacity or skills to implement CIL as a policy without external 
assistance.  The rapidly changing national policy regulations and guidance was of 
particular concern and a main reason for the appointment.  The initial consultation 
event on 2nd March 2012, before any proposals were published, was merely to 
announce the Council’s intention to implement the CIL policy, but the Council 
considered that an independent view of the market and of values was needed to 
assist the justification of the proposals at an early stage. 
“viability is the one thing which I have been really nervous about so we 
thought the more we get an independent person involved in that” (LA:D4 
Interview) 
“we commissioned HDH, at the time didn’t have that much viability expertise in 
house.  It has come on a hell of a lot, but even 2 years on, needed someone 
with authority to challenge the house builders, as we know what the house 
builders are like, with working with then on other issues, we know they would 
run circles round us unless we had someone” (LA:D1 interview) 
The Council did involve their in-house surveyors in the process, but again their 
involvement was limited, confidence in their capacity and level of experience and 
knowledge was not very high in what was still the early days of a new policy.  The 
working relationship between the two teams was good but at times the in-house 
surveyors felt rather in a secondary role. 
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“xxxxx and other planners have very regular meetings with representatives 
from Barratt’s and one or two others from NLP, we are not really involved with 
that side of things” (LA:D3 Interview) 
The consultants involvement was to provide a detailed viability assessment which 
would fulfil two functions, firstly to support the viability assessment to support the 
Local Plan process and to provide confidence in the deliverability of the Local Plan, 
and secondly to support the CIL proposals.  Durham County Council decided to run 
the CIL process in parallel with the Local Plan process, which is in contrast to 
Newcastle/Gateshead which consciously chose to separate them due to capacity 
issues.  This is another reason for the significant involvement of HDH from early 
2014. 
Following the publication of the DPCS in September 2012 (Durham County Council, 
2012a) and the ambitious CIL rates proposed therein, which resulted in a strong 
challenge particularly from the house building industry, the role of the consultants 
was increased, not only using his appraisal model and methodology but involving 
HDH in some of the key meetings and engagement with developers. 
This reflected the lack of capacity and confidence in their skills by the local authority 
officers in the face of a strong and well-resourced group or Discourse Coalition.  Yet 
over time these officers had considered their skills and knowledge of viability had 
grown over time, although they always thought they would be one step behind the 
development industry. 
“the viability appraisal is a bit of a game being played out between LA and 
developers, developers will always have the upper hand as even if LA gets an 
expert like Simon Drummond Hay or any surveyor. As like a “black box” they 
can know how to reduce costs which won’t even make it into the assumptions 
it’s just a game.” (LA:D1 Interview) 
The practices in this arena reflected the reduced discretion from national policy 
influences and the increasing reliance for private sector consultant support in the 
face of strong challenges from the private sector.  Key practices such as the 
acceptance of profit levels as standardised and the asymmetry of evidence between 
the parties were influential at the local level. 
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6.9.3 Setting of the Rates 
The setting of the rates is a decision making process which is influenced by national 
policy regulations and guidance but also by other local factors as it is essentially a 
political decision.  The rates were changed between the DPCS in September 2012 
(Durham County Council, 2012a) containing the particularly controversial £250/sqm 
rate and the DCS in October 2013 (Durham County Council, 2013a) with the highest 
residential rate reduced to £60/sqm.  The County wide rate remained unchanged at 
£15/sqm, and the boundary changed with the removal of the Durham City Strategic 
zone and a new West Durham zone now added.  The retail rates also changed with a 
reduced rate from £200 to an overall £150.  The proposal for a CIL for hotels was 
dropped but conversely the CIL rate for student accommodation was significantly 
increased from £50 to £150 (Durham County Council, 2013a).  The DCS had made 
reductions more than increases and reflected a more cautious approach. 
“the Policy Burden on a site” so LAs imposing policies on to a developer that 
99 times out of a 100 they have no idea what they have done or what they are 
seeking to achieve” (DV:D/NG3 Interview) 
In studying the VA documents produced by HDH from September 2012 (Durham 
County Council and HDH, 2012), October 2013 (Durham County Council and HDH, 
2013) and the Pre-submission note of April 2014 (Durham County Council and HDH, 
2014), to support the CIL charging rates and the Local Plan viability assessment, 
there is an increasing emphasis on justifying the CIL rates and the deliverability of 
the Plan, in a wider way than based purely on viability assessments. 
“It is important to note that whilst viability is not the primary information to 
define these areas, viability is one of the key factors when developing policies 
within each area.” (Para 9.8 Durham County Council and HDH, 2013) 
“Viability is an important factor when developing policy but it not the only, or 
even the principle factor.” (Para 9.14 Durham County Council and HDH, 2013) 
The October 2013 document makes several references to this mismatch whilst also 
acknowledging that the CIL regulations state that CIL charging zones must be set 
with regard to viability. 
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“The CIL Regulations are clear, CIL Charging Zones can only be set with 
regard to viability – and the context is whether the delivery of the Plan as a 
whole is threatened. Initially the Council and consultees expressed a firm 
preference for CIL to follow other policy areas (i.e. the Delivery Areas) as this 
would be a simple and straight forward approach. As the project developed it 
was recognised that this was not possible as the Planning Delivery Areas do 
not follow the viability areas.” (Para 9.18 Durham County Council and HDH, 
2013) 
This difficulty is partly due to the very challenging process of assessing the viability 
across the county, in the October 2013 Viability Assessment (Durham County 
Council, 2013a), the first reference to the “granular” market and the challenges of the 
rate setting, something emphasised again in the April 2014 pre-submission note. 
“There has been a significant challenge in undertaking this work. The County 
Durham housing market is highly granular with large differences in the nature 
of housing and the value of it over very short geographical distances.” (Para 
9.3 Durham County Council and HDH, 2013) 
“The principle challenge in preparing the Viability Study and subsequently 
interpreting the results has been the granular nature of the County Durham 
property market and we take this opportunity to stress again that it would be 
inappropriate to consider the Viability Study in isolation and without putting 
due weight in what is actually happening on the ground and the local patterns 
of land ownership.” (Para 8.1 Durham County Council and HDH, 2014) 
There is also over time in the HDH VA documents a greater emphasis on the 
engagement with stakeholders and the HBF working group in particular. 
“As set out above the Council met with the HBF working group on the 1st 
October to discuss the final refinement of the affordable housing and polices 
and appropriate rates of CIL. It was agreed that following residential CIL 
charges were reasonable and would not undermine the delivery of the majority 
of sites nor would they undermine the delivery of the Plan.” (Para 9.20 
Durham County Council and HDH, 2013) 
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In the April 2014 pre-submission note this becomes even more an issue reflecting the 
difficult engagement process with specific reference to matters having been 
specifically agreed. 
“During the preparation of the Viability Study the modelling and price 
assumptions were explicitly agreed with the HBF. The assumptions are 
necessarily cautious and representative of the anticipated pattern of 
development.” (Para 8.6 Durham County Council and HDH, 2014) 
The interaction with other policy objectives was less clearly evident except in the 
taking account in the appraisal work of the Affordable Housing rates for different 
areas of the County to demonstrate that both CIL and the affordable housing rate, 
which would be recovered via an s106 agreement, could be afforded within the 
appraisal. 
“The Council recognises that the rates above are not affordable on all sites 
and as based on the appraisals carried out as part of this study. This is in 
large part due to the highly granular nature of County Durham’s housing 
market. The majority of development is expected to come forward over the 
Plan Period will be in the larger sites in and around Durham and Chester-Le-
Street and around Barnard Castle. Development in these key areas are able 
to bear these levels of CIL (and the agreed affordable housing targets). The 
Council have worked closely with the development industry particularly the 
HBF to formulate rates of CIL and affordable housing that are deliverable and 
over which there is a consensus.” (Para 9.21 Durham County Council and 
HDH, 2013) 
The managing of expectations was another important part of the practices, especially 
as the Council members had expectations of significant income to fund infrastructure 
which was reduced over time.  There were several briefing sessions about the impact 
of viability and about the process.  In December 2013 a Council scrutiny committee 
discussed CIL, this may have been as a result of them becoming aware of developer 
discontent.  As comments were made about the competiveness of the CIL rates with 
neighbouring local authorities and the concern about discouraging investment. 
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“Ensure that we are mindful of the levels of CIL charges compared to 
neighbouring local authorities to alleviate any chance of losing investment 
opportunities.” (Durham County Council, 2013b) 
There appeared to very limited discussion about the rates of other local authorities 
and in fact limited discussions with other local authorities in the region about CIL.  
There was some liaison with officers at Newcastle/Gateshead as the only two active 
CIL processes in the north east and some involvement in the POS best practice 
group and also some involvement and help from PAS. 
The mismatch between where money collected and where spent (the hypothecation 
issue) and where needed was also an emerging issue, as well as the emergence of 
Neighbourhood Plans being proposed to capture the 25% CIL income which was 
also beginning to happen. 
“pockets of high deprivation and pockets of high value so had to take a 
cautious approach, Sedgefield Village (Neighbourhood Plan) progressing 
interested in 25% share, were unhappy at £15 CIL rate being the same as 
other areas, asked why not higher” (LA:D2 Interview) 
Practices also changed in relation to the consultation process, partly reflecting the 
difficult process of engagement with the private sector for Durham.  The October 
2013 rationale supporting the DCS (Durham County Council, 2013a) as well as 
acknowledging the formal consultation exercise after the PDCS in September 2012, 
also made explicit reference to the working group with HBF. 
“An important part of the process of preparing the viability report has been 
engagement with stakeholders - particularly the development industry. All 
stakeholder comments have been considered and the results of a stakeholder 
workshop held early in the process are set out in the LP&CIL VS. All 
comments to the CIL Rationale and Preliminary Charging Schedule are set out 
within the Statement of Consultation Preferred Options Local Plan.  The 
affordable housing targets and CIL charging rates have been agreed by the 
working group nominated by the Home Builders Federation prior to the 
publication of the Draft Charging Schedule for consultation. The detailed 
viability report by HDH in October 2013 also included many references to the 
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ongoing engagement with the HBF and the apparent agreement to certain 
elements of the appraisal.” (Para 3.8 Durham County Council, 2013a) 
The final evidence about viability submitted for the Examination in April 2014 
(Durham County Council and HDH, 2014) also made references to the process of 
engagement and agreement of certain points. 
“During the preparation of the Viability Study the modelling and price 
assumptions were explicitly agreed with the HBF. The assumptions are 
necessarily cautious and representative of the anticipated pattern of 
development.” (Para 8.6 Durham County Council and HDH, 2014) 
There was no real engagement with any landowners other than to respond in general 
terms to some agents who had made some general comments as part of the formal 
consultation processes at DPCS and DCS stages.  There was likewise little 
consultation with the communities, about the rates although some had indicated that 
they thought the CIL proposal was too low in their location. 
“pockets of high deprivation and pockets of high value so had to take a 
cautious approach Sedgefield Village (Neighbourhood Plan) progressing 
interested in 25% share, were unhappy at £15 CIL rate being the same as 
other areas, asked why not higher” (LA:D2 Interview) 
“but as I say, we got a number of Neighbourhood Plans coming through in 
Durham now, I think we are up to 15 that are interested and when you talk to 
them it’s not about more housing coming forward but it’s actually about just 
getting that little bit extra bunce as they see it for 15% up to 25% - the only 
reason there in it” (LA:D4 Interview). 
As the consultation and engagement process proceeded the two main groups 
became more entrenched in their positions and hence the intention to proceed to a 
formal arena to decide matters.  This also reflected the underlying differences in 
skills, education and cultures between the local authority officers and the private 
developers, which was revealed by this process, this didn’t help the decline in trust 
between the two groups and the decline in the engagement process.  The Council 
officers felt that the development industry were just playing a game, and were from a 
culture of negotiation and would negotiate in any event. 
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“if they don’t feel they have been in a bit of a battle they feel cheated is I think 
how they feel so it’s almost you have to go through the process for them to 
feel content” (LA:D4 Interview) 
This decline in the effectiveness of the engagement process contrasted with the 
national policy guidance placing increasing importance on this engagement.  
Practices in this arena also reflected the influence of national policy in restricting 
discretion for local authorities in setting rates and the emphasis on deliverability and 
viability and the need to take account of wider policy requirements and their impact 
on those factors. 
6.10 Conclusion 
The Durham case study presents an example of the challenges of implementing the 
CIL policy in an area of poor economic and property market conditions, even though 
the County Council sought an ambitious growth policy to address those issues.  The 
discursive struggle over the research period from March 2012 to February 2015 
reveals that the national “supporting growth” discourse remained important as did the 
national storylines of “encouraging developers”, “incentivising landowners” and 
“facilitating local authorities” up to the interim report from the Local Plan inspector, 
which stopped the process.  The local storylines demonstrated a decline in the 
“business not as usual” with its ambitious policy practices to be replaced by a 
“reduced ambition” storyline of lower CIL proposals and some disenchantment with 
the CIL as a policy revealed by the “an artificial process” storyline and “playing 
games” trope. 
The County Council were broadly successful in promoting the justification for the CIL 
policy in general terms, they were challenged much more strongly in their approach 
to the proposed CIL rates and in relation to the skills and capacity of the local 
authority, and the consultation and engagement process became a significant issue.  
The proposal of very high CIL rates initially, led to a more difficult discursive struggle 
around the calculation process than perhaps might have been the case and also to 
the setting the rate struggle. 
One of the main issues arising, was the increasing formality of the CIL process which 
in this case was forcing resolution of the disputes into the formal arena of the CIL 
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examination in public.  This is in contrast to the national Government promoting a 
shift to increasing emphasis on engagement and consultation especially with the 
development industry.  The engagement process became dysfunctional in spite of 
significant efforts by various actors to engage on a regular basis, but the lack of trust 
between the main actors become clear, again supporting the need for formal 
resolution in a formal arena.  The very ambitious proposals may have partly led to the 
scale of the problem, but there are also the different cultures, skills, education and 
objectives of the actors revealed through this conflict and disagreement. 
The engagement process also became focused on the technical aspects of the 
viability assessments and this excludes some parties, as specialist knowledge claims 
and skills were involved.  For those actors involved the imbalance of skills and 
asymmetry of knowledge was also an influential factor, impacting on the use and role 
of consultants and on the confidence of planners.  It also supports the importance of 
evidence in the process, its ownership, control and interpretation thereof, which 
rested with certain key actors.  Evidence is also something which the national 
guidance has given increased emphasis to over the period. 
The setting of the rates whilst a political judgement, is an increasingly constrained 
area of judgement due to the changes in the national policy regulations and 
guidance.  The impact of the tropes of “cumulative policy burden” and “striking the 
balance” were influential in again constraining the flexibility and discretion available 
to local authorities in setting rates 
The mismatch between viability zones deciding the ability to generate CIL funding, in 
a difficult “granular property market” and the appropriate zones for delivery of 
planning policy, reflects the challenge of hypothecation issues, which relate to many 
value capture mechanisms as well as CIL. 
What has become clear is that even in studying the process over a relatively short 
period of time is that the impact of the struggle between the storylines did impact on 
practices by the actors involved in the process.  The impact of local factors such as 
the Councils approach to the implementation, the use of consultants, the 
engagement process, the detail of the viability assessment process, the decision to 
set rates at certain levels are all clearly influential.  The impact of the changing 
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national CIL regulations and guidance over the period on the practices is also 
observable, this will be considered further in a later chapter. 
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Chapter 7. Newcastle/Gateshead Case Study (Business as usual) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As mentioned earlier case studies were studied which used CIL policy as a lens 
through which to study the micro-political processes involved in value capture 
policies in local contexts where due to challenging economic and market conditions 
the process would be more contested and therefore more observable.  The selection 
of Newcastle/Gateshead also afforded the opportunity to study the implementation of 
a joint CIL being introduced by two local authorities working together and what 
influence that may have on the policy making process.  The selection of a second 
case study also allowed a comparison to be made with the findings from Durham. 
7.2 Methodological Approach and Link to the Research Questions 
As set out in chapter 4, the same approach and methodology were used as in the 
Durham case study.  By studying the operation of discursive mechanisms within the 
policy making process, the use of knowledge by local authority planners in their 
decision making can be considered, both in how knowledge claims are generated 
and tested, but also in the effects on the relationships between various actors and on 
policy practices. 
7.3 Description of Newcastle and Gateshead 
The City of Newcastle upon Tyne and the neighbouring town of Gateshead lie to the 
north and south respectively of the River Tyne at the highest bridging point of the 
river.  The river Tyne gorge presents a distinctive landscape for the area with the 
famous bridges crossing the river and the important developments on both sides of 
the river such as Newcastle Quayside, the Baltic Art gallery and The Sage 
Gateshead.  The area attracts approximately 4.4 million visitors per annum from 
around the world and is growing as a tourist destination. 
It is located some 95 miles north of Leeds and 106 miles south of Edinburgh the two 
nearest other urban centres.  The urban area is located on the main east coast rail 
line and main A1 road linking London to Edinburgh, it is also linked to Carlisle in the 
west by the A69 and has its own regional airport.  
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Figure 7.1 Location for Newcastle/Gateshead 
It is the regional centre and main employment source and economic driver for the 
north east region, with 299,000 people working in Newcastle and Gateshead, 44.9% 
of them commuting in from surrounding areas every day.  This predominately urban 
conurbation is illustrated by the fact that there are no Town Councils within the area 
and only seven parish councils, which are located within the limited rural hinterlands 
around the main urban area.  The housing market of Newcastle overlaps with North 
Tyneside and Northumberland to the north of the Tyne, whilst Gateshead’s housing 
market overlaps with the northern part of County Durham south of the Tyne. 
7.4 The Newcastle/Gateshead Core Strategy and Urban Core Plan 
Whilst two separate unitary local authorities Newcastle City Council and Gateshead 
MBC have worked together since 2009 to prepare a joint planning strategy for their 
area believing this was to the economic advantage of both areas.  The “Planning for 
the future Core Strategy and Urban Core Plan for Gateshead and Newcastle upon 
Tyne” (the Plan) (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead MBC, 2015) was formally 
adopted in early 2015 and sets out the vision for the two areas up to 2030. 
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The current population of the two Authorities is 475,400 (from the 2011 census) and 
this is expected to grow by 50,000 by 2030, of this 23,000 currently live in the urban 
core.  There has been an outward migration of families and working aged population 
from Newcastle particularly to North Tyneside, the Plan seeks to address this issue 
by proposing ambitious growth proposals to accommodate a population of over 
500,000 by 2030, by building 30,000 new homes and generating 22,000 new jobs in 
the area. 
The Plan has identified that to deliver this new development there is a need to alter 
the Green Belt boundaries around the main urban area to be able to meet the 
required 5 year housing land supply (DCLG, 2012b).  There are also proposals to 
bring forward 380,000 sqm of office space and 50,000 sqm of new retail space in the 
Urban Core within the plan period. 
In order to bring forward this scale of new development significant strategic 
infrastructure is required, as identified in the “Infrastructure Delivery Plan” (IDP), in 
order to contribute to the funding of this infrastructure the CIL is proposed to be 
introduced as now considered. 
7.5 Timeline for the CIL Process 
The CIL process within this case study starts with the first mention of CIL in 
documents in 2011, relating to the funding of infrastructure to support the Core 
Strategy.  The Core Strategy process was already underway at this time and the 
decision to pursue growth by releasing greenbelt sites for housing had already been 
proposed.  The first substantial discussion of the CIL policy by the two Councils was 
a cabinet report to Newcastle City Council on 30th May 2012 (Newcastle City Council, 
2012a), which attached the proposed Preliminary Draft Charging Schedule with 
proposed CIL charges as shown below in figure 7.2. 
This report was supported by a Viability Assessment document (Newcastle City 
Council and Gateshead Council, 2012a) and a CIL Background Paper (Newcastle 
City Council and Gateshead Council, 2012b) setting out the justification for the CIL, 
the national policy guidance, the methodology used in the viability assessment and 
the context for introducing the policy. 
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Two important drivers emerge from this report, firstly the importance of continuing to 
receive s106 income, even to the extent that two interim developer contribution 
models were also presented to the same meeting for approval in order that the City 
Council could continue to receive income before CIL was fully in place.,  Secondly, 
the calculation of the CIL charge rates were also considered, affordability was key 
with the previous level of payments made under s106 agreements an important 
strand of evidence in the assessment of the proposed rate.  The second comment 
made in the covering report itself was revealing about the local position 
“The level of the charge is set by each local authority but it must not 
undermine the viability of development.  Each local authority will be watching 
how neighbours set their charges.  We are therefore aligning with Gateshead, 
given our economic cooperation.” (Newcastle City Council, 2012a) 
The report also referred to the “striking the balance” and the “margin of viability” and 
took a cautious view of the proposed rates set, it also set out the importance of 
consultation.  The Viability Assessment report had been prepared by in house 
surveyors in Newcastle and Gateshead, however the background report which 
summarised the position and justification had been prepared with assistance from 
Simon Drummond-Hay in the role as a “critical friend”, even at this early stage of the 
process. 
It is interesting that Gateshead Council’s reporting to their cabinet did not in fact take 
place until the 17th July 2012 (Gateshead MBC, 2012) during the consultation period 
and then as a minor addition to a general update report on the progress of the One 
Core Strategy and Urban Core Area Action Plan update.  This report has much less 
detail than the Newcastle report and makes reference to the Council and 
communities deciding where the money will be spent and on what.  In addition to the 
comment on striking “an appropriate balance” in setting the rate, the justification is 
framed in terms of growth and competitiveness 
“based on an initial review of the infrastructure needs identified in the draft 
One Core Strategy, alternative funding sources, objectives for the growth of 
Gateshead, and the desire for Gateshead to remain competitive” (Gateshead 
MBC, 2012) 
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Figure 7.2 Draft Preliminary Charging Schedule (May 2012) 
Following the publication of the Preliminary Draft (figure 7.2) above there was a 
formal consultation period from 20th June 2012 to 13th September 2012 during which 
a series of breakfast meetings took place, one on the 19th July 2012 specifically on 
the CIL proposals.  The event was attended by 36 representatives who included 
several of the major house builders and quite a range of other local authorities and 
public sector agencies (such as the Environment Agency) who were primarily 
interested in where any income from the levy would be spent, there was little 
representation by property agents other than Savills, although several planning 
consultants did attend.  Several questions were asked some relating to viability, how 
the money will be spent and the mechanics of how CIL worked.  What is apparent 
from the formal note reported to the Council in September 2012, was at the early 
stages of the CIL policy, knowledge was limited about the CIL mechanism and its 
210 
 
potential impact.  As the CIL event took place between two other events on the Core 
Strategy; it appears that some representatives were really more interested in issues 
of greenbelt sites in the Core Strategy rather than in CIL. 
Newcastle City Council also issued in July 2012 “Community Infrastructure Levy 
(CIL) CIL and Section 106 Planning Obligations - A Guide for Developers in 
Newcastle upon Tyne” (Newcastle City Council, 2012b) a document relating to how 
the CIL and s106 will operate together.  This reflected the need to both raise 
awareness and to set out how the policy would operate in practice, such as how the 
CIL will be charged on a planning application, the CIL preliminary draft charging 
schedule was also set out in the document.  This is perhaps a response to the 
apparent lack of understanding of the policy generally, and being aimed at reassuring 
the development industry and their advisors, reflecting the difficulties that were being 
experienced at the time in the informal consultation process, with the property and 
development sector in particular about the assumptions used in the appraisal work 
and the evidence used to support that. 
In terms of the formal responses to the consultation period these have been analysed 
and several groups have been identified, the first group were Government Agencies 
such as Natural England, Sport England, Highways Agency and the Environment 
Agency who were concerned with the spending of the levy income and wished to be 
consulted further in the process. The second group were the Chartered Surveyors 
mainly commercial property agents who commented on the viability issues but 
generally at a high level, the next group were the house builders (the main volume 
house builders but also specialists such as McCarthy and Stone and Banks Group) 
who made a range of comments from generally supportive and general viability 
comments to very detailed viability comments, there were also comments from 
retailers Asda and Tesco but very much at a general level.  There were also 
comments from campaign groups such CPRE and the Green Party and also from the 
Citizens Advice Bureau and two Landlords Northumberland Estates jointly with 
Bellway and Capital Shopping centres (owners of Eldon Square and the 
Metrocentre).  These were reported to the Newcastle Cabinet in the Cabinet report 
on 22nd May 2013 (Newcastle City Council, 2013). 
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There was a significant period of time from the end of the formal consultation period 
in September 2012 up to May 2013, during which the CIL process was not 
progressed.  The Newcastle Cabinet report of 22nd May 2013 sets out the Council’s 
thinking at that time in three respects.  Firstly, the consultation responses were 
reported to be noted but with very limited comments.  Secondly, the major request 
was to approve a pause in the CIL process due to changes and uncertainty about the 
national CIL policy and the likely approval at that time of a further delay in the 
deadline for the restrictions on the pooling of s106 contributions from April 2014 to 
April 2015, thereby reducing the time pressure on the Council to progress CIL.  
Finally the third element was an approval being requested to approve s106 
contributions models for Education and Transport to enable continued collection of 
developer contributions. 
At this time the Core Strategy was progressing with its consultation and there was 
concern in Newcastle City Council that the assumptions in the viability assessment 
needed to be consulted upon again, to support the Core Strategy and the viability of 
the five year housing supply, rather than in relation to CIL.  It was at this stage that 
the decision to separate the Core Strategy from the CIL process was made for 
reasons of resource, but also based on counsel’s legal advice regarding risk to the 
Core Strategy being approved. 
There was an effort to engage with both the housing developers primarily on a one to 
one basis, and with the commercial property agents, with a RICS event organised on 
3rd June 2013 which was quite well attended following a poorly attended earlier 
event.  Some progress was made on assumptions and evidence and a revised 
Viability Assessment Report was produced in July 2013 (Newcastle City Council and 
Gateshead MBC, 2013).  Interestingly following the move of one of the authors of the 
original May 2012 Viability Assessment (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead 
Council, 2012a), (the Gateshead Council contributor), the revised Viability 
Assessment report has seemed to have been predominantly written by the 
Newcastle City Council representative, with agreement and some limited input from 
Gateshead Council estates team.  Reflecting the concentration on the Core Strategy 
and pause in the CIL process the “Infrastructure and Developer Contributions 
Technical Paper - September 2013” (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead Council, 
212 
 
2013) was issued which reflects the discussions about viability up to that point and 
the production of the Infrastructure Delivery plan (Newcastle City Council and 
Council, 2013) which is a crucial document to both the Core Strategy and CIL 
processes, this report refers to the revised Viability Assessment report as September 
2013 but in terms of evidence to support the Core Strategy this is the same 
document as the July 2013 version (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead MBC, 
2013). 
The formal consultation on the Core Strategy took place between the 9th September 
2013 and 21st October 2013 and included proposals regarding developer 
contributions, these were later discussed at the Examination in Public of the Core 
Strategy between July and September in 2014.  In February 2014 a revised Viability 
Assessment report (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead MBC, 2014) was 
produced as evidence to support the Core Strategy Examination in Public process, 
this was an extended version of the July 2013 (Newcastle City Council and 
Gateshead MBC, 2013) report referred to earlier.  It sets out much detail on the 
methodology used to assess viability of sites across the two local authority areas, 
although the writing of the document was very much led by and based on the viability 
appraisals by Newcastle City Council.  Whilst the report relates to viability, it is very 
much focused on the Viability Testing of the Local Plan (Core Strategy), although the 
responses to the consultation on the CIL Preliminary Draft Charging Schedule 
proposals are discussed in detail with amendments proposed or not in response to 
the comments.  Much of this work would be equally applicable to the CIL process, but 
it is clearly framed in terms of the Core Strategy.  At the examination in public for the 
Core Strategy there was very little comment or discussion on the Developer 
Contributions section of the Core Strategy proposals. 
The Core Strategy was formally approved by the Inspector in his report dated 24th 
February 2015 and following that the CIL process was restarted with cabinet reports 
to Gateshead Council on 24th March 2015 (Gateshead MBC, 2015) and to Newcastle 
City Council on 25th March 2015 (Newcastle City Council, 2015; Newcastle City 
Council and Gatehead MBC, 2015).  Which both request a restart of the whole CIL 
process with an issuing of the CIL preliminary draft charging schedule as set out on 
figure 7.3. 
213 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Revised Draft Preliminary Charging Schedule (March 2015) 
As can be seen the proposals for the new CIL preliminary draft charging schedule 
were significantly lower than those in the 2012 proposals, approval was also 
requested to a “planning obligations supplementary planning document” which would 
seek to secure developer contributions up to when the CIL is formally approved, 
especially as the pooling restrictions for s106 contributions came into force 1st April 
2015, the timing of the report is timely in that respect. 
7.6 Key events and sites of argumentation 
Having set out the time line and discussed some of the main events in the CIL 
implementation process in Newcastle/Gateshead these are summarised in the table 
7.1. 
Key Event  Date 
One Core Strategy 2030 Newcastle/Gateshead 
– Topic Paper: Infrastructure and Resources 
Core Strategy and Urban Core AAP joint 
technical paper – infrastructure overview 
January – October 2011 (topic paper) 
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Cabinet Report (Newcastle City Council) with 
background papers - CIL Background Report, 
Viability Assessment Report, CIL Preliminary 
Draft Charging Schedule 
30th May 2012 (report and documents) 
Formal Consultation on Draft Preliminary 
Charging Schedule (including two stakeholder 
breakfast meetings on viability) 
20/6/12 to 13/9/12 (schedule of responses) 
CIL Breakfast Event  19/7/2012 (note of event) 
Guide to Developers  July 2012 (document) 
Cabinet Report (Gateshead MBC) with Revised 
Viability Report (16/7/13) 
17th July 2012 (report and documents) 
Breakfast Meeting Feedback report  19th September 2012 (report) 
Cabinet Report (Newcastle City Council) 22nd May 2013 (report) 
Consultation events re viability and 
questionnaire on viability assumptions (April to 
June 2013) 
May to July 2013 (RICS event 3rd June 2013) 
(some notes and minutes) 
Revised Viability Assessment Report  July to September 2013 (report) 
Background Paper 2013 Consultation Statement 
Infrastructure and Developer Contributions 
Technical paper  
September 2013 (document) 
Formal Consultation on the Core Strategy and 
Urban Core Plan  
9/9/2013 to 21/10/2013 (schedule of responses) 
Revised Viability Assessment Report  February 2014 (report) 
Examination in Public of the Core Strategy and 
Urban Core Plan 
May to July 2014 (notes) 
Cabinet Reports (Gateshead MBC and 
Newcastle City Council) with background papers 
Background paper and Preliminary Draft 
Charging Schedules 
24/3/2015 (Gateshead) and 25/3/2015 
(Newcastle) (reports and documents) 
Table 7.1 Key Events in Newcastle/Gateshead 
215 
 
The key events are however only part of the process of attempting to reconstruct the 
policy making process, it is important to also identify the sites of discursive production 
or argumentation.  These sites or arenas where knowledge is produced, tested and 
contested between the various actors involved in the policy making process are 
shown in the table below (table 7.2), they are the same main arenas as identified in 
the Durham Case study and relate to the key policy making decisions and key 
documents that are at the centre of the CIL process. 
Site of Argumentation Description 
What is the funding to be spent on Preparation of the Infrastructure Delivery Plan 
(IDP) what infrastructure needed for Local Plan 
and the 123 list setting out what infrastructure 
items CIL to be spent on within IDP 
Viability Assessment Preparation of the Viability Assessment Report 
comprising area wide appraisal and assessment 
of Threshold Land value (TLV) to establish 
headroom available for CIL rates 
Setting of the Rates Preparation of the Draft Preliminary Charging 
Schedule and Draft Charging Schedule setting 
out the proposed CIL rates 
Table 7.2 Key Sites of Argumentation in Newcastle/Gateshead 
As with the Durham case study the focus of the research has been in relation to the 
capture of value, rather than decisions about how the money is to be spent.  
Accordingly the initial focus of the analysis was on the assessment of viability and 
setting of the CIL proposals, rather than on where and how the money would be 
spent, what became apparent however was that these three arenas interrelated to 
each other even if the spending arena was somewhat less contested.   
These sites of argumentation have been studied considering key documents together 
with data from a series of semi-structured interviews with key actors in the process.  
To ascertain the key ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given 
to the discussion and arguments made, to help identify the storylines and topes that 
structured these discussions and which in turn influenced how the policy became 
implemented. 
7.7 Discourse Analysis 
7.7.1 Identification of Discourses 
As in the Durham case study the main national discourse of “supporting growth” is 
acknowledged as the dominant discourse influencing policy making in this case 
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study.  Accordingly the influence of the national storylines and tropes identified in 
chapter 5 and how they interact with locally generated storylines and tropes is more 
the focus of the case study analysis. 
7.7.2 Identification of Storylines and Tropes 
As mentioned earlier storylines and tropes are important concepts in analysing 
policy, they are reductive discursive devices that simplify complex debates through 
simplified narratives or figures of speech, as such they influence the meaning 
attached to a policy problem and in turn influence policy practices.  They can often 
disguise contradictions and areas of misunderstanding with both positive and 
negative effects.  They can also be used to legitimise policy making decisions whilst 
disguising incomplete arguments and institutional biases (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005, 
p. 177). 
Site of Argumentation 
 
Storylines 
 
Tropes 
 
What is the funding to be spent 
on 
 
Why the CIL is needed 
 
Facilitating Local Authorities 
 
CIL policy not being applicable 
to the north east 
 
Why is CIL needed 
 
Plan led approach 
 
double counting of developer 
contributions 
 
 
Viability Assessment 
 
Incentivising Landowners 
 
Robust Viability Assessment 
 
Encouraging Developers 
 
Appropriate Available Evidence 
 
Setting the Rate 
 
CIL at a cautious level 
 
Margin of Viability 
 
Business as usual 
 
Demonstrating Deliverability  
 
Securing Income 
 
Reluctant Acceptance 
 
Cumulative Policy Burden 
 
Striking the Balance 
 
Table 7.3 Storylines and Tropes in Newcastle/Gateshead 
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The storylines and tropes identified in the Newcastle/Gateshead case study are 
shown in the table 7.3, the national storylines and tropes are shown underlined and 
have been identified in the national policy documentation as it has evolved over the 
period.  The locally generated storylines and tropes have been identified from the 
local policy documentation and interviews and consideration of the main events of 
the policy making process during the period being studied. 
Having set out the main storylines and tropes involved in the policy making process, 
it is now appropriate to consider how they interacted in Newcastle/Gateshead and 
with what impacts on policy practices. 
7.8 Analysis of Discourses and Storylines at Key Sites of Argumentation 
As discussed earlier storylines and tropes are important and influential discursive 
mechanisms, they are employed by actors to influence the meanings attached to 
knowledge claims, which in turn influence the policy making process.  Actors may 
use three methods to support their meaning or construction of reality, firstly, 
credibility, combining the plausibility of the argument with the authority of the authors, 
secondly acceptability, implying that a position is attractive or at least necessary and 
finally trust, which seeks to support and suppress doubt about how this definition of 
meaning was reached (Hajer, 1995, p. 59).  These methods can be used positively or 
negatively to discredit arguments, to establish doubts, undermine trust, and in turn 
positon other actors.  These discursive mechanisms can determine what can and 
what cannot be discussed in the policy making process (Hajer, 1995), and when the 
problem definition is accepted to a point where alternatives are not even considered 
“discursive closure” can be considered to have been reached (Hajer, 1995). 
Storyline and tropes can have three main affects, firstly, they can be used to position 
actors into certain roles, secondly, they can lead to the creation of Discourse 
Coalitions which are (often temporary) groups with shared aims and objectives in 
influencing policy development, and finally to cluster knowledge sources (Hajer, 
2006).  These methods and affects will be used to support the discussion of the 
discursive struggle within the three main sites of argumentation in the 
Newcastle/Gateshead case study from May 2012 to March 2015. 
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7.8.1 What is the funding to be spent on? 
The discursive struggle within this site of argumentation concerned three main areas, 
the justification of the CIL as a policy, which linked to the new development identified 
in the Local Plan and the need to maintain income from developers whilst not 
stopping development. 
To justify the introduction of the CIL policy into its area Newcastle City Council 
employed the “why the CIL is needed” storyline.  This was influenced by the 
requirements of national policy and the link to the Local Plan and the national “plan-
led approach” trope, to determine the infrastructure required to support new 
development and growth, which is set out in the Infrastructure Delivery Plan.  The 
local authority sought to establish credibility, acceptability and trust for the “why we 
need CIL” storyline by using the need for growth established in the Local Plan 
process as also a need for strategic infrastructure, it derived authority from a lengthy 
and robust Core Strategy process and CIL was presented as necessary to contribute 
part of the funding for this infrastructure. 
“Without the timely delivery of required infrastructure to support development 
the Core Strategy ambitions cannot be delivered.  CIL is one of a number of 
fundamental funding streams that will help to pay for such infrastructure. There 
is a difficult balance to be struck as the provision of infrastructure funded by 
CIL will be an essential element to supporting the provision of quality housing, 
sustainable neighbourhoods and attractive accommodation for business.” 
(Newcastle City Council and Gatehead MBC, 2015, p. 6) 
This has been challenged by private sector actors in two main respects, firstly the 
storyline “CIL policy is not applicable to the north east”, with claims it is a south east 
policy.  Secondly, the challenge over the need to fund the infrastructure from CIL, in 
terms of whether s106 could be used instead or whether all of the proposed 
infrastructure was really needed, encapsulated in the storyline “why is CIL needed”. 
The principle of inapplicability of the policy to the north east and to Newcastle and 
Gateshead, especially at a time of poor economic and market conditions was used 
by a range of actors especially specialists such as property agents, but this was not 
particularly effective in influencing policy.  The questioning of the CIL as a 
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mechanism was also relatively ineffective, as the restrictions on s106 funding 
effectively forced the local authorities to introduce CIL to maintain income levels. 
As the local authority established the need for growth as part of the Local Plan 
process, they then employed the national storyline “facilitating local authorities” to 
justify some contribution from developers.  There was also a concern in the early 
stages from the Development industry about potential “double counting of developer 
contributions”, but the national policy was tightened up on this over the period, by 
introducing the 123 list at a national level and this reduced the impact of this trope at 
a local level. 
As a result of the discursive struggle various positioning effects can be seen, 
primarily in this arena that the local authority is positioned as the facilitator of 
infrastructure, even if this is only partly funded by CIL, (27% of the total cost in 
Newcastle), the national policy requires a gap in funding to be set out.   
The clustering of knowledge claims and creation of Discourse Coalitions from the 
storylines and tropes also reflects the discursive struggle outlined above, with the 
main knowledge claims being about the Local Plan establishing the need for growth 
and new development.  Once established and supported by significant research and 
evidence in the Local Plan process and overcoming opposition from communities to 
some development proposals, the CIL justification was relatively straight forward to 
establish in principle, based on the need for infrastructure to support that new 
development. 
7.8.2 Viability Assessment 
This was another important area of discursive struggle as the local authority pursued 
its calculation of the viability across its area and was challenged by a range of actors.  
This is a specialist area of expertise, which also serves to exclude some actors from 
this part of the process.  There are two parts of this site of argumentation, the 
assessment of the threshold land value and the area wide appraisal, together which 
are combined in the Viability Assessment document as  
“There are differing industry terminologies for assessing the level at which land 
could be transacted, including the ‘benchmark value’ and ‘threshold value’. For 
the purposes of this report we refer to threshold value being: “the value at 
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which a typical willing landowner is likely to release land for development, 
before payment of taxes (such as capital gains tax).” (Harman Report)” 
(Newcastle City Council and Gateshead MBC, 2013 p6) 
The TLV assessment is also acknowledged as a very difficult part of the assessment 
process but as the quote above shows, the assessment reflects the national storyline 
of “incentivising landowners” to sell land to enable new development to go ahead. 
“that was again one of the lengthy debates because again we just had to take, 
we called it the benchmark value didn’t we, trying to think now just in my head, 
that was probably one of the longest early debates was how we set that level 
and then also communicate that level as well” (AS Interview) 
“Identifying what constitutes the threshold value and thus viability of 
development is one of the most challenging aspects of the viability appraisal 
process. Identifying and justifying a reasonable value is a complex process 
and can be particularly challenging in the absence of recent and comparable 
land transactions.  The emerging position in relation to threshold land values is 
that their establishment is a matter of an iterative process between local 
authorities, landowners and developers.  The following is an analysis of 
published work and a critique of the Councils’ approach to establishing a 
robust threshold land value.” (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead MBC, 
2013, p. 7) 
It has also been the subject of several sources of guidance which unhelpfully actually 
conflict and which have changed over the period.  In challenging this assessment 
most of the concern has been raised by the volume house builders, who have a great 
dependence on numbers and on land supply. 
“The RICS involvement has not been helpful with the 2012 guidance being 
unhelpful only 6 weeks after the Harman report and stating it didn’t recognise 
the Harman methodology as a valid approach, it is not a valuation method, but 
is certainly a much and long used and valid approach to the industry.” 
(CA:D/NG3 Interview) 
The second element relates to the area wide appraisal which is the calculation of 
residual valuations across a range of hypothetical sites spread across the local 
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authority areas to try and reflect the differing market conditions and values, based on 
differing uses and location.  These residual valuations have been undertaken by in-
house surveyors from the local authorities and contain assumptions on end use 
values and development costs (including the profit level for the developer to 
undertake the development).  The assumptions used and the evidence used to 
support the assumptions were expected to be a major area of challenge, with virtually 
all detailed areas of the residual valuations contested.  This reflects the national 
policy storyline of “encouraging developers” which requires the viability assessment 
to reflect within it, an appropriate return to developers.  The comparison between the 
threshold land value and the residual valuations from the range of hypothetical sites 
produces the available CIL headroom across the whole local authority areas for a 
range of different uses. 
The local authorities sought to build credibility, acceptability and trust by presenting a 
detailed and transparent viability assessment document showing all the assumptions 
and calculations, this is part of their employment of the “robust viability assessment” 
storyline.  Nevertheless, there was much debate about sources of evidence, with the 
local authorities being criticised for using inadequate evidence, with private 
developers and surveyors employing the national policy trope “appropriate available 
evidence” to discredit the local authorities appraisal work.  The local authorities in 
turn requested assistance from the other actors who held this evidence but this was 
not always forthcoming, due to the confidentiality of developer’s business models and 
of some evidence. 
An important part of the discursive struggle concerned the local authority and its skills 
and capacity to implement the CIL policy and the role of planners as having to take 
the lead on introducing the CIL policy.  The capacity of the local authority to 
implement the policy again was a key challenge, in a period of very significant cuts in 
funding and staffing, the implementation of a new policy with sometimes conflicting 
and rapidly changing guidance is also difficult.  Newcastle/Gateshead used in-house 
surveyors to undertake much of the viability assessment work, this was due to 
several reasons, resources for the appointment of consultants needed to be justified 
in times of very tight budgets, and it was considered that they had the expertise and 
capacity internally. 
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However, it became apparent that much of this work was undertaken be Newcastle 
with much less involvement from Gateshead.  The local authorities used a consultant 
HDH Planning and Development, but in a “critical friend role” which was a fairly 
constrained and with limited involvement.  There was however a recognition that they 
required specialist knowledge of the national policy guidance on CIL, especially as it 
changed and evolved over the period and to ensure their process was robust. 
The local authority planners also valued the support from the Planning Officers 
Society (POS) who had an established network to exchange best practice, this was 
considered a key assistance to supporting skills development and of building 
confidence in an area of expertise where they did sometimes feel uncomfortable. 
“because we are members of the Planning Officers Society there is the a 
couple of national groups we meet every quarter but we are in contact I had 
three emails this morning constant emails and circulations anyone who has a 
question will send it on to the group and the group will come back with 
answers” (LA:NG7 Interview) 
Similarly to Durham the positioning effects from this discursive struggle is to position 
developers, consultants and agents/surveyors as experts on development economics 
and viability, with the local authority being less knowledgeable and having less 
evidence. 
The clustering of knowledge from this discursive struggle puts sources of evidence 
and specialist knowledge claims at the heart of the policy making process.  The 
process of assessing viability is an imprecise exercise, making judgements about the 
future based on evidence from the past, it also attempts to anticipate the decision 
making and behaviour of actor’s, landowners in assessing the TLV and of developers 
in the area wide viability assessment. 
7.8.3 Setting the Rate 
The final area of discursive struggle is about the setting of the CIL rates, this is a 
process which seeks to bring together information from the other sites of 
argumentation, on how much headroom is available from the viability assessment 
and how much infrastructure funding is required in the IDP, then making a decision 
on the rates to set. 
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In making this decision the local authority has a range of considerations to consider, 
what level of risk is it prepared to take around the proposed CIL rates, even within 
the restrictions required of the CIL regulations and guidance.  The managing of 
expectations, of Council Members around income to fund infrastructure provision, the 
expectations of communities also in this respect.  The impact on developers of the 
local authorities attitude to new development and growth, the track record of the local 
authority in delivering development (see below) and securing s106 income, and the 
impact on affordable housing provision and delivery of other policy objectives.  Also 
perhaps what CIL rates, if any, neighbouring and competing other local authorities 
may be proposing and the potential impact on competition for development. 
“The Councils will need to show that they are doing what they can to facilitate 
development throughout the economic cycle. The Councils have a strong track 
record of past initiatives in this regard, although it must be noted that in the 
current economic climate there is little government money to provide such 
help” (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead MBC, 2014, p. 47) 
Newcastle City Council sought to promote credibility and acceptability with the local 
storylines of “CIL at a cautious level” combined with the “business as usual” in which 
in the early stages the Council sought to say that developer contributions were at the 
same level but via a different mechanism.  The Council also employed the national 
policy trope “margin of viability” to indicate that the CIL rates were not at the margin 
of viability and that most sites were still viable. 
Newcastle City Council also having an existing income from s106 agreements were 
keen to retain this income yet also didn’t want to stop development, hence initially the 
Council promoted a storyline of “business as usual” to indicate that developer 
contributions would not increase only change from one mechanism to another. 
“Most development has some impact on the need for infrastructure and 
amenities, or benefits from them. So it is considered fair that such 
development pays a share of the cost. By paying a contribution, developers 
will help fund the infrastructure that is needed to make development 
acceptable and sustainable. CIL will be equitable as it shares the costs across 
developments that can withstand a charge.” (Newcastle City Council and 
Gatehead MBC, 2015, p. 6) 
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However the CIL process was separated from the Core Strategy process, as 
reflected in the local storyline of “demonstrating delivery” this stopped the CIL 
process and used the viability evidence to support the Core Strategy showing it was 
deliverable.  When the Core strategy was approved, the need to continue the receipt 
of income from the s106agreements that had originally driven the need for the CIL 
policy led to the local storyline of “securing income” emerging at the end of the period 
of study when the CIL process was restarted with some urgency to retain income.  
Alongside this whole CIL process, Gateshead Council pursued an implicit local 
storyline of “reluctant acceptance” as Newcastle led the joint process. 
In setting the rates the national policy tropes of “striking the balance” and “cumulative 
policy burden” were again even in the early stages of this policy process influential in 
the policy making process.  The “striking the Balance” trope clearly influencing the 
whole City Council approach of pursuing a CIL that wouldn’t stop development as in 
“business as usual” and in spite of the need to secure continuation of income.  The 
“cumulative policy burden” was employed within the Council documentation from 
national guidance.  These tropes influenced policy practices as will be discussed in 
the next section, the cautious approach of the City Council in relation to setting CIL 
rates meant that the discursive struggle was not strongly contested in marked 
contrast with the Durham case study. 
There was a challenge about local authority capacity and concern generally about 
delays and the lack of being able to respond to private sector developers.  This was 
more in connection with s106 negotiations, a general concern about progressing 
planning applications, there was a general concern of loss of staff with experience, 
expertise and a “loss of corporate memory” of the history of an area.  The long 
established relationships were highlighted as a key factor and many of these were 
being lost. 
“what I am a bit worried about, I am to be honest, we worried about the brain 
drain from the public sector, I think there I even go back 5 or 10 years, now if I 
needed to go in I would come in and be able to make decisions, would meet 
some senior people who would talk back to me in the way, that in the way we 
are having a conversation now, who could say ……….no I will not accept that, 
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but who would give you it who you went they are clued up” (DV:D/NG5 
Interview) 
“there is a huge problem at the minute and you feel desperately sorry for local 
authorities at the moment because so many people have been made 
redundant they don’t have the capacity or a lot don’t have the capacity or don’t 
have the resources and are making tricky decisions at the minute where you 
don’t need to be rushed on this stuff you need the evidence and things like 
that and there are local authorities who just do not have the resource and do 
not have the policy resource to deal with these things which leaves them open 
to challenge at a later stage” (DV:D/NG1 Interview) 
The discursive struggle here again is not resolved, as the CIL process is not 
completed, but the adoption of the Local Plan has strengthened the local authorities 
storyline and the setting of a cautious rate suggests that whilst a Discourse Coalition 
of developers, house builders, agents and consultants may oppose the proposals this 
is significantly weaker than in Durham.  As referred to earlier there may be a culture 
of challenge, but this is a standard response rather than a really determined 
challenge based on real concerns, as has been more evident in the Durham case 
study. 
The positioning effects from this storylines reinforce some of those in the other 
arenas, that developers are key deliverers of development, that developers, agents 
and consultants are experts on viability and that the local authority is the facilitator of 
the infrastructure.  The clustering of knowledge again is more the gathering together 
of knowledge from the other arenas on the need for the CIL income, the potential 
headroom for income and on the balance of policy priorities.  But other judgements 
about developer’s perceptions and competition with other places are also relevant. 
The struggle between the storylines and tropes outlined above can lead to 
“Discourse Structuration” (Hajer, 2006), at this point the construction of the policy 
problem and the meaning attached to it have been established by one definition.  It is 
difficult to conclude that Discourse Structuration has been achieved in the 
Newcastle/Gateshead case study especially at the relatively early stages of the 
policy making process studied. Yet national policy storylines and trope have been 
influential in what has been a much more measured and cautious approach taken by 
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Newcastle City Council compared to Durham County Council.  When the dominant 
discourse starts to influence practices and has institutional effects this is termed by 
Hajer as “Discourse Institutionalisation” (Hajer, 2006) and the impact of the policy 
storylines and discourses on policy practices are now considered. 
7.9 The impact of the discursive mechanisms on the CIL process 
Having considered the discursive struggle between the different storylines and tropes 
within the three sites of argumentation above, the impact of that struggle on day to 
day policy practices is now considered.  Hajer defines practices as “embedded 
routines and mutually understood rules and norms that provide coherence to social 
life” (Hajer, 2006, p. 70). 
7.9.1 The identification of What CIL spent on 
The first area of practice relates to the production of the IDP document which sets 
out the strategic infrastructure required to support the growth in the Local Plan.  The 
main change in practices over the period of the research is in relation to the IDP 
document, was the defining of what is included and excluded from the document.  In 
Newcastle/Gateshead an initial IDP was produced in 2012, amended in September 
2013 with a final version issued in March 2015.  In many of these earlier documents 
the list of items were not fully costed, but it appears that the overall costs have 
increased over the period, the CIL income expected also has not been set out until 
the final report in March 2015 when a Newcastle’s income from CIL is estimated at 
£27m out of a total IDP cost of £242.9m and Gateshead £12.5m out of £208.5m. 
The need to define a list of infrastructure from within the IDP, to be specifically 
funded from CIL, termed the123 list, reflected concerns from the development 
industry nationally about double counting of costs between different mechanisms, in 
particular s106 and CIL.  These national policy changes have impacted on local 
practices and tightened up the work with the 123 list.  Yet at a local level some actors 
still had concerns about double counting between mechanisms. 
“the CIL 123 list this important list of all the factors that are on CIL that should 
be contributed to fairly across an area gets distorted and it gets double 
counted so between CIL and s106 and primary taxation I believe personally 
there is a lot of double counting going on” (DV:D/NG5 Interview) 
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The second area of practice is the requirement to show a gap in funding of the IDP 
infrastructure, supporting the need to levy CIL, even if CIL is only to fund a small part 
of the overall IDP costs.  In discussions with the local authorities there was some 
concern that this presented a conflict between the preparation of evidence for the 
Local Plan and its requirement to show certainty of delivery and the preparation of 
evidence in support of the CIL process needing to show a funding gap to justify CIL. 
“well I think that the joint EIPs for Plans and CILs were very early stages and 
there wasn’t much to learn from but we felt it was an uncomfortable set of 
evidence because the evidence are to a certain extent conflicting between CIL 
evidence you have got to prove a funding gap and the plan you have to prove 
deliverability” (LA:NG6 Interview) 
This appears to have contributed to the strategic decision to separate the two pieces 
of work completely and to the conscious delay in the CIL process whilst the Core 
Strategy was progressed due to possible conflicts in evidence.  This separation 
contrasts with Durham’s combining of the CIL and Local Plan processes as 
suggested in early National policy documents. 
There was some comment that the CIL policy wouldn’t work in the North East but this 
seemed to have very limited impact on the practices of implementing the CIL policy in 
the area.  However, it was apparent probably because of the much greater history of 
securing of s106 income and the greater values and more expensive development 
proposals in the joint Local Plan that Newcastle City Council were far more strongly 
driven to introduce CIL, Gateshead if they hadn’t been part of a joint Local Plan may 
not have pursued the CIL policy  
“Newcastle certainly wanted it, I think in the early days as well there was 
probably within the Council there was some people thought that CIL was going 
to be a really big cash cow so the expectations probably four years ago about 
what CIL would bring in to Gateshead hasn’t been played out in land values” 
(LA:NG8 Interview) 
“there is no change their particularly as we have bought into a joint Plan with 
Newcastle, and Newcastle are in a different position, so I have no doubt we 
will progress, what benefit actually for Gateshead remains to be seen 
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particularly as you are right whether it is CIL or s106 there are highway works 
and other accommodation works that will be required to bring these sites and 
as I say contamination probably land condition issues as well that need to be 
paid for its not going to be straightforward “(LA:NG8 Interview) 
The issue of planning infrastructure such as schools and the income from CIL also 
presented problems and contradictions. 
“how do you get a CIL contribution to a school you have an ideal that 
investment is needed or a new school is needed but actually in 5 years’ time 
the picture can have changed and particularly under the current government 
where its only schools that are good or excellent can cut the mustard so you 
got a failing school deemed to be failing now what do you do with that a good 
school today may not be a good school in 5 years’ time so I think the school 
one is a really interesting one (LA:NG8 Interview). 
It was acknowledged however, that it would be important to show central 
Government that an effort had been made to secure funding at a local level when 
and if bidding into national funding pots. 
7.9.2 Calculation of Viability 
The practices in relation to the above had two distinct elements, firstly the 
establishment of the threshold land value and secondly the residual valuations of a 
range of hypothetical sites to establish the area wide viability assessment. 
The establishment of the threshold land value is one of the most challenging 
practices involved in the Viability Assessment, and requires an understanding of the 
decision making of developers and landowners as set out in national guidance but 
was also reflected at the local level. 
“The emerging position in relation to threshold land values is that their 
establishment is a matter of an iterative process between local authorities, 
landowners and developers.” (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead MBC, 
2014, p. 8) 
In the case study in spite of setting out much of the guidance and updating this as the 
various versions of the Viability Assessments were issued, there was little change in 
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practice in respect of the assessment of TLV, other than changing the label from 
benchmark to threshold land value to bring it in line with national guidance.  The 
guidance from the Harman (Local Housing Delivery Group, 2012) and RICS reports 
(RICS, 2012) were set out and discussed in the later reports in July 2013 and 
February 2014, the initial report from May 2012 predated the guidance and relied on 
the HCA advice (HCA, 2011). 
The conflict between the guidance was played down and the Viability Assessments 
stated that they believed that both sources of guidance had been complied with.  The 
May 2012 report was very detailed in describing the process and stated that little 
evidence was available.  The July 2013 (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead 
MBC, 2013) and February 2014 (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead MBC, 2014) 
reports were less about the CIL and more about the Viability Assessment for the 
deliverability of the Local Plan, this change in emphasis is reflected in the 
presentation, the February 2014 report is however directly referred to as evidence for 
the new CIL Preliminary draft charging schedule issued in April 2015, so hence its 
inclusion here. 
There is much more evidence included in the July 2013 report, as well as the 
guidance, in the February 2014 report the recent decisions and guidance are added 
and a whole section is added to the July 2013 report, dealing with evidence from the 
Council’s own land sales and commenting on market and land owner expectations. 
It is also perhaps revealing that the Norwich CIL examiner is quoted in respect of his 
comments that land values may be expected to fall 
“Ultimately, as the Greater Norwich case referred to above indicates, land 
values may fall as a consequence of an adopted CIL, and note the values 
above are from transactions prior to adoption of a CIL charge.” (Newcastle 
City Council and Gateshead MBC, 2014, p. 19) 
In spite of all the further justification and discussion the same land value adjusted 
from the VOA report 2011 was used although the percentage between urban and 
non-urban sites across the 5 value zones was increased from 30% to 40%, 
increasing the urban rural differential. 
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“As a result of a virtually static land trading market the figure of £1.28m/ 
hectare has been used for benchmarking purposes.” (Newcastle City Council 
and Gateshead MBC, 2014, p. 14) 
The threshold Land value for the commercial urban core was excluded as too difficult 
to assess. 
“There is no stated threshold value for City Centre sites as it is extremely 
difficult to establish a threshold value as these developments tend to involve 
existing buildings being remodelled and extended as opposed to being bare 
development sites. The nature of the Newcastle market is that there are 
complex ownership arrangements in place and inevitably the price that a seller 
would be prepared to sell a site at will already have substantial existing use 
value plus a premium to incentivise the sale, and as such bare development 
sites are not usually traded.” (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead MBC, 
2014, p. 39) 
However, compared to the concern about the TLV in Durham which was the subject 
of considerable challenge, the TLV assessment in Newcastle was much less 
contested, many developers feeling that the assessment was unlikely to be a 
problem in terms of ensuring that landowners would allow sites to come forward, 
which had been the major concern in Durham especially with the volume house 
builders. 
The second element of practice is the residual valuations for a range of hypothetical 
sites to reflect variations in use and location across the local authority’s areas and 
trying to establish different value zones.  This area of practice was also influenced by 
national policy and guidance, especially in relation to the use of evidence, with new 
guidance on “appropriate available evidence” (DCLG, 2014a).  Whilst the 
assumptions used in the residual appraisals, varied very little between 2012 and 
2014, the sources and interpretation of evidence however became an issue 
especially in the commercial property sector.  In spite of several meetings and 
attempts at trying to discuss evidence, the view taken by some of the commercial 
property agents was that the local authorities didn’t use the right evidence and 
wanted the local agents to do the viability work on the “cheap” for them, a reference 
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perhaps that the Councils had decided to do the work in-house rather than employ 
agents or consultants. 
“well I think its demonstrated lack of understanding of it and you know I think 
they have tried to do it on the cheap” (CA:NG2 Interview) 
“just doing Newcastle central business district office market on its own is a big 
piece of work, what became apparent was that the evidence that they were 
using in the respective town halls was at least two years out of date” (CA:NG2 
Interview) 
“I think the problem came about on Newcastle/Gateshead in my mind at least 
was when they tried to justify and by just producing to the private sector the 
evidence base that they were using, frankly it wasn’t worth the paper it was 
written on and it lost the confidence of the people who were trying to engage 
with and who just then went you know haven’t got time for this” (CA:NG2 
Interview) 
The position on evidence in the commercial sector remained unresolved up to the 
restarting of the CIL process in April 2015.  The evidence in relation to the residential 
sector was also disputed but was much less contested than had been evident in the 
Durham case study. 
The configuration of housing mix and size was amended between the 2012 and 2013 
reports and there was also much more discussion on the response to consultation 
and in justifying the proposals.  This included a specific response to comments from 
Barratt with the additional material in the appendix added in February 2014. 
The CIL headroom is derived by comparing the TLV with the residual valuations, 
much was made of the “cautious approach” and “comfortable developers profit on 
GDV” seeking to give comfort on deliverability required by the NPPF for assessing 
Local Plans. 
“The viability model used is based on assumptions of cost, such as build 
costs, professional fees and marketing costs, which were the subject of much 
consultation and engagement with stakeholders. It allows for significant and 
comfortable developers’ profit on Gross Development Value of a scheme and 
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was developed and run to meet the Councils’ requirements for informing the 
preparation of CIL and supporting the development of the emerging Core 
Strategy and Urban Core Plan. For residential schemes the assumption is for 
20% on GDV and for commercial schemes it allows for 20% profit on cost, this 
compares well with the Shinfield case9 where 20% on GDV for residential 
development was agreed.” (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead MBC, 
2014, p. 19) 
In the 2014 report extra testing of a selection of the SHLAA sites to show 
deliverability was added, to the hypothetical sites across the local authority areas in 
earlier reports.  In addition, new sections were added to the February 2014 report on 
using evidence from Council owned sites in areas that may otherwise not be 
deliverable and to also provide comfort of deliverability of the overall Plan for both 
Newcastle and Gateshead.  In a similar respect there was also discussion in the July 
2013 and extended in February 2014 report on “Economic Development and 
Regional Working” and “New Development Deals” which again sought to provide 
comfort on deliverability of the Local Plan especially in locations and sectors which 
traditionally had required regeneration and public subsidy.  This had not appeared in 
the May 2012 report (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead Council, 2012a) but 
was now seen as important with several pages, it discussed the importance of the 
“combined authority and “Local Enterprise partnership” and the local authorities track 
record of delivery. 
“Together the local authorities are also recognising the need for greater 
regional collaboration to achieve common goals. This finds its focus in the 
North East Local Enterprise Partnership (NE LEP) but also via the emerging 
combined authority. The seven NE LEP local authorities have collaborated 
and are currently consulting on a Draft Strategic Economic Plan18” (Newcastle 
City Council and Gateshead MBC, 2014, p. 44) 
The Viability Assessment is a complex and specialist area of work, and the two local 
authorities working together decided they had the skills and capacity to undertake the 
work in-house, using internal surveyors to carry out the appraisal work.  This was 
partly not wishing to pay extra fees for consultants when skills were available, but 
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also because they believed they had good local knowledge of the area and property 
markets as they were active in selling land and working in those markets. 
“yes I mean as resources within Authorities drastically reducing we do need to 
make the most use of the competencies we have in house and we are 
required to do that before we go out to procurement. Do we have the 
competencies in house, that’s a question you need to answer before you even 
start to think about procurement, and we did have the competencies in house, 
we might not have the consultant with the overview of how CIL and Local Plan 
viability assessments have been undertaken nationally, but so we hired, we 
procured a critical friend Simon Drummond-Hay [HDH]” (LA:NG6 Interview) 
“we basically have him for a day every 6 months where we just go through 
everything we have done and then just bombard him with emails and he reads 
them over the weekend and we come in and talk about our approach, we use 
him, critical friend is the role is the right thing, so he would look at all of our 
reports and say change this, add this, beef that up, you know do a bit more on 
this, and it’s been really useful and I think because he’s nationally renowned 
now as well, I think that’s useful so it’s better to have him our side” (LA:NG7 
Interview) 
The in-house surveyors produced the Viability Assessment documents, jointly 
authored in May 2012 (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead Council, 2012a), but 
the later versions of July 2013 (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead MBC, 
2013)and February 2014 (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead MBC, 2014) were 
produced by the in-house surveyor at Newcastle jointly with the in-house planners.  
This reflects the greater importance of the CIL process to Newcastle, whilst there was 
some input from internal surveyors at Gateshead, this was very much in a supporting 
role with lack of capacity cited as the reason. 
“yes from the very beginning it was something we thought we could do in 
house we have had to rely more on Paul than I thought we would” (LA:NG7 
Interview) 
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“yes well, it was originally Paul and Andrew Holtham so when he went 
(Andrew) really it was just again there just wasn’t capacity to maintain that 
level of involvement so we just relied on Paul” (LA:NG7 Interview) 
[Note Paul Scaplehorn was Newcastle City Council’s surveyor and Andrew 
Holtham from Gateshead who left to go to Durham County Council.] 
The in-house surveyor even produced his own bespoke appraisal model and all the 
detailed appraisal work was undertaken in-house.  The use of consultants was very 
much in the role of a “critical friend”, and Simon Drummond-Hay of HDH was 
appointed into that role.  This involved monthly meetings for a day, when the in-
house planners and surveyors sought advice on the national guidance regarding CIL 
and on the presentation of the viability assessment.  This role remained unchanged 
over the period, in contrast with the more intensive and increased role of the 
consultant over time in the Durham cases study. 
In relation to skills, the numerous changes to and the complex nature of the national 
policy guidance, had been a challenge for local authority planners and surveyors and 
hence the appointment of a consultant as support in this area.  The skills of in-house 
planners and surveyors had developed over the period and this had also been very 
much facilitated by the PAS with training sessions.  But perhaps more importantly the 
POS network to disseminate best practice and experience from across the country 
from other local authorities, which was an important support for knowledge, but also 
provided emotional support and confidence at times. 
“Gateshead are part of a Planning Officers Society learning group which is 
really helpful too, and then obviously Simon Drummond-Hay our critical friend.  
Very much you know he attends lots of the examinations and he is very clued 
up on those types of things, so he will point things out, if you could watch out 
for this change” (LA:NG6 Interview) 
7.9.3 Setting of the Rates 
The practices in this area were influenced by the national policy guidance about the 
“striking the balance” and “cumulative policy burden”, other local factors of having to 
manage member expectations, the general risk level and “margin of viability” issue 
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and the nature of competition with neighbouring and or competing local authorities 
were also relevant. 
The practices in setting the rate, were influenced by the change to the CIL 
regulations and guidance over the period and the reduction in the discretion available 
to the local authority in making a judgment about the appropriate rate for its area.  
The CIL rates in Newcastle/Gateshead were changed between 2012 and 2015 with 
removal of the rates for office development, hotel and comparison retail and changes 
to the student housing which was increased from £16 to £80 sqm.  The residential 
rates changes with the zone A being reduced from £88 to £60 sqm, and zone B 
increasing from £16 to £30 sqm, and the retail supermarket being reduced from £128 
to £30 sqm. 
The changes in rates were a reflection of a change of policy practices and even 
further caution in setting the rates, after the challenge from the retail and housing 
sectors and clearly influencing the assessment of the balance. 
The consideration of the CIL rate within the wider policy context has also influenced 
the practices in this area, with a whole extra section added to the VA report in 
February 2014, “Policies scoped for costs”, this seems to be a direct response to the 
requirement to assess the cumulative policy burden and the impact of CIL alongside 
the other policy objectives, not least s106.  The section is included to provide comfort 
about the deliverability of the Local Plan and that policy requirements will not 
jeopardise that delivery.  The section sets out the costs of various policy objectives 
and the impact on viability across a range of sites, it is careful to state that it is “not 
weighted or a prioritisation of policies”, but can be varied site by site 
“the specific type of developer contribution that could be sought in the 
essential to transformational categories. It is an indication only of the likely 
priorities applied; however, this will vary depending on the specifics of 
individual planning applications and is thus a strategic guide, rather than a 
weighted policy requirement”. (Newcastle City Council and Gateshead MBC, 
2014, p. 19) 
This sits alongside the categorisation of infrastructure as essential and 
transformational as contributions.  A typical site should be able to bear the “policy 
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costs”, as this is a requirement of NPPF as is also referred to.  This is similar to the 
“margin of viability” requiring that any rates don’t stop development of a majority of 
sites across an area. 
The cumulative impact of policies is a particular concern to developers who consider 
the requirements for other contributions, for say s106 for affordable housing or 
sustainability or design requirements all have an effect on the viability of schemes 
(especially sustainability requirements such as included in the Code for Sustainable 
homes).  There was also a view from the development industry that sometimes local 
authorities and their members had unrealistic expectations and just didn’t appreciate 
the impact of these policy requirements on development viability.  
“my role is to try is balancing the impact of policy burden on cost and therefore 
return to myself and the landowner” (DV:D/NG3 Interview) 
“my experience in terms of CIL is probably actually rather limited because it 
falls for me within that whole concept of policy what we call in HBF, the Policy 
Burden on a site, so LAs imposing policies on to a developer that 99 times out 
of a 100 they have no idea what they have done or what they are seeking to 
achieve ……a fantastic example is the code for sustainable homes (CSH) if 
you ask a LA what the CSH is all you will get, it’s about renewable energy, one 
tiny bit of it is about renewable energy” (DV:D/NG3 Interview) 
On the other hand the managing of expectations of members was important for more 
senior local authority officers, to realise the impact of decisions on viability and 
delivery and that things were now different, also to manage expectations on the 
amount of money that would be collected.  This was much stronger in Newcastle 
than in Gateshead due to the history of collecting s106 monies, and hence the 
regular return to cabinet for approval of temporary mechanisms to continue to collect 
income.  It also influenced the rate charged for CIL with reference to previous rate 
levels as a comparison throughout the period.  In the February 2014 report there 
were even an analysis of the CIL rates as a percentage of GDV to show how 
reasonable they were. 
The emergence of competition between different local authorities over CIL rates was 
not a particularly strong issue amongst the local authorities Officers but was raised 
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by Council members.  There was some liaison between the different local Authorities 
at Officer Level, but this was more on general planning matters rather than on CIL.  
There was a CIL officer group but this didn’t meet often and was more about best 
practice rather than rates, some of the other local authorities just weren’t interested 
as they weren’t going to implement CIL in the foreseeable future. 
“we have a on paper we have a group of the lead officers from the Tyne and 
Wear area but there has been so much change as well on that basis we have 
not met in a while we used to meet you know 3 or 4 times a last few years” 
(LA:NG7 Interview) 
“well we have the we have a heads of planning group which is across the 
seven local authorities’, the seven northern authorities, there is so we have a 
regular meeting there where everything is on the agenda so we have the 
general discussions there but there is also you have got spatial planning 
officer groups as well north and south of the Tyne and they have had 
discussions on CIL” (LA:NG5 Interview) 
The importance of the CIL rates and the competitiveness of the North East and 
Newcastle City Centre was an interesting issue that emerged, it was a concern to 
Newcastle City Council, but also to the commercial letting agents and to groups such 
as “G9” and “Developing Consensus” who comprise Local Commercial agents and 
developers and sometimes other business representatives.  They engaged with the 
local authority and expressed views about the promotion of the area for inward 
investment enquiries and were clearly interested in letting commercial property and 
didn’t want CIL to become a problem. 
“what we said [G9 group of agents] that they must all of the Tyne and Wear 
authorities and ok with Northumberland and Durham should produce one 
inward investment portal” (CA:NG1 Interview) 
“well they are still into development and letting properties that’s all they want 
at the end of the day, what I said, what is the outcomes we all want, let’s start 
on what’s the outcome, letting property for them or developing property and for 
us it’s for landing the investment and getting the jobs, so there exactly so we 
actually all want the same thing” (LA:NG2 Interview) 
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“what I think CIL does, potentially does it is it acts as a brake on speculative 
development activity particularly in marginal marginally viable locations and I 
think that, that’s where Developing Consensus and G9 are looking at inward 
investment, because that’s about driving occupation demand, which will move 
a lot of these sort of notional areas.  If you can get demand there you can 
move some of these areas where there is no anticipated CIL collection from 
unviable to viable, so then actually you have got some land value and you get 
business rates” (CA:NG2 Interview) 
The other issue that influenced the practice round the setting of the rate was that of 
the delivery of infrastructure, or the rational nexus issue.  The CIL policy didn’t 
provide the same level of certainty to developers, as that promised by the certainty of 
a legal agreement under a s106 agreement, which the development industry 
considered as more secure. 
“there is money in my budget to deal with these various things and I Know 
because I have got a scheme within my legal agreement that I know can be 
delivered within highway land to a cost of lots of money, I know if I spend that 
and do that I get the ticket to build beyond it, if you were just paying a 
contribution to CIL what to is there to ensure that that scheme is delivered by 
the time its needed to mitigate the impact of my traffic on my development” 
(DV:D/NG5 Interview) 
“where in traffic terms its indicating you need that by then in order to mitigate 
the effect in accordance with European Legislation and in the mechanism to 
do it is not there, there is the whole question about whether you are carrying 
out development lawfully” (DV:D/NG5 Interview) 
The local authority also had the issue of guaranteeing delivery without the certainty of 
timely funding and this was also a slight concern to various actors. 
“There is a risk re growth and how fast we get the CIL income.” (LA:NG1 
Interview) 
“we are trying to plan it but my fear is that a combination of circumstances we 
may well underplay income from CIL because we cannot, it’s not exact 
science” (LA:NG8 Interview) 
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The mismatch between where collected and where spent and where it was needed 
was also an emerging issue, the hypothecation issue.  This was made more 
complicated by the community 25% share, and there was some evidence that whilst 
most community involvement had been to oppose new development as part of the 
Local Plan process.  Following adoption of the Core Strategy and having to 
reluctantly accept this new development, that these communities may well establish 
neighbourhood groups to secure CIL money, although to date this had not been the 
case. 
“(Has there been any move to set up neighbourhood plans as a result of 
that?) no I am surprised I really am surprised” (LA:NG7 Interview) 
“there is a lot of work involved in it and if you did a neighbourhood plan 
realistically now it’s purely to get the income because you cannot influence 
development anymore” (LA:NG7 Interview) 
The consultation and engagement process was somewhat fragmented as in summer 
2012 a CIL process was commenced, then a delay until 2013 when a consultation in 
relation to the viability assumptions was undertaken, which was related to the viability 
assumptions supporting the Local Plan preparation and trying to show deliverability 
rather than for a CIL rate proposal.  Then a further document issued in February 
2014 for the Local Plan preparation process and the Examination in Public for the 
Local Plan in September 2014.  The CIL process was restarted again in April 2015 
after the formal adoption of the Local Plan in March 2015 (Newcastle City Council 
and Gateshead MBC, 2015), with some urgency due to the risks of losing income.  
The strategic decision to separate the two processes as mentioned above taking 
precedence to manage capacity and risk. 
“basically the advice and we took counsels advice because of the shifting 
sands, I suppose this year of the guidance and the regulations, we well 
internally we didn’t feel confident enough in our ability to decipher the various 
legal language and then the regulations to make that call.  So we sought 
Counsels advice through chambers in London, about what our stance, what 
our position should be.  What our next steps should be and even that is 
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difficult, because between Newcastle and Gateshead we also had different 
interpretations of the situation” (LA:NG7 Interview) 
“so that was the debate for a while we got counsels opinion back and his 
recommendation was that we don’t do anything for a start until the inspectors 
report has been produced because one we wouldn’t want to risk mischief 
making shall we say again from objectors just to the plans saying hold on if 
you are consulting again on something that has an impact on the Plan or if we 
do more viability work and find our assumptions are slightly needing updated 
the does that actually undermine the assumptions that are in the Plan and 
about delivery and about growth so his very clear recommendation was do 
nothing until the inspectors finished writing” (LA:NG7 Interview) 
What is also apparent is the inclusion of increasing amount of commentary and 
explanation of how the consultation was undertaken and what account was to be 
taken of the comments, even if in reality this was actually not that significant.  The 
national policy guidance placed a greater responsibility to show engagement after 
2014 and this is reflected in the documentation. 
The importance of engagement with the Development industry in particular is 
increasingly emphasised in the guidance over time.  Consultation with local 
communities is something different, it is notably absent from much of the 
documentation, although Gateshead make specific reference in their Cabinet papers 
(Gateshead MBC, 2012; Gateshead MBC, 2015).  When the issue of community 
involvement was raised at a Newcastle cabinet meeting in May 2013 by a Council 
Member the formal response recorded in the minutes by the planning department 
was rather vague and somewhat defensive, (see quote below). 
Q1. CIL was introduced nationally in 2010 the government states" The Levy 
provides funding for infrastructure that the council, LOCAL COMMUNITY, 
neighbourhoods and delivery partners need to support development. The 
council has consulted on the CIL; how many members of the community took 
part. 
A. Last summer (20 June- 13 September) the Council undertook a ‘CIL 
Preliminary Draft Charging Schedule’ consultation which was run alongside 
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the ‘Major Changes to the Joint Core Strategy’ consultation to encourage 
engagement on what is a technical subject. Letters seeking views were sent to 
all types of consultees on the LDF database including 10,214 residents, 
seeking their views on the proposals. There were consultation fact sheets 
available to help answer questions and the technical documents were 
available for inspection at the civic centre and libraries. 
Q2. As we can see from the background papers the developer had a lot to say 
but poor if no representation from the public. How do officers mean to improve 
this given that they recommend a delay AND HAVE NOW TIME TO DO 
MORE MEANINGFUL CONSULTATION THE SORT CLLR BELL TALKED 
ABOUT NEEDING AT THE RECENT CALL IN OF THE JOINT CORE 
STRATEGY. 
A The next Draft Charging Schedule consultation event will take place in the 
autumn of 2013 will also include extensive consultation with all types of 
consultees on the LDF database including 21,000 residents. This is a 
technical consultation programme and we seek to engage with appropriate 
stakeholders. 
Q9. What evidence can Officers produce to show they have been consulting 
with neighbouring authorities when setting CIL value? Has this been done 
through the LEP? 
A. Newcastle has from the outset, worked with Gateshead Council to develop 
a shared methodology to rate setting for CIL and has discussed 
methodology with authorities in the wider region. Consultation with 
neighbouring authorities has occurred at officer level and through the Local 
Plan Duty to co-operate north of the Tyne. (Newcastle City Council, 2013) 
[Note: the letters in capitals are as shown in the original document] 
7.10 Conclusion 
The Newcastle/Gateshead case study presents an alternative to County Durham of 
the challenges of successfully implementing CIL policy in an area of difficult 
economic and property market conditions.  The nature of the geographies of the two 
areas are different and the joint working between Newcastle City Council and 
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Gateshead MBC also provides an extra element to consider.  Due to the delays to 
the CIL process the time period studied from May 2012 to April 2015 did not see the 
discursive struggle bought to a conclusion, but again even taking a snapshot of the 
policy implementation process reveals impacts on policy practices. 
The CIL policy making in this case study was influenced by the discursive struggle 
across three sites of argumentation involving various actors using both national and 
local storylines and tropes to influence the definition of the meaning of the policy.  
The CIL process studied was very much a start stop start process in this case study, 
it also reflected the cautious approach taken by Newcastle City Council to the CIL 
policy in spite of the need to continue the receipt of funding from developer 
contributions. 
Some of the main issues arising, were the deliberate separation of the Local Plan 
and CIL processes, the approach to using in house capacity with little use of external 
consultants, the differences in the main drivers to the process between Newcastle 
and Gateshead and to an extent their involvement in the viability assessment 
process.  The importance of continued s106 income and the much more significant 
new development proposed in Newcastle compared to Gateshead.  The importance 
of the inward investment as an issue (with groups such as G9 and Developing 
Consensus), as Newcastle as the regional capital has the main office market in the 
north east, and the involvement of professional bodies such as the RICS and the 
Planning Officers Society. 
The challenge to the skills and capacity of the local authorities has been less than in 
Durham but the process was still at a relatively early stage, the more cautious 
approach to the setting of rates may also be a factor in this respect.  Again, evidence 
and specialist knowledge emerge as important, with ownership and control of 
evidence a key point, even when national level guidance requires greater 
collaboration between actors about evidence. 
The setting of the rates reflected the constraints being placed on local authorities by 
the changes in national policy guidance, the tighter assessment of the striking the 
balance and the impact of the cumulative policy burden on the viability assessment 
and rate setting and with the need to set out much more detail on the justifications in 
the appraisal work.  The need to present policy impacts and options in a wider 
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regeneration context to provide confidence on the delivery of the Plan, involving the 
LEP and Combined Authority.  The influence of the viability assessment in framing 
the policy choices and priorities was also apparent and also in constraining the 
judgement and discretion available to local authority planners. 
What is clear that even in studying a snapshot of this process over a short period, 
has started to reveal the impact of national regulations and guidance as they 
interacted with local drivers of policy to influence policy practices.  In the next chapter 
a comparison between the two case studies is considered, alongside the actual 
policy impacts on practice as compared with those anticipated at a national policy 
level set our earlier. 
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Chapter 8 Calculating, Capturing, Spending… 
 
8.1 Introduction  
In this chapter the research questions are addressed utilising the findings from the 
two case studies and the anticipated impact on policy practices from the national 
policy perspective.  The process of CIL policy making as a specific subset of planning 
policy has been conceptualised as a series of arenas in which knowledge claims are 
tested drawing on (Rydin, 2007).  Three main arenas within the CIL process have 
been identified and these are considered in terms of the types of knowledge 
generated and tested in those arenas, the actors involved in the process and the 
influence on policy practices as studied over the period in question.  This has been 
analysed using the methodology set out in chapter 4; where a key part of the analysis 
is the construction of storylines, which involves the bringing together of different 
knowledge claims and knowledge types (experiential and codified), to influence 
policy practice.  Accordingly the analysis of storylines and tropes as identified in the 
arenas is also an analysis of knowledge generation and testing in those arenas as 
required by the research question below. 
How is knowledge generated and validated to support planning decisions in 
relation to the delivery of infrastructure as funded by value capture 
mechanisms? 
Three main planning decisions within the CIL process take place each within their 
own arena to produce three separate but related documents, they are the viability 
appraisal which attempts to calculate the value available to be captured, the setting 
of the rate for CIL which seeks to capture a share of the value for the funding of 
infrastructure; and the Infrastructure Delivery Plan which sets out the infrastructure to 
be funded, three arenas of Calculating, Capturing and Spending. 
These three planning decision arenas are now considered in turn, setting out the 
effects of the discursive mechanisms on policy practices and comparing the national 
policy perspective with the case study findings.  This is convenient to facilitate 
analysis but it should be noted that they overlap and interrelate to each other in 
practice. 
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8.2 The CIL Decision Making arenas 
8.2.1 The Viability Assessment (Calculating) 
The viability assessment is the planning decision which seeks to calculate the value 
that is available to be captured.  As part of this process an assumption about the 
level of profit required by a developer is required, as is the price of land required by a 
landowner in order to sell (the threshold land value calculation).  Whilst these are part 
of the work and decision making in the viability assessment, they implicitly influence 
the second planning decision of the sharing out of the value, and the decision of how 
much value to capture for the funding of infrastructure. 
The knowledge in this arena is generated from: a mixture of codified and experiential 
knowledge of land and property markets and values; the costs of development; the 
specialist knowledge of appraisal software and methodologies and codified guidance 
in this area; and, experiential knowledge as dispersed across a range of actors 
involved in the policy making process. 
Within this arena the most influential storylines and tropes from the cases are 
compared to national policy aims. Table 8.1 shows the main storylines and tropes 
identified in the two case studies with the national policy storylines and tropes shown 
as underlined.  Storylines simplify complex debates with reductive narratives that 
seek to legitimise a certain position and also often disguise contradictions and 
misunderstandings (Hajer, 2006).  Storylines have a beginning, middle and an end, 
they are employed by various actors to convey meaning within the policy making 
process.  Tropes similarly influence meanings and understandings, as figures of 
speech they act as rhetorical devices beyond their literal meaning and often play an 
emblematic role in changing policy understandings and in turn impact on practices 
(Fischer and Forester, 1996). 
What is apparent is that national policy storylines and tropes were very influential at a 
local level, as they interacted with locally generated storylines or tropes, some 
supporting the national policy practice and others not.  The overarching discourse at 
a national level was the dominance of the “supporting growth” discourse which 
shifted the policy in this area from a capture of land value uplift for community 
benefit; towards an area wide viability assessment to fund infrastructure provision to 
support growth; reflecting a reconceptualization of value capture.  The calculation of 
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the value has been a long standing challenge to policy in this area in a range of 
different value capture mechanisms and this is also apparent in this arena of the CIL 
policy. 
Viability Assessment Arena Storylines Tropes 
Durham Case Study Artificial Process 
Incentivising Landowners 
Robust Viability Assessment 
Encouraging Developers 
 
Playing Games 
 
Granular Property Market 
 
Appropriate Available Evidence 
 
 
Newcastle/Gateshead Case 
Study 
Incentivising Landowners 
Robust Viability Assessment 
Encouraging Developers 
Appropriate Available Evidence 
 
 
Table 8.1 Storylines and Tropes from Viability Assessment arena in case studies 
The national storyline of “incentivising landowners” was about ensuring a supply of 
land for new development and growth, it is also about ensuring land value for 
landowners is protected within the appraisal process, within the assessment of the 
threshold land value.  The TLV requires an assessment to be made of the uplift 
above current use value required by a landowner in order to persuade him to sell the 
land for development.  The practice of assessing the TLV was acknowledged in both 
case studies as challenging and problematic, due to a lack of evidence, limited 
engagement with landowners and poor understanding of the landowner’s business 
models and motivations for selling land.  The conflicting guidance in this area 
between the Harman (Local Housing Delivery Group, 2012) and RICS (RICS, 2012) 
as mentioned earlier in Chapter 2 was also unhelpful in this respect. 
In Durham, the TLV was a major area of disagreement between the LPA and volume 
house builders over the assessed TLV level and the potential impact on the supply of 
housing land.  In Newcastle/Gateshead the TLV assessment was a much less 
contested issue reflecting the cautious approach taken by Newcastle to the appraisal 
process. 
In a similar way the national storyline of “encouraging developers” was influential in 
the preparation of the viability appraisals in the CIL process.  Specifically the main 
influence on local policy practice was the fixing of the profit level at 20% of Gross 
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Development Value within appraisals.  This was partly as a result of examiners 
reports on CIL establishing this precedent alongside other national guidance.  This 
was adopted as the norm in both case studies after being initially contested within 
Durham by the local authority planners. 
The national trope “appropriate available evidence” was also influential in both case 
studies.  This was set out in national policy guidance (DCLG, 2014a) and reflected 
the change in policy making emphasis at a national level placing greater importance 
on evidence to support the viability assessment process.  The meaning of 
“appropriate” can be interpreted by different actors in different ways, with the quality 
of evidence used by local authorities a major area of criticism by developers and 
agents.  The meaning of “available” introduces the issue of control and ownership of 
evidence which also became apparent in both case studies and finally the meaning 
of “evidence” became more and more important over the period as required by 
national policy guidance but was interpreted differently by different actors as a 
specialised knowledge source. 
The importance of evidence was apparent in the Durham case study in the panel 
process with the HBF and the discussions about evidence between the parties.  In 
Newcastle/Gateshead evidence was also a concern, firstly the quality of evidence 
used by the Council was contested by the private sector, secondly when the Council 
requested access to private sector evidence issues were raised about ownership and 
its confidentiality and finally across both cases the interpretation of evidence was 
also contested. 
The increased emphasis on evidence and collaboration revealed the asymmetry of 
the parties, with the private sector having access to and ownership of more evidence 
than the local authority.  It also supported the national policy guidance for increased 
engagement and collaboration with developers in the CIL process with part of that 
being to agree evidence.  In Durham as discussed earlier this collaboration broke 
down into disagreement after a significant period of engagement.  In 
Newcastle/Gateshead the evidence position remained unresolved in the period of 
study, but was somewhat reduced in its effect on practice by the cautious nature of 
the proposals.  This suggests a reduced flexibility and discretion available to local 
authorities in both this arena and the setting the rate arena considered next.  The 
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Newcastle/Gateshead proposed a low CIL rate as they had limited evidence 
available to support their proposals and the need to have good evidence was 
required by national policy.  
Having considered the national storylines and tropes, it is worthwhile considering the 
impact of the locally generated storylines and tropes.  In both case studies the local 
authorities presented a storyline of a “robust viability assessment”.  As perhaps could 
be expected these storylines were of limited effect within the arenas, as the viability 
assessments were strongly contested by other actors in the process especially in 
Durham. 
In the Durham case study the local authority and their consultant generated the trope 
of “granular property market” which was reflective of the unusual and difficult 
challenge of establishing market and value boundaries across County Durham with 
big variations in residential values within localised geographic areas.  As the CIL 
guidance states that values must drive the viability assessment this was particularly 
challenging hence the emergence of this trope.  It reveals the complex nature of the 
viability assessment exercise, the need for judgement and specialist knowledge and 
expertise which will be considered further later in this chapter. 
Finally, the locally generated storyline “artificial process” supported by the local trope 
of “playing games” together reflect the disillusionment of the local authority in 
Durham with the viability assessment process over time and the view that the 
discussions with the private sector were problematic.  The “artificial process” storyline 
reflects that the collaboration with the panel involved regular rerunning of the 
appraisal model with different assumptions and evidence, which over time produced 
results that showed the whole county as unviable for housing development.  This was 
not borne out by the reality on the ground where house building was taking place, the 
nature of the area wide assessment also required hypothetical residual valuations 
and appraisals to be produced not based on specific site based information as in a 
s106 appraisal.  It also was the source of the trope “playing games” reflecting the 
Council’s view that the private sector were using the appraisal modelling process to 
influence the policy making process and that it was a negotiation or even a game. 
What these last two discursive mechanisms reveal is that the viability assessment is 
a complex process involving specialist knowledge, which excludes some actors from 
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the process and introduces power relations into the policy practices within this arena.  
Examples of which are the control of evidence emphasising the asymmetry of 
knowledge sources between actors and the use of specialist knowledge to influence 
the policy making process and potentially forcing matters into formal arenas for 
determination.  Whilst the national policy guidance presents the viability assessment 
as a techno-rational process, these storylines and tropes reveal the much more 
socially constructed nature of the viability assessment process at a local level which 
will be considered further later in this chapter. 
8.2.2. The Setting of the Rates (Capturing) 
If the viability assessment sets out the value that is available to be shared between 
the parties involved in the development process, the setting of the rate starts to look 
at the sharing out of this development value between the various parties.  As 
mentioned above the assessment of the threshold land value presents the share to 
the landowner, the assumption about the level of profit in the viability assessment 
also seeks to set out how much the developer gets as a return for the risk taken in 
undertaking the development.  In the viability assessment the headroom or value 
available for sharing is established, the setting of the rate seeks to set out what share 
the public sector takes as value capture to fund infrastructure provision. 
Setting the Rate Arena Storylines Tropes 
Durham Case Study Reasonable CIL proposals 
Unrealistic proposals 
 
Business not as usual 
 
Reduced ambition 
 
Cumulative Policy Burden 
 
Striking the Balance 
 
Newcastle/Gateshead Case 
Study 
CIL at a cautious level 
Margin of Viability 
 
Business as usual 
 
Demonstrating Deliverability 
 
Securing Income 
 
Reluctant Acceptance 
 
Cumulative Policy Burden 
 
Striking the Balance 
 
Table 8.2 Storylines and Tropes from the setting the rate arena in case studies 
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The types of knowledge claims involved in this arena are less specialist and technical 
than in the last arena, table 8.2 shows the main storylines and tropes.  The testing of 
the knowledge claims in this arena were often linked back to the technical issues 
within the viability assessment arena, as the national storylines and tropes influential 
in this arena placed an increasing importance on viability in framing the setting of the 
CIL rate. 
The preparation of the charging schedules and the setting of the CIL rate is 
essentially a political decision by a LPA and is influenced by local factors, but also 
framed by national policy guidance.  Much of the knowledge is generated in the other 
arenas, the viability assessment arena providing the headroom value available to be 
captured and the spending funding arena providing the infrastructure needed to be 
funded.  These are combined with the experiential knowledge of previous policy 
delivery and the policy requirements of the area, and with the codified knowledge of 
the national guidance in relation to setting the CIL rates.  National policy placed 
increased emphasis on collaboration with other actors especially developers this is 
reflected in the changes in the local storylines promoted by the local authorities over 
the period. 
The two most important national policy influences on the policy practices in the case 
studies were the tropes of “striking the balance” and “cumulative policy burden”, 
these are both derived from the national policy guidance and were employed in the 
CIL policy making process by various actors. 
The “striking the balance” trope relates to balancing the need to capture funding with 
setting a levy rate at such a level that it may stop development.  As mentioned 
earlier, the test for assessing this balance has been more restricted over the period 
of CIL guidance with reduced flexibility and judgement available to local authorities in 
setting the rate.  The main contrast between the two case studies was the ambition in 
setting the rates, which in Newcastle/Gateshead was from the early stages cautious 
and set out as a continuation of the existing developer contribution requirements.  It 
was designed to not reduce development activity, this ties in with the local storylines 
of “business as usual” and “CIL at a cautious level” as discussed below.  Newcastle 
City Council also employed the national policy storyline of “margin of viability” 
complementing the “striking the balance” trope to support its cautious approach, the 
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“margin of viability” storyline requiring that CIL rates not be set at the margin but to 
include a buffer in the value.  In the Durham case study the “striking the balance” 
trope was supported by the local authority storyline of “reasonable CIL proposals”, 
but the ambitious rates proposed by Durham were challenged by the local developer 
storyline of “unrealistic proposals”. 
The “cumulative policy burden” trope was also from the national policy guidance and 
was employed by the private sector actors in the policy making process.  The 
meaning of “cumulative policy” meant that the impact of the CIL rates needed to be 
considered in their impact on viability, but not just alongside other developer 
contributions such as s106 requirements but also all other policy requirements that 
could impact on viability of new development, such as design and sustainability 
requirements.  The sustainability requirements were a particular concern to some 
private developers, which in their view, was a cost of development with no impact on 
higher values and so had a negative impact on viability.  The meaning of “burden” 
also conveys the view that policy requirements were a burden for new development 
to bear, having a negative effect on delivery of new development. 
The important differences between the two case studies was the way that CIL as a 
new policy was promoted.  Whilst in both cases it was still influenced by the 
“supporting growth” discourse with both having growth oriented Local Plans under 
preparation at the same time as CIL, the presentation of the CIL differed.  In Durham 
the new ambitious growth oriented Local Plan was presented to national Government 
and to private sector actors in the storyline as “business not as usual”.  This was the 
change in approach from a County Council previously promoting itself as an area of 
industrial decline to one of promoting growth. This partly resulted from the creation of 
a new unitary authority from 2009 and a reappraisal of its strategic direction.  In 
terms of CIL this manifested itself in a very ambitious CIL rate proposal and following 
a very strong challenge to the proposals by the private sector a revised storyline 
emerged of “reduced ambition”.  Linked to this change in storylines were the 
conflicting storylines of “reasonable CIL proposals” promoted by the County Council 
and the opposing private sector view that the CIL proposals were “unrealistic 
proposals”.  These reflect the break down in the relationship during the CIL process 
which was not the case in the other case study. 
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In Newcastle/Gateshead the “supporting growth” discourse also inspired a growth 
based Local Plan and the need to introduce the CIL as a policy to fund the 
infrastructure needed to support the new development.  In this case however the 
presentation mainly to the private sector was a storyline of “business as usual”, 
derived from the need to reassure the private sector that the history of s106 and the 
collection of developer contributions would continue but via a different mechanism.  
This complemented the “CIL at a cautious level” storyline which was also promoted 
by the Council who were keen to see this policy as not stopping development. 
The “demonstrating deliverability” storyline represented the strategic decision by the 
two local authorities to stop the CIL process and give precedence to the Local Plan 
process.  It was considered that the need to employ viability evidence to support the 
deliverability of the Local Plan was more important than to support a CIL proposal, 
hence the renaming of and change of emphasis in the viability reports.  It also 
revealed a concern that there was a contradiction between demonstrating 
deliverability of a Local Plan including provision of development and infrastructure 
whilst also having to show a funding gap to justify CIL.  Once the Local Plan process 
was completed the storyline switches to “securing income” as the need to continue 
the developer contributions income stream is vital for the council and hence the 
urgency to restart the CIL process in early 2015. 
The Newcastle/Gateshead policy making was dominated by Newcastle City Council 
mainly driven by its greater number of new development sites, but also by its history 
of collection of s106 contributions which had been much lower in Gateshead.  The 
joint Core Strategy (Local Plan) by the two local authorities also required a joint CIL, 
Gateshead Council if producing its own Local Plan may not have proposed a CIL and 
hence the “reluctant acceptance” storyline, which whilst it was not particularly openly 
articulated was reflected in the policy making process. 
What the discursive struggle between the very influential national policy topes and 
the locally generated storylines revealed is that in both cases a cautious CIL rate was 
proposed, even if via differing routes.  This reflects the overriding importance placed 
on delivery over the collection of funding, and the influence of viability on setting the 
rates.  This led on to the framing of policy decisions being made within the ceiling of 
viability, this reinforces the performative effect of the viability assessment on this 
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arena.  Whilst essentially a political decision, national policy guidance has 
increasingly presented the setting of the rates as a techno rational decision based on 
viability evidence, but again as can be seen it is socially constructed.  By interpreting 
knowledge from other arenas, together with policy and political priorities, local 
authorities have to consider matters both strategically and tactically as will be 
considered further later in this chapter. 
8.2.3 The Infrastructure Delivery Plan [what is the funding to be spent on] 
(Spending) 
This leads on to the other big planning decision that is required, what is the funding 
to be spent on.  Occurring in the arena dealing with the preparation of the IDP, the 
infrastructure needed to support the new development sites as determined by the 
Local Plan, reflecting the national trope of the “plan led approach”.  The knowledge 
claims in this arena relate to the policy strategy of the local authority going forward, 
this implicitly includes place competition with other areas, the decisions about growth 
and where it is located and the infrastructure needed to facilitate that.  The main 
storylines and tropes identified in the case studies are shown in table 8.3 with the 
national storylines and tropes shown as underlined. 
Spending the Funding Arena Storylines Tropes 
Durham Case Study Why the CIL is needed 
Facilitating Local Authorities 
CIL policy not being applicable 
to the north east 
 
Why is CIL needed 
 
Plan led approach 
 
double counting of developer 
contributions 
Newcastle/Gateshead Case 
Study 
Why the CIL is needed 
Facilitating Local Authorities 
CIL policy not being applicable 
to the north east 
 
Why is CIL needed 
 
Plan led approach 
 
double counting of developer 
contributions 
 
 
Table 8.3 Storylines and Tropes from the Spending the funding arena in case studies 
The testing of the knowledge claims here was less significant than the other arenas 
although the principle of what the funding is to be spent on was used by the LPAs as 
a justification for the CIL policy introduction.  The local authorities employed the 
national discourse of “supporting growth” and the national storyline “facilitating local 
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authorities” to justify the introduction of the CIL policy (as it is not mandatory for a CIL 
to be introduced).  These were supported by the locally generated storylines of “why 
the CIL is needed” which was in Newcastle primarily to continue funding income from 
s106.  Other actors employed challenging storylines such as “not being applicable to 
the north east” and questioning “why is CIL needed”, both locally generated but with 
limited success. 
At both a national and local level the trope of “double counting of developer 
contributions” of funding and spend was raised, at a national level this led to the 
introduction of the 123 list, which sets out what specific infrastructure CIL will fund.  
At a local level this trope illustrated the distrust developers had in local authorities in 
administering the policy and whether as developers they would contribute twice to 
the same infrastructure.  The discursive struggle around the preparation of the IDP in 
this arena, was however limited, partly because the value captured by the CIL 
mechanism doesn’t have to pay for all of the infrastructure identified in the IDP and in 
many cases, including the two case studies, could only make a small contribution. 
In the Newcastle/Gateshead documentation a key justification for the CIL was to 
ensure the timely delivery of required infrastructure to support development and 
delivery of the Core strategy.  This reflects the “rational nexus” issue of ensuring 
timely delivery and the importance of a better link between collecting funding income 
and when and how it is spent.  There are however problems as the timing, as the 
income is uncertain and market determined, it in any event is only making a small 
contribution to the total, the planning of infrastructure provision is therefore difficult 
going forward. 
In Durham the IDP was very much driven by ambitions of Growth and Economic 
performance, Durham as a new Unitary Authority, was keen to change the image and 
perspective of the County, from an area of decline and need, to one of growth and 
opportunities.  Latterly this has somewhat been questioned by the problems 
encountered by the response of the Planning Inspectorate questioning the realism of 
those growth ambitions.  Yet the main actors involved were supportive of these 
proposals. 
Several issues are highlighted from the discursive struggle within this arena, firstly, 
the lack of flexibility the local authorities had on how the funding collected could be 
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spent, quite restricted due to the “plan-led approach” trope included in national policy.  
The spending could only be used to fund infrastructure to support growth and new 
development, as set out in the IDP and Local Plan.  The 123 list constrained matters 
even further with a specific list of CIL funded infrastructure items having to be 
identified, reflecting the lack of trust the private sector had in the LPAs in this respect, 
this was “facilitating local authorities” but in a restricted way. 
The separation of collection and spending of the income also became apparent.  
Three issues emerged, firstly the rational nexus issue and the certainty of timely 
delivery of the infrastructure by the Council in return for the payment by the private 
sector.  Secondly, the uncertainty of the timing and amount of income to the Council 
with which to provide this funding of infrastructure being to a certain extent 
dependent on the market.  Lastly, the hypothecation issue of the mismatch spatially 
of income collection and the areas of policy priority and spending need. 
Similar to the other arenas the LPA has to consider the strategic policy requirements 
of its area within the frame of a growth based policy.  The justification of the CIL 
policy is to support growth and requires a growth oriented Local Plan and IDP, 
however spatially and temporally the matching of new development with 
infrastructure provision is challenging both strategically and tactically, which will be 
considered further later in this chapter. 
8.2.4 Summary of Research Question 1 
The construction of storylines involved the combining of different knowledge claims 
and employing them within arenas to influence policy making practices.  Within the 
CIL policy making process three arenas have been identified each reflecting a key 
area of planning decision making.  Whilst there is some overlap between these 
arenas, they assist analysis of the discursive struggle between and generating 
storylines and tropes.  This discursive struggle illustrates a testing of knowledge 
claims contained within the storylines and their impact on policy practices it also 
shows the operation of power within the arenas.  The discursive struggle within the 
arenas within the two case studies have been compared and considered against the 
anticipated impact on practices envisaged by national policy guidance. 
The main points that emerged were that firstly, within the viability assessment arena 
that the discretion and flexibility available to local authority planners is constrained by 
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the guidance.  The increased importance placed on evidence to support viability 
assessment, the challenging nature of the assessment of the threshold land value 
and the encapsulating of profit levels within appraisals are all performative in nature 
(Christophers, 2014) and restrict the judgment and flexibility available to local 
authority planners in preparing viability assessments.  The control, ownership and 
interpretation of the evidence are reflected in the asymmetry of knowledge between 
the actors, enhanced by national policy requirements for local authorities to 
collaborate with developers in relation to this evidence and knowledge.  The 
complexity of the viability assessment process requires specialist knowledge even to 
interpret the figures, termed as “black boxing” (McAllister et al., 2015).  This excludes 
some actors from the process and introduces the issue of skills and the need for and 
role of specialist consultants and advisors in this difficult policy making area.  The 
viability assessment process is also presented as a technical-rational decision 
making process, providing objectivity and precision, termed by (McAllister et al., 
2015) as a “calculative practice” when in practice this is revealed to be socially 
constructed and influenced by the power relations between the parties involved. 
In the setting of the rates arena the importance of viability is established by national 
policy as the main determinant on the policy making, supporting the view of 
McAllister et al. (2015) that the viability assessment process helps make this complex 
process more governable.  This however also restricts the discretion and judgement 
available to the local authority planners in setting the rate, reflecting a trend of 
diminishing “judgement space” (Vigar, 2012) or “discretionary space” (Gunn and 
Vigar, 2012).  The need to demonstrate a balance between collecting funding and not 
stopping development, assumes that a balance can be realistically determined within 
a dynamic market based on evidence.  The effect on policy practices are of 
separating viability from policy objectives and of using viability as a frame within 
which policy choices have to be made by local authorities, this reflects the trend 
towards more market oriented planning as in other value capture mechanisms 
(Campbell and Henneberry, 2005).  The local authority has to consider its political 
and policy priorities strategically as well as the tactical issues of the policy 
implementation and proposed rates. 
Finally, in “what is the funding to be spent on” arena the main points are again the 
discretion and flexibility available to local authority planners in making decisions, the 
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collected funding is restricted to be spent on funding of infrastructure to support 
growth as set out in the Local Plan (Rydin, 2013).  This is further restricted to the 
need to identify the specific items to be funded by CIL from within the IDP, which 
reflects a lack of trust by the private sector in the local authority in this matter (Adams 
and Tiesdell, 2013).  The planning of and certainty of infrastructure provision into the 
future are problematic for local authorities as well, as they are tied to market forces 
and timing of future development, this also causes uncertainty to developers.  Finally, 
the mismatch between the collection of funding and the spending of funding again 
emerges as an issue as with other value capture mechanisms (Oxley, 2004a). 
National Policy guidance is very influential at a local level, whilst there are locally 
generated drivers which influence the policy making process these are often more  
tactical exercises by the local authorities to achieve local goals within the constraints 
of the national policy guidance as will be discussed more fully later. 
8.3 Wider Governance Arrangements 
Having considered the process of generating and testing knowledge within the CIL 
policy making process by analysing the discursive struggle between storylines and 
tropes and their impact on planning practices, the wider governance arrangements 
are now considered, founded on how the practices within these arenas have 
influenced the roles of various actors involved in the process.  The second research 
question (shown below) suggests that policy making could be improved by a better 
understanding of these roles and this is now considered by reviewing the operation of 
the three arenas and roles of the various actors within them. 
Can policy making be improved by planners having a greater knowledge of the 
decision making of developers and the operation of land and property 
markets? 
8.3.1 Viability Assessment Arena (Calculating) 
In the earlier analysis of this arena, several key policy practices were identified as 
influenced by the discursive struggle; the calculation of the TLV, the area wide 
appraisal, the establishment of boundaries of values, the use of evidence in the 
appraisal process and the collaboration and engagement process, these are now 
considered in relation to their impact on the roles behaviours of various actors. 
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The calculation of the TLV, is a challenging element of the viability assessment 
process the amount of uplift over current use value that is required to provide an 
incentive to the landowner to release land for new development.  A greater 
understanding of the motivations of landowners in selling land, which can vary 
significantly as landowners are not a homogeneous group, would be very beneficial 
to policy making but this is challenging. 
The decision making of landowners is often not transparent nor the nature of 
transactions between developers and landowners.  The actions of landowners are 
influenced by intermediaries such as consultants, agents and developers, in the case 
studies landowners had very little direct involvement in this or indeed any of the 
arenas.  Developers however were proactive in protecting a level of land value in the 
TLV calculation, to ensure a supply of development land was likely to come forward 
to maintain development activity, this was particularly the case in Durham.  This is in 
contrast with the policy objective of seeking to reduce land values over time and the 
former conceptualisation of value capture as capturing undeserved land value uplift.  
Other factors influencing landowner’s decision making are assumptions about future 
values and future policy with often a decision to delay selling land due to unrealistic 
expectations.  Policy making could also be improved by a better understanding of the 
structure of the land ownerships across local areas and of the operation of the land 
market this is also challenging for similar reasons of lack of transparency. 
The area wide appraisal involves carrying out a series of hypothetical appraisals and 
as such is an artificial exercise, it is not even based on specific site based 
assumptions as with of s106 negotiations.  This averaging issue is also problematic, 
the fixing of boundaries for values across an area can be particularly difficult as in 
Durham.  The viability assessment is also problematic in temporal terms, as viability 
appraisals are forward looking, having to forecast future values, costs, market and 
policy conditions some way into the future, they of course never turn out as forecast.  
These judgements were based on high levels of specialist experiential knowledge, 
excluded actors without the specialist knowledge.  Although things are improving 
local authority planners are struggling in this area with skills and confidence, in the 
face of other actors with specialist knowledge.  The role of consultants emerges as 
key to support local authority planners with specialist knowledge, especially in 
relation to appraisal software and methodologies and also national policy guidance.  
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Policy making could be improved by local authority planners having a better 
understanding of the appraisal process, but consultants and agents control this 
specialist knowledge and many local authority planners due to lack of confidence are 
willing to leave much of this work to specialist consultants, the degree of involvement 
of consultants depends upon the amount of control the local authority wishes to have, 
including the running of the appraisal software.  The assumptions included in the 
appraisals are also highly contested but with key assumptions such as developers 
profit being embedded as fixed.  This is in spite of the fact that developers are not a 
homogenous group and are very varied, having an improved understanding of 
developers decision making would be helpful to the policy making process.  Which 
leads on to the relationship between local authority planners and developers which is 
part of this increased understanding, yet is currently an area of much 
misunderstanding and little trust. 
National Policy places a greater requirement for the local authority to collaborate with 
private developers on evidence and assumptions which places more power to the 
developers in the policy making process.  The requirement nationally to require more 
evidence to support the viability assessment process also places more power with 
private developers, where there is already a significant asymmetry in terms of 
specialist knowledge and evidence.  Developers and consultants have control of the 
evidence in some cases, they also have greater specialist knowledge to interpret this 
evidence determining what counts and doesn’t count as appropriate evidence in 
certain situations. 
One of the main issues that emerged was the view that whilst this viability 
assessment process is presented as a rational-technical exercise of assessment, in 
practice this is not the case.  The increasing importance placed on collaboration with 
developers and on the evidence base to support the assessment as required by 
national policy, in practice increases the asymmetry of knowledge and evidence 
between different actors.  It is also illustrative of the power relations that underlie the 
process and the socially constructed nature of the process.  Policy making assumes 
that actors make rational and fully informed decisions, but the lack of information 
transparency and the institutional influences on the decision making in the local 
context from the case studies show that rational price based decision making is too 
simplistic an assumption to make. 
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8.3.2 Setting the Rate Arena (Capturing) 
The key policy practices identified as influenced by the discursive struggle in this 
arena were; the setting of the rate reflecting viability to not stop development across 
the area, the consideration of policy priorities against viability and the strategic 
approach of the local authority combined to its tactical approach of getting the policy 
approved.  The relationship of the local authority with national government, 
developers, and landowners and with other neighbouring local authorities were also 
important factors in this arena. 
This arena was also a strongly contested element of CIL policy making and due to 
national guidance placing viability at the heart of the CIL policy making process is 
very much linked to the early arena about the assessment of viability.  However, this 
arena takes the viability assessment input and seeks to decide how much of the 
available headroom can be captured for the funding of infrastructure.  The national 
guidance in this area of decision making has reduced the discretion available to local 
authorities from some limited discretion to little or no discretion in setting a CIL rate. 
The need to strike a balance between collecting funding and stopping development is 
a challenging judgement to make and suggests that a balance point or equilibrium 
point can be assessed. This reflects the implicit assumption of a rational technical 
decision making, but which in practice is a political decision reflecting the institutional 
context of the local area.  The local authority’s strategic position on what level of CIL 
to introduce, and the balance with the other developer contribution mechanism s106.  
There has been much confusion about the relationship between s106 and CIL and 
this was still apparent in the case study areas. 
The relationships with developers and to a lesser extent with landowners is 
important, to understand the decision making of these actors and the operation of the 
land and property markets, this all influences the decision on the CIL rates.  
Newcastle took a more cautious approach compared to Durham and perhaps from a 
tactical point of view were more successful in managing the approval of the policy 
through the process. 
The expectations of Council members over the income, the retention of funding 
income in Newcastle’s case and the issue of competition with other areas in 
attracting development and investment were also relevant within the CIL rate setting 
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process.  The relationship with other neighbouring or competing local authority areas 
was also a factor, in competing for new development the CIL had a risk in making the 
area less attractive.  In Newcastle the private sector were also concerned about the 
potential impact on inward investment to the City. 
Another important practice was to place a ceiling on the cumulative policy 
requirements that could be afforded across the local authority area, this could mean 
that policy choices and priorities had to be decided within that ceiling, forcing local 
authorities to choose may be between affordable housing provision, sustainability 
standards such the code for sustainable homes and the provision of strategic 
infrastructure as funded by the CIL.  This viability ceiling or headroom which was 
indicative at the stage of setting of the CIL rate to show deliverability, as the CIL is an 
up-front flat rate levy, could be considered again in the planning process on specific 
projects as they proceeded to the planning application stage, with may be a 
renegotiation of the s106 requirements due to the impact on viability.  Again due to 
the importance of viability an understanding of land and property markets and of the 
decision making of developers are important to improve policy making in this arena. 
8.3.3 What is the funding spent on Arena (Spending) 
The main practices that emerged from the discursive struggle in this arena related to 
the identification of infrastructure needed to deliver the new development in the Local 
Plan (IDP) and those items within that to be funded by CIL (123 list).  These 
restricted the freedom of the local authority on how to spend the income from CIL to 
growth oriented expenditure.  This arena also promoted the principle of CIL as a 
policy, as it is not a mandatory requirement to introduce the policy. 
This arena was less contested than the other two but nevertheless some issues 
emerged regarding the role of the various actors and the operation of the arena.  The 
CIL was always a growth policy and linked to growth oriented Local Plans, the 
Infrastructure Delivery Plan setting out the infrastructure needed to support the Local 
Plan new development restricts what CIL funding can be spent on, hence the funding 
collected has to be spent on growth supporting infrastructure.  This was further 
restricted by the introduction of the 123 list to set out the specific items of expenditure 
to be funded by the projected CIL income.  This further restricted the discretion and 
flexibility of local authorities on the spending but perhaps more interestingly revealed 
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at both a national level and it was also raised in the case studies, the lack of trust that 
the private sector had in the local authority in its spending of the income and that 
they may be charged for something twice over. 
This lack of trust was also reflected in the private sectors view over the certainty of 
the delivery in a timely manner of the infrastructure to be funded from CIL, this is 
termed the “rational nexus” issue (Crook, 2016b).  Due to the fact that CIL is only to 
provide a small proportion of the overall funding costs the sourcing of the other 
funding and its timing are a reasonable issue to raise.  This also suggests that a 
better understanding of the decision making of developers and their need for more 
certainty to reduce risk would be helpful in policy making in this area. 
But of course this works the other way, the local authorities have a challenge to 
deliver the infrastructure provision with an uncertainty of not only the timing of the CIL 
income but also of the other sources of match funding.  This contradiction was also 
apparent in the way that Newcastle/Gateshead consciously separated the Local Plan 
viability testing from the CIL viability assessment process due to their perceived 
contradiction between showing deliverability for the Local Plan but at the same time 
showing a funding gap to show a need for CIL funding. 
The other issue that should be mentioned although it was fairly limited in effect over 
the period of the research was the “hypothecation” issue (the mismatch between the 
areas of collection and spending of funding), this was only apparent in early stages in 
a few communities, but was envisaged by planners at Durham County Council that it 
could emerge as a problem, as the places where the funding is collected are not 
necessarily where the funding is then spent.  The move by some neighbourhoods to 
capture some funding is motivated by the fact that some communities want control of 
funding raised from their areas to spend on their priorities, this of course doesn’t 
always align with the local authority priorities or areas of greatest need. 
The promotion of the CIL as an appropriate policy for the area, usually to support 
growth, but in Durham the CIL policy was seen as an important demonstration to 
national government of a change in strategic direction by the County Council, in 
Newcastle it was about continuation of income.  The initial simplicity and certainty of 
the CIL policy as benefits over the s106 mechanism have been weakened over time 
263 
 
with more and more complexity and many changes to the policy, in addition the s106 
mechanism has been retained also undermining the original objective. 
Finally, the sources of and mechanisms for funding infrastructure provision were 
raised, the national policy shift to secure more funding from the private sector to 
reduce the traditional burden on the public sector.  The assumption that this will not 
impact on the delivery of new development is contradictory, as the capture of value 
must impact on either land value, developers profit or be reflected in higher property 
prices to end users.  The debate on how that is shared out is the discussion of the 
other two arenas, but the discussion about whether a local levy, as opposed to a 
national tax or indeed existing taxation as sources of funding, were raised in 
discussion with various actors and are more relevant to this arena, as some actors 
believed that in areas with challenging property markets introducing CIL as a policy 
was not realistic and that even using s106 was challenging.  In this arena the 
importance of infrastructure provision and its certainty on the development industry 
and its decision making would be helpful in policy making.  The clarity about the 
value capture mechanisms and their certainty and predictability also is an important 
part of understanding, but the development industry perhaps also need to understand 
the uncertainty this value capture mechanism presents to the local authorities in their 
funding and planning of infrastructure provision. 
8.3.4 Summary of Research Question 2  
Having identified the policy practices in the three main arenas, in addressing the 
second research question, the roles and behaviours of the various actors were 
considered with a view to establishing how policy making could be improved by 
planners having a better knowledge of the operation of land and property markets 
and of the decision making of other actors. 
In the viability assessment arena, policy making would benefit from better knowledge 
of the role of landowners in bringing forward land for development, their motivations 
and decision making, something which has had relatively little research since 
Goodchild and Munton (1985).  Planners also could benefit from a greater knowledge 
of the structure of land ownership in their area and as far as possible of the operation 
of the land market, but this is a challenging proposition with transactions often very 
confidential and ownership not always obvious (Adams et al., 2012a).  Greater 
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knowledge of appraisals methodologies and software would also be helpful, the 
complexity and opaqueness of this area of specialist knowledge is also a challenge 
to local authority planners and hence the reliance on specialist consultants 
(McAllister et al., 2015).  This is linked to the issue of relationships with developers, 
which is vital to being able to understand their decision making and behaviour, but is 
challenging to local authority planners (Adams et al., 2012a; Adams and Tiesdell, 
2013).  The viability assessment whilst presented as technical and rational, in fact is 
socially constructed (McAllister et al., 2015) and dependent on relationships between 
key actors (Henneberry and Parris, 2013). 
The importance of viability transfers into the setting the rate arena as set out earlier, 
this also requires local authority planners to have a better understanding of property 
markets and the influence of planning policies such as CIL on developers decision 
making (Adams et al., 2008).  Property development as a process is relational (Guy 
and Henneberry, 2000) and based on reputation and trust (Adams and Tiesdell, 
2013).  Planners are market actors (Adams and Tiesdell, 2010) and need to 
understand other actors in the planning process (Hillier, 2000).  This requires 
planners to acquire and develop market skills, market information and market 
networks (Adams and Tiesdell, 2010)  The need to balance viability and policy 
objectives is a major challenge to the role and identity of planners with another 
example of the commercialisation of planning practice in value capture (Campbell 
and Henneberry, 2005).  It also requires a general consideration of best practice 
networks to support local authority performance as in planning obligations (Dunning 
et al., 2016). 
In the spending arena the need for greater knowledge of land and property markets 
and the decision making of other actors is less specifically relevant to that arena, but 
the same issues of knowledge of markets, viability and actor decision making 
emerge.  In this arena it is more about reducing uncertainty for developers around 
the introduction of two value capture mechanisms, also over the certainty of the 
provision of infrastructure to open up new sites for development, both requiring 
knowledge of developer decision making (Adams et al., 2008).  The relationship with 
local communities didn’t emerge strongly in either of the case studies, but the 
mismatch between viability and the collection of funding with policy needs and spend 
is a problem which could increasingly involve communities. 
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The lack of trust is apparent across all three arenas, reflecting the differing cultures, 
values and objectives of the different actors, also the differing professional training 
and education.  There is often misunderstandings between the different actors as 
well as lack of trust, as shown by the double counting of spend issue, the mis trust of 
each other’s evidence and the general different approaches, one side believing the 
other are both unrealistic and don’t have the specialist knowledge and expertise, 
whilst the other side believe that the other are playing games and using their superior 
knowledge to influence the outcome in their favour.  This is reflective of other 
research of relationships between developers and planners (Adams et al., 2012a; 
Tait, 2012). 
The overall tactics of local authorities to deliver this CIL policy were also indicated by 
the policy making with contrasts in strategic approaches between the three different 
local authorities involved.  Newcastle City Council needing to retain s106 income had 
less ambition regarding the CIL rates not wanting to stop development, but also 
showing an awareness over maintaining relationships with developers who wanted to 
take advantage of the opportunity of attractive new sites opened up by the Core 
Strategy and who tacitly accepted the CIL as part of that opportunity.  Gateshead 
with neither the history of income from s106 nor the same level of attractive 
development sites, took a much lesser role and had a reduced involvement.  Durham 
were more ambitious in terms of the proposals for growth in the Local Plan especially 
around Durham City and also initially in terms of the CIL rate proposals, this was a 
much higher risk strategy and encountered difficulties as a result.  What is apparent 
is that whilst local factors within the local authorities differed and influenced the CIL 
policy making in each area, this was still within the framework of a very influential 
national policy within which the local authorities had to work and which produced 
cautious rates of CIL proposals. 
8.4 Conclusion 
The dominance of the “supporting growth” discourse was apparent within both case 
study areas and represented an important shift from capturing value from land value 
increases or from the development process to compensate communities and collect 
unearned income; to value capture framed by a need to support growth and new 
development, hence the need for a growth based Local Plan and CIL to fund 
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infrastructure only to support that growth.  The CIL policy is a growth policy and is 
about removing barriers to growth and new development, it is plan-led, even though it 
is capturing value from the development process.  The main national storylines 
support this by seeking to support in differing but complementary ways the different 
actors involved in the development process. 
At the local level the influence of the national storylines was still apparent although 
the “persuading communities” was perhaps less significant in the north east than it is 
likely to be in other areas of the country.  This of course could change as 
communities who are unhappy about having to accept new development as part of 
the Local Plan process may see CIL as a source of funding to compensate them 
when the CIL scheme is fully operational in their areas. 
Hajer (2006) describes Discourse Structuration as when the construction of the 
problem and the meaning attached it are dominated by one discourse.  In this case 
the “supporting growth” discourse seems to have achieved this dominance.  Hajer 
(2006) goes on to say that when the dominant discourse starts to influence practices 
and in turn has institutional effects then “Discourse Institutionalisation” is said to have 
been achieved.  The supporting growth discourse having placed delivery at the 
centre of policy making in this area, then having equated viability with delivery based 
on the assumption that delivery will be by the private sector, has influenced policy 
making practices as described above to such an extent that it seems significant 
Discourse Institutionalisation has also been achieved. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
9.1 Research aims, objectives, research questions 
This thesis employed a new approach to analysing value capture policy mechanisms.  
It highlights the impact on policy making practices of both a new value capture 
mechanism CIL, but also how it represents a shift in policy from a value capture for 
redistribution objectives towards value capture to support growth.  This also reflects a 
shift away from social town planning towards planning’s role in securing economic 
growth through land and property development. 
The main aim of the research was to better understand the viability assessment 
process as it operates in practice and the CIL as a policy offered an appropriate 
opportunity in which to undertake this research.  The objectives were twofold, firstly 
to identify the key features of value capture mechanisms which could then perhaps 
inform the design of future value capture mechanisms.  Secondly, the study of this 
policy making process in a local context presented an opportunity to consider how 
the national policy making assumptions of rational decision making and viability as a 
techno-rational exercise actually turned out on the ground. 
The first research question addressed the process of how knowledge is generated 
and tested, in studying three separate but related arenas key to the CIL process, it 
became clear that specialist knowledge was especially important in the “calculating” 
arena, with the effect that it excluded some actors from the process and resulted in 
an asymmetry of knowledge and evidence between actors.  The control and 
ownership of this specialist knowledge and evidence in turn influenced the testing 
process and policy making process.  This confirms the view that whilst the CIL policy 
is presented as a techno-rational decision making process it is in fact socially 
constructed and influenced by the institutional context.  National policy was also 
influential reflecting the shift to an emphasis on supporting growth and delivery.  This 
in turn impacts on both the skills of planners, needing to understand specialist 
knowledge around viability issues, but also the importance of relationships with other 
actors. 
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The second research question addressed this issue more specifically in relation to 
planners understanding of the operation of markets and decision making of 
developers as key actors.  The importance placed on viability and delivery in national 
policy makes the relationship between planners and various other key actors in the 
CIL process particularly important.  The increasing commercialisation of planning 
requires planners to understand their role as “market actors”, in spite of the skills, 
knowledge and cultural challenges that may involve.  The research examined various 
relationships and the issue of lack of trust and misunderstandings between actors 
was revealed reflecting their different objectives, education and values.  The 
research also revealed differing strategic approaches by local authorities and how 
this interacted with national policy within a local context and impacted on policy 
making. 
9.2 Key contributions 
There are several areas where the thesis has contributed to existing areas of 
research, these are in relation to the research methodology approach; the viability 
assessment process; the impact on planning practice and on the comparison 
between CIL and other value capture mechanisms.  With also proposals on how 
policy making for this subject of value capture may be improved into the future. 
Methodologically the linking of the Rydin (2007) concept of planning decision making 
as a series of arenas where knowledge claims are tested, with the Hajer (2006) 
approach of using an interpretive policy approach of discourse analysis to uncover 
policy meanings and practices is particularly appropriate to this subject area.  It is 
believed that discursive mechanisms such as storylines, which combine knowledge 
claims and arguments together to influence policy practices usefully illustrate how 
knowledge is generated, tested and in turn influences practices.  The designation of 
three main arenas for these discursive struggles between storylines and tropes has 
assisted the analysis, although it is acknowledged that there is some overlap 
between the different arenas.  Each arena has a particular focus and tangible output 
document, the approach has been helpful in uncovering the knowledges used, the 
practices influenced and the characteristics and behaviours of the actors involved in 
them.  Whilst this policy analysis approach has been employed in other subject areas 
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(Hajer, 1996; Kern, 2009; Hajer, 2010; Hewitt, 2011) it has not been applied in the 
contested policy area of value capture. 
The three arenas identified in the case studies also fit well with the history of policy in 
value capture, as the issues of the calculation of the development value, how it is 
shared out between the different actors to the development process and how the 
collected funding are to be spent, have always been central to the effectiveness and 
delivery of policy in this area as will be discussed later. 
The viability assessment process is very much at the centre of the CIL decision-
making process as set out by national policy guidance.  The role and importance of 
the viability assessment has been considered in (McAllister et al., 2013; 
Christophers, 2014; McAllister et al., 2015) the research suggest that the viability 
assessment as a calculative practice does have a performative effect, by embedding 
certain key assumptions as beyond challenge.  The fixing of the 20% profit on Gross 
Development Value as an example which couldn’t be challenged in the Durham case 
study.  The calculative practice suggests an objectivity and accuracy that in reality is 
not the case (McAllister et al., 2015).  The whole process in fact is socially 
constructed and influenced by the knowledge and evidence available to various 
actors in the process.  As an example in the Newcastle/Gateshead case study the 
quality of the Council’s evidence was questioned by other actors who had access to 
and control of more and better evidence.  In discussions in Durham there was greater 
trust in the evidence supplied by consultants and agents than by the Council. 
The viability models and tools are also complex and require specialist knowledge and 
expertise to be operated, this meant that local authority planners had to rely on 
consultant support.  These sophisticated software models make forecasts about the 
future and appear accurate, but depend on the assumptions and evidence input.  In 
Durham the viability model eventually showed most of the County as not being viable 
for development when on the ground development was taking place, leading to the 
local authority planners becoming very disillusioned about an artificial process.  
These models are always forward looking and making forecasts about the future but 
can be used to influence policy making. 
The view of Christophers (2014) is that they have become more than analytical tools 
to try and predict the future, and have become more performative in nature, the 
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model determining the outcomes, with the actors merely inputters of data.  The 
research didn’t compare appraisal models in enough detail to support this, but the 
choice of software or model, is important and even with the same input assumptions 
and evidence may produce different results due to different software algorithms.  The 
confidentiality of some models makes comparisons difficult and often an agreed 
model is used and the main negotiation is about the inputs, this is reflected in both 
case studies. 
The contrast in the two case studies over the software model used is also indicative 
of the performative nature of the viability appraisal.  The software was built and run 
in-house in Newcastle/Gateshead but by an external consultant in Durham.  This 
showed the importance of control over the appraisal process in Newcastle.  In 
Durham the greater use of consultant support over time reflected the lack of 
confidence of the local authority planners and the need to use the reputation of the 
consultant in the engagement process. 
The performative effect of the viability appraisal in how it starts to frame policy 
choices has been outlined earlier.  This supports the research regarding the reduced 
discretion available to local authority planners in decision making (Gunn and Vigar, 
2012; Vigar, 2012).  CIL is therefore part of a wider policy trend in this respect.  The 
potential conflict between viability and policy requirements highlighted in both cases 
also reflects the tension between the values of local authority planners and what may 
have to be accepted.  The research suggests that whilst the decision making 
discretion is reduced, the importance placed on viability as a techno-rational decision 
over policy requirements challenges planners not just in terms of skills but also in 
terms of their values, culture and identity, similarly as suggested in (Henneberry, 
2016).  Disillusionment with the whole viability assessment process as both artificial 
and being a game in the Durham case study supports this concern about viability and 
its impact on planning practice.  With greater specialist knowledge of building 
economics, more evidence on costs and values the developers had power to 
influence policy discussions using this asymmetry of knowledge. 
This introduction of commercial considerations and viability assessments is not 
confined to the CIL process, it has increasingly been part of the S106 process, 
researched by (Campbell and Henneberry, 2005) amongst others.  This challenges 
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the nature of the planning system as a whole from one of social planning to one of 
being primarily to support economic growth as discussed earlier.  It also challenges 
the skills, values and culture of local authority planners, requiring them to consider 
commercial considerations as well as the public good, which has been resisted by 
some planners (Campbell and Henneberry, 2005).  The practical collaboration 
process generates a socially constructed meaning of the policy which is reflected in 
both cases by a cautious setting of the CIL rates, resulting from the collaboration 
process (Davoudi, 2015).  This has been studied using an interpretive approach to 
seek to understand the social construction of meaning in the policy making process. 
The research has provided an alternative approach to studying the area of value 
capture and viability assessment, recognising that it is socially constructed in nature, 
rather than as often presented a techno-rational exercise.  The socially constructed 
nature of the policy making acknowledges the influence of relationships between 
actors on the process and in turn the power held by the different actors.  This is 
illustrated by the cautious level of rates set by Newcastle realising the reliance on 
private developers to continue developing in the city.  In Durham the power of the 
Council in setting high CIL rates caused a strong response by the private sector, 
which illustrates that the hierarchical power of government whilst less than previously 
is still such that it has the ability to pursue policy objectives and takes a concerted 
effort from other actors to stop.  Had the market conditions been less challenging 
there may have been less of an effort to resist the proposals, accordingly whilst the 
findings suggest that Council’s will pursue cautious CIL rates there may be more 
room for ambition depending on the market context. 
Finally, this prompts the reflection as to whether this approach of considering the 
micro-politics within the key arenas could be developed into a framework with which 
to analyse different value capture mechanisms and in other institutional contexts.  
The framework has demonstrated that the viability assessment process is socially 
constructed in nature and that in practice planners are currently disadvantaged in 
policy making involving viability assessments in three key respects.  Firstly, viability 
assessments by their very nature use the tools of developers and accordingly 
developers have therefore more knowledge and experience in using these tools.  
Secondly, the national policy context has increasingly emphasised the need to 
support growth and new development and the need to facilitate new development 
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coming forward, to remove barriers.  This has caused planners to have much 
reduced discretion and to have to accept development on whatever basis.  In the CIL 
policy there has been reduced discretion over setting the rate and the need to not 
stop development coming forward.  Finally, the policy guidance has also required 
greater collaboration with developers strengthening the developer’s position.  The 
greater reliance on evidence to support the decision making on rates also 
strengthened the developer’s position having most of the evidence. 
This approach could be used in combination with more quantitative analysis 
providing detailed behavioural input into the rational decision making assumptions of 
the quantitative approaches.  As discussed earlier the three main arenas studied in 
relation to the CIL policy making process map well on to the key areas by which the 
effectiveness of value capture mechanisms can be considered (Oxley, 2004a).  
Bringing this together more formally could be helpful in studying value capture 
mechanisms further and could be an area of future research. 
9.3 Effectiveness of Value Capture Mechanisms 
In light of the review of value capture policy in the UK context and the assessment of 
national taxation and Planning Obligations mechanisms using the framework set out 
in chapter 2, (Oxley, 2004a).  Four main areas were highlighted that need to be 
considered when looking at the effectiveness of value capture policy.  These are the 
calculation of the value, the sharing out (or capture) of the value, the spending of the 
captured value and the governance of the approach.  It is appropriate to compare the 
CIL policy against the other mechanisms using this same framework. 
The calculation of the value, this is a fundamental issue to any value capture 
mechanism, but with significantly different approaches for the three main 
mechanisms.  The national betterment taxation approach is derived from using actual 
transaction values (or valuations as an alternative), to provide transaction and site 
specific value to be captured.  A completely different approach is taken in relation to 
Planning Obligations, this policy only considers the value to be captured if the 
spending is considered to be so high as to require a level of value not available within 
the site or the proposal.  This mechanism starts from a cost basis whereas the 
national taxation starts from a value basis.  The CIL also starts from a value basis but 
instead of a site by site approach it seeks to take an area wide approach with 
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generalised values rather than site specific details.  The value is calculated in terms 
of head room, within which some value can be captured for spending on 
infrastructure.  The area wide assessment is a particularly problematic area for CIL 
and a major arena for contestation as not based on actual or site specific information. 
The capturing of value, is also fundamental to any value capture mechanism, the 
national taxation approach is based on setting a percentage rate to be applied on the 
value figure, it has been even as high as 100% on occasions, which reflects the 
context of those policies as based on a taxation of unearned value, usually land 
value uplift, driven by the objective of redistributing this to other parties.  Planning 
Obligations take a very different approach, being cost driven rather than value driven.  
They only really consider this capture of value (or sharing of the value by the public 
sector to fund infrastructure), when the costs requested start to impact on the viability 
of a project, when negotiations take place, on the basis of site specific costs and 
values.  In relation to CIL the capturing of value is determined by the setting of the 
rate for CIL as a charge, but must be set at a rate strongly influenced by viability.  
The TLV as a share to landowners, developers profit within the area based 
appraisals as the return to developers and an appropriate charge for the public 
sector.  The share of the development value captured by the public sector from CIL 
will be a much lower rate than under national taxation rates and lower than the 
capture from Planning Obligations which is very varied in any event and dependent 
on the market as well as quality of planning practice (Dunning et al., 2016). 
The spending of the captured value is also an important element to all value capture 
mechanism, the provision of infrastructure is one of several options for the collected 
funding.  In the case of the national betterment taxes they were driven by the notion 
of redistribution of the value generated, with the funding collected as national 
taxation, the issue of where it was to be spent and what on was not relevant.  
Planning Obligations were completely different, with the items of expenditure being 
the main driver of the discussion, the mechanism being about the mitigation of impact 
of the proposed development.  The spending of the captured value is the most 
important element and reflects the promotion of the policy, not as a tax on value, but 
rather as funding secured from the development to mitigate its impact, nevertheless, 
implicitly the funding has to be captured from value, even if not explicitly.  The CIL 
again has a different approach setting out infrastructure specifically linked to a growth 
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and Plan-led approach, but which may be only partially funded from CIL.  The 
hypothecation issue is ignored in the national taxation mechanism, it is very clear and 
direct in Planning Obligations and is somewhat problematic in CIL as the collection 
and spend are spatially separated.  Similarly, the Rational Nexus issue, is ignored by 
national taxation, it is again clear and direct under Planning Obligations with a legal 
contract covering the commitments, under CIL it is problematic as it may be only a  
small element of funding, the income is also uncertain and hence the spend. 
Finally, the governance of the mechanism is also important to the effectiveness of the 
different value capture mechanisms.  They can be national such as national taxation 
or local such as Planning Obligations and CIL, they can be site specific in terms of 
costs and values such as National Taxation or Planning Obligations or more widely 
applied such as CIL.  They can be negotiated between parties such as Planning 
Obligations or determined within a wider engagement process such as CIL, or by a 
national policy with little consultation such as National Taxation.  The governance 
also includes issues, such as what is the nature of the policy guidance, how 
prescriptive is it, how much flexibility and choice is there available.   What is the 
policy process, what knowledge and information is required, how is this generated, 
validated and challenged; by whom and in what arenas; what is the micro-politics 
between the various actors involved, who gains and who loses. 
The CIL policy presents a new approach in the English context, to these areas and 
has partly arisen as a response to the criticism of the s106 policy, which has 
curiously been retained anyway.  It also reflects the shift in the funding of strategic 
infrastructure to be funded more from the private sector and less from the public 
sector.  The policy has potentially many benefits over the other previous policy 
mechanisms, in terms of predictability, certainty, transparency and efficiency, but the 
increased complexity of the CIL policy changes have somewhat eroded those 
benefits.  It is an additional vehicle to capture extra funding from developments that 
didn’t contribute in the past.  The implicit assumption of seeking to reduce land 
values, an aspiration in the Barker Review (Barker, 2004) from the policy is rather 
more doubtful.  This appears to have virtually disappeared as an aspiration, always 
challenged by the policy contradiction of the TLV assessment which seeks to protect 
land values for landowners to maintain land supply. 
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What is more evident from this research is that the charge levels proposed will reflect 
the market context and will either be reflected in higher end use values in areas of 
high demand.  In areas of low demand where end use values cannot be increased 
then the return to the other three main actors will be reduced.  This is either the land 
value to the landowner, who may then not sell and therefore stop development going 
ahead; a lower profit level to the developer, who may then decide not to proceed 
again stopping development going ahead; or the amount recovered by any value 
capture mechanism to fund infrastructure.  This last element will not stop the 
development going ahead on a commercial basis, but will reduce the funding of 
mitigation measures or infrastructure provision.  At a time where the main policy 
objective is delivery, where the assumption is that delivery is by the private sector, 
the main pressure for any reduction will be on heavily on the value capture element. 
In addressing the earlier research objective of identifying the key features of value 
capture mechanisms, four features can be set out as follows.  Firstly, the 
conceptualisation of value capture as either an explicit taxation of value, or more an 
implicit tax being linked to the costs of infrastructure provision or mitigation of impact.  
This feature is linked to the wider issue of the funding and delivery of infrastructure, 
by the state and the availability of resources at a national or local level.  It is also 
about the political perception of the share of land value retained by the landowner; 
the current English position is to avoid explicit taxation.  Secondly, the timing and 
certainty of the operation of the mechanism, the greater the certainty and the earlier 
in the development process the value capture mechanism, then the more it may be 
able to be accommodated in any negotiations between developers and landowners 
and therefore reduce land values.  Conversely, the greater the level of uncertainty 
then the better the opportunity to negotiate more value from the development 
process by the public sector.  This is provided the mechanism is not too late in the 
development process, when the land price is already fixed and then the developers 
profit and value capture mechanism are in direct negotiation.  As seen in CIL a fixed 
levy early in the development process is more cautious in the level of value capture 
compared to negotiated s106 agreements later in the development process, this 
does also depend on market conditions and the performance of the LPA in its 
practices.  Thirdly, if the nature of the value assessment is based on real figures, 
then the value capture mechanism is likely to be more effective.  But again this 
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depends on being later in the development process and involves greater uncertainty, 
delay and costs than more generalised hypothetical assessments, with the need for 
more resources.  The balance between the costs of a site by site negotiated 
approach and its opportunity to secure more value capture from the process, has to 
be balanced against the higher costs involved to all parties in its operation. From the 
private sectors viewpoint the uncertainty and costs are the basis of their criticism of 
the s106 mechanism but the basis on real figures has the advantage of realism in a 
real development appraisal even if not necessarily reflected in the land value.  The 
CIL whilst more certain and predictable may impact on reducing land values over 
time, but this is still unknown.  What is clear from this research is that developers 
often argue for higher land values within the viability assessment to ensure the 
continuity of land supply rather than the policy pushing down land values.  Finally, the 
application of a value capture mechanism universally to all new development is also 
a key point, it will collect more funding but has to be a lower rate than may be 
negotiated site by site, it will also always be perceived as more of a tax.  There is 
also then the question of how the rate is determined, nationally or locally and with 
what methodology.  A key criterion with CIL was simplicity but over time it has 
become more and more complex. 
Perhaps a better solution is to share the risk and reward between the parties, 
acknowledging that landowners, developers and the state/community are all needed 
to bring forward new development and perhaps all need to have a financial 
contribution and stake in the success of the development and the market 
uncertainties over time.  The capture of value would then reflect the real world 
outcome of the development, but relies on the need for site by site negotiation and an 
agreement between the parties monitoring openly.  The resources and expertise 
required would be higher, but it may provide more return to the public sector if a 
longer term partnership mechanism were established.  Conversely it may also 
provide for a later payment of the value capture in the development process and only 
when the actual position was clear, if the market worsened there would be a safety 
net for the developer rather than the stalling of a site forcing the need to renegotiation 
of developer contributions, to allow the site to restart.  If the market improved some of 
the super profit could be shared with other parties as true sharing of risk. 
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Whilst in principle this may work, it will require three key changes, a culture of 
openness and trust between the parties over the period of development, extra 
resources and expertise from the public sector and the commitment to share risk and 
reward, all of which are potential barriers to its operation, similar to the operation of 
all value capture mechanisms. 
9.4 Reflections on the research process 
The approach has explicitly taken an interpretive policy analysis approach seeking to 
uncover meanings and the power relations between different actors involved in the 
policy making process.  This approach assumes that the production of knowledge is 
socially constructed from the interactions between actors and contrasts with the more 
traditional quantitative approaches usually employed to research in this area.  The 
approach also sought to consider the institutional context at a local level, in contrast 
with the classical economic assumptions often underpinning much of national policy 
making which assume rational decision making when in local contexts things are 
often more complex. 
The choice of case study areas has been determined by the available access to key 
actors in the policy making process in the two areas, which have enabled a depth of 
material to be secured.  This has nevertheless introduced two other issues, firstly the 
positionality of the researcher and his former professional relationships in the area, 
which have been carefully considered within the interview and analysis process.  
Secondly, the research of two case studies, is also limited in whether these findings 
can be generalised on a wider basis (Yin, 2009).  The research has analysed two 
specific cases in a geographic area with challenging economic and market 
conditions, whilst this was considered to be helpful in research question 1 revealing 
particularly clearly the contested nature of the discussion over viability, it is not 
necessarily representative of a typical case for CIL policy implementation across 
England. 
The research is also limited in that it covered a restricted timescale, and due to 
delays in the policy implementation and unexpected occurrences in the case study 
areas didn’t proceed as anticipated.  Accordingly whilst the original hope had been to 
study the whole CIL process for the two areas, in fact this was not possible as in 
Durham the Local Plan and CIL processes were halted by the interim report form the 
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Local Plan inspector (Harold Stephens – Development Plan Inspector, 2015).  In 
Newcastle/Gateshead the process has been start/stop and was not restarted until 
March 2015.  The research has still however provided a useful snapshot of the policy 
making process over a three year period from 2011 to 2015, and the challenges of 
policy making in this field.  Whilst the research has focused on the CIL policy making 
process, this has been used as a vehicle to investigate wider policy making 
processes of value capture and viability assessment, in a changing planning policy 
picture. 
The operationalisation of the methodology was also quite challenging, the 
identification of storylines and tropes was not always straightforward and the subject 
of much deliberation and refinement over the period.  An example of this was in 
identifying national and local storylines and tropes and then how they interacted to 
influence policy practices.  The Hajer methodology did provide a useful approach to 
trying to analysing the policy making process within the two case studies and some 
practical assistance on how to operationalise the methodology was assisted by two 
other research theses (Kern, 2009; Hewitt, 2011) and also from (Sharp and 
Richardson, 2001).  The Hajer (2006) ten step methodology whilst helpful, has been 
employed as a general guide rather than as a detailed process, some of the steps 
are challenging to operationalise as others have also indicated (Hewitt, 2011) and is 
more applicable to longer term changes in national policy than shorter periods of 
analysis.  The final step requiring a return to the actors to reflect on the data has not 
been undertaken due to the practical issue that in both case studies things have 
moved on such that in Durham the CIL and Local Plan process has completely 
stalled and in Newcastle the process has proceeded rapidly through the stages from 
April 2015 and to review this earlier part of the process would be difficult due to 
having been completely overtaken by practical events in the real world. 
The Hajer methodology is perhaps more applicable to the analysis of a longer term 
policy making periods, was useful to determine the powerful influence of the 
“supporting growth” discourse at a national policy level (set out in chapter 5), from the 
commissioning of the Barker report in 2003 up to 2015.  At a local case study level 
(in chapter 6 and 7) it has been and has assisted in uncovering influences on policy 
practices in a local context and in turn reveal some of the behaviours of key actors. 
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It is hoped that the findings from the research can have some relevance to value 
capture as a subject area in a more generic way, in identifying local level micro 
political relationships and how they may relate to strategic areas of policy debate.  
The three arenas identified and analysed are generic to all types of value capture 
mechanism and may provide a framework to compare different mechanism in 
differing contexts to assist future policy development in this field. 
9.5 Future areas of research 
A consideration of CIL policy making over a longer time period to cover the whole 
process in the case studies and elsewhere would be valuable, especially in being 
able to track the impact of the changes in national policy over a longer period.  In 
addition, a consideration of a greater number of case studies would also be useful 
perhaps to be able to make comparisons between the policy making process in areas 
of differing economic and market conditions. 
The impact of the viability assessment process on the overall policy making process 
as a whole, the relationship between the two could also be an area of future 
research.  The promoted rationality of the viability assessment process and how it 
interacts with the wider policy discussion and the framing of policy priorities could 
also be considered further. 
The approach taken in this research to employ an interpretive approach to seek to 
understand the process of the social construction of viability assessments could 
perhaps be employed more widely to viability assessments in other policy contexts, 
as a way to analyse what has traditionally often been viewed as a technical and 
rational decision making process.  The use of the interpretive and quantitative 
approaches in a complementary way may provide a useful area of future research.   
This research has revealed the socially constructed nature of the viability 
assessment process especially when considered in a local context; it is influenced by 
the knowledge and power of the parties involved.  National policy making however 
still uses classical economic models and assumptions of rational behaviour as the 
basis of policy making, as has also been seen this can lead to unforeseen outcomes 
and consequences at a local level.  Assumptions of practices and behaviours from 
the national policy may not playout as envisaged in a local context, especially as the 
local contexts vary so considerably, in terms of economic and market conditions, the 
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differing expertise and resources of local actors, and the differing micro-politics and 
relationships between local actors. 
The use of the three arenas as a framework in other case studies in other contexts 
could provide a more nuanced view of the local decision making of actors taking 
account of the micro-politics and behaviours as highlighted earlier.  This in turn could 
perhaps better inform future national policy making decisions in this area, and move 
away from a reliance on a classical rationalist approach and inform policy making 
based on a more socially constructed model, in turn perhaps helping to construct 
better value capture mechanisms which can operate in differing local contexts. 
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